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Latin American countries are faced with a complex economic situation caused 
by lower growth and the prevailing uncertainty in the global economy. Although the 
region has solid macroeconomic foundations to withstand possible drops in aggregate 
demand in the short term, the medium-term outlook is less favourable than in the 
previous decade. Because of more sluggish growth in external demand and volatile raw-
material prices, on which Latin American economies remain over-dependent, structural 
weaknesses will impede higher, more inclusive economic growth in the coming years. 
To meet these challenges and consolidate recent progress, especially in reducing 
poverty and inequalities, support must be given for a structural change to boost 
diversification of the economy, raise productivity and narrow the production and 
technology gaps. To achieve these objectives, the region’s governments ought to 
redouble their efforts in designing and implementing more and better policies in the 
areas of production development, innovation, finance and education. Co-operation and 
economic integration among countries can also be effective tools to create the mutual 
learning and dynamism needed in the current context. 
These questions are addressed in this publication, Latin American Economic Outlook 
2013, which has been produced thanks to the joint efforts of the Development Centre of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The report puts forward 
policies aimed at making Latin American small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
agents of change by increasing their productivity and competitiveness and enabling 
them to fully utilise their potential to create good-quality jobs. 
The overriding message of this report is that policies designed for SMEs – either to 
modernise those that exist or create new firms involved in activities with a higher added 
value and introducing them into the market – should keep in view that SMEs and their 
environment are highly diverse. 
The report discusses experiences and best practices both in Latin America and the 
OECD and proposes specific policies to promote production linkages, regional development, 
access to international markets and participation in global value chains. To meet its long-
term challenges, Latin America also needs to implement policies to give SMEs greater 
access to sources of finance, enable them to improve their skills and human resources, 
and promote innovation in the use of information and communication technologies.
We hope the report – presented at the 22nd Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State 
and Government in Cadiz – will contribute to the debate on policy options to enhance 
the role of Latin American SMEs.
Alicia Bárcena  
Executive Secretary 
Economic Commission for 




Organisation for Economic 
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Latin America will have relatively strong growth in the short term, and if 
necessary there is room for countercyclical action. However, the picture 
for the medium term is more complex. A decline in external demand will 
expose the limitations of the current growth pattern, which is based on low 
added value and on exports of natural resources in many countries in the 
region. Latin American governments must act now, in line with their short-
term macroeconomic policies, to strengthen productive structures and 
overcome the problems of structural heterogeneity through diversification 
and development. Latin American small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) can become catalysts for this structural change and productivity 
growth. An effort of this nature requires a new approach to public policies 
for SMEs. For these policies to be effective, there must be greater coherence 
and co-ordination among infrastructure policies, the provision of services, 
and sectoral policies. In particular, policies in the areas of finance, skills 
and training, systems for innovation and the dissemination of technology, 
and productive linkage policies can help SMEs overcome their obstacles. 
Policies must be designed in a way that takes into consideration the 
specificities of sectors, institutions and regions. They must also consider 
the heterogeneity of all SMEs, since different firms have very different 
development needs and potential. Many of these tasks require institutions 
that are able to lead complex processes while being flexible to adapt to the 
changing requirements of the productive sector.
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The economic outlook for Latin America remains relatively positive, but is subject to 
uncertainty and volatility because of the wider external context.
After nearly a decade of continuous expansion, interrupted only in 2009, the most 
recent projections indicate growth of 3.2% in 2012 and 4.0% in 2013. These figures indicate 
an economic slowdown relative to recent performance, which would be accompanied 
by a decline in inflation.  In the short term, this scenario would mean the economy is 
likely to perform well compared to the rest of the world, providing continued economic 
stability in the region. In the global economy, sluggish growth is expected in 2012 and 
2013 due to fiscal problems, financial fragility and high unemployment in the euro area. 
Additionally, although the US economy is seeing higher growth than the euro area, 
economic consolidation is still weak and there remains a risk of a sharp contraction in 
fiscal strength in 2013. In addition to the slow growth of developed countries there will 
be a slight slowdown in the Chinese and Indian economies, which have been key drivers 
of global growth, especially in Latin America. 
In the short term, trade will be hit hardest, but if necessary there is room for fiscal 
and monetary policies to soften the blow.
The impact will vary from country to country, depending on how diversified its 
export products and destinations are and the size and dynamism of the domestic market. 
In turn, a decline in international prices of certain raw materials would affect many 
countries in the region that export such materials, with their trade balance deteriorating 
and fiscal revenue dropping, although it would provide relief for net importers of food 
and fuel, especially Central American and Caribbean countries. While there is risk that 
a reversal in capital inflows might hurt the financial sector, the region has substantially 
increased its international reserves, which account for around 16% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) on average. Many Latin American countries have relatively low external 
debt, their debt is relatively low risk (short-term external debt made up around 15% of 
the region’s total debt) and they have good access to contingent lines of international 
liquidity. These factors should allow most countries to prevent a contraction in external 
financing from contributing to an economic downturn. Moreover, good macroeconomic 
performance and prudent management of macroeconomic policies in recent years have 
put the region in a strong position. For instance, if aggregate demand falls there is scope 
for fiscal stimulus thanks to relatively low government debt (39% of GDP on average) and 
generally well-balanced budgets (-1.8% of GDP on average). Also, in terms of monetary 
policy, inflation forecasts remain well grounded and the risks of overheating appear 
to be under control, thanks in particular to macroprudential and regulatory measures 
adopted by various countries in recent years. Therefore, there is scope for introducing an 
expansive policy if the external situation makes it necessary.
However, there are significant macroeconomic challenges that could affect economic 
growth in the medium term and sustain trends of low productivity, scant diversification 
of production and persistent structural heterogeneity.
There is great uncertainty regarding the next few years, as OECD countries deal 
with structural problems, since the institutional reforms and changes required are 
huge in many cases and will take a long time to implement. This uncertainty combined 
with the low interest rates that are expected in more advanced economies could cause 
highly volatile capital flows and raw-material prices, possibly causing exchange-rate 
fluctuations. This could damage the competitiveness of certain tradeable-goods sectors 
in the region, hinder the diversification of production and condition the capacity for 
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future growth. Higher capital inflows in the region, as has already been observed in 
recent years, could lead to unsustainable rises in the prices of certain assets or excessive 
credit expansion, causing macroeconomic imbalances that would significantly limit 
economic growth. Falling raw-material prices following the slowdown in Asian growth 
and the change in its composition could shrink the macroeconomic space available to 
finance measures to address structural weaknesses in the Latin American economies. 
This could, for example, happen through investment in infrastructure, which could 
increase the competitiveness of tradeable-goods sectors. Such a scenario would expose 
the limitations of Latin America’s production structure and the current growth pattern, 
which in many countries in the region is based on exports of natural resources. 
Therefore, coherence must be ensured between short-term stability-oriented policies 
and structural measures to enhance potential growth.
Greater regional integration is an effective response to sluggish growth in demand 
from developed countries. Better integration would also enable the region to develop 
dynamic competitive advantages in non-traditional sectors and activities and increase 
the diversification of its exports. Economic policy has various tools to protect against 
the risks of currency appreciation and volatile prices of raw materials. Depending on the 
causes and nature of the currency appreciations, these tools, which include exchange-
rate interventions, macroprudential regulations and fiscal policy, can make the rest 
of the tradeable-goods sector more competitive. Investment could be channelled into 
infrastructure, innovation and human capital, which would help transform and diversify 
production. Institutions and fiscal instruments such as stabilisation funds and fiscal 
rules can be useful for stemming currency fluctuations and creating sustainable fiscal 
space for additional investment.
A more integrated approach to public policy to empower SMEs as agents of structural 
change
SMEs have a key role to play in enhancing Latin America’s potential growth. 
But SMEs are highly heterogeneous in terms of access to markets, technologies and 
human capital, as well as their linkages with other firms, and these factors affect their 
productivity, export capacity and potential growth.
On the one hand, SMEs are a fundamental building-block of the productive structure, 
accounting for around 99% of businesses and employing around 67% of employees. But 
on the other hand, they contribute relatively little to GDP, which reflects their low levels 
of productivity. For instance, large companies in the region reach levels of productivity 
which are as much as  33 times greater than those of microenterprises (vs. 2.4 times in 
OECD countries) and are up to 6 times more productive than small firms (vs. 1.6 times in 
OECD countries). Furthermore, levels of internationalisation for SMEs in Latin America 
are significantly lower than in Europe and East Asia. For instance, while only around 10% 
of Latin American SMEs engage in export activities, 40% of European SMEs do so. Within 
this productive context, well-designed co-ordination policies are essential to ensuring 
that production is diversified, which is one of the region’s major structural challenges. 
Latin American SMEs are highly heterogeneous, ranging from sole traders running 
informal microenterprises to highly efficient innovative companies with the capacity 
to export products. If a set of coherent, co-ordinated policies is introduced, SMEs could 
contribute to structural change by helping to improve productivity, complementing 
the economies of scale of large firms fostering the creation of production clusters (and 
contributing to social inclusion). 
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Public policies should support the development of SMEs in order to close the gaps 
with larger enterprises, with the objective of supporting SMEs as catalysts of structural 
change. 
To accomplish this, SME policies should consider six relevant dimensions: 
1)  First, in addition to their small size, a frequent problem SMEs confront is their 
inability to achieve economies of scale or the necessary specialisation. Because 
these firms are isolated, policies are often more effective when: a) they focus 
on the full production cluster or value chain into which SMEs are integrated; 
b) the policy intervention is adjusted to the type of company, taking into account 
its different policy needs; differentiating, for instance, between microenterprises 
operating in the local market and an incipient cluster of competitive companies 
that exports products. There are no blanket solutions, and interventions must be 
specifically adapted to the production chain, cluster or region. 
2)  Second, given the significant interactions and complementarities among policies, 
a high level of co-ordination is needed among sectoral policies, including 
infrastructure policy and the provision of services to remove the bottlenecks 
affecting the productive development of SMEs and their sphere of influence. 
Furthermore, it is of critical importance to facilitate the integration of these policies 
into other overarching policy areas such as industrial policy and innovation policy, 
as well as the national development strategy.
3)  Third, in addition to these improvements to horizontal co-ordination, greater 
vertical co-ordination is also necessary given the role that local and regional actors 
play in policies that support production clusters and chains at the sub-national 
level. For example, instruments should be operated in a decentralised manner to 
ensure they reach the intended beneficiaries throughout the country.
4)  Fourth, given the long maturation period, policies must have specific objectives 
that are sustained over time. More than being intensive in financial resources, these 
policies must provide specific inputs and services with monitoring and assessment 
mechanisms so they can be tweaked and fine-tuned accordingly. For instance, 
co-ordination policy initiatives should be accompanied by a business plan 
with a clear timeframe. Such a plan requires a regulatory framework, including 
a monitoring system, a set of regulations and a favourable macroeconomic 
environment. 
5)  Fifth, better co-ordination is needed among economic actors. With financial 
restrictions limiting the scope of public policy and a need for investment that is 
often beyond the capacities of individual companies, incorporating associative 
actions into programmes for SMEs provides an opportunity to reduce transaction 
costs. The fixed cost of support activities will thus be shared among a larger 
number of beneficiaries, boosting efficiency and coverage. Creating opportunities 
for co-operation among firms stimulates competitive advantages and externalities 
that will help consolidate and drive forward business modernisation. The main 
objectives of these partnership programmes to support SMEs are: a) to distribute 
information on markets and technologies; b) to adopt new techniques and 
technologies; c) to find and develop processes for the exchange and complementing 
of resources, knowledge and skills; d) to build up trust so actors will come together 
and engage in dialogue.
6)  Finally, the integration of production clusters into global value chains (GVCs) 
presents opportunities for SMEs. The global production structure has moved 
towards internationally integrated production systems. This segmentation of the 
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production process can provide SMEs in the region with new opportunities to access 
new markets, especially those firms that operate in small domestic markets. The 
integration of clusters and business networks into GVCs can help SMEs diversify 
exports, create new jobs and acquire new technological capacities in accordance 
with international best practices, thereby strengthening competitiveness. However, 
this integration into GVCs also presents challenges. The distributional effects and 
spillovers to domestic economies are not automatically guaranteed. Whether SMEs 
seek to improve their product, production process or function in the chain depends 
on several factors such as governance of the chain and the specific characteristics 
of the sector. Despite the challenges these strategies present, governments, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational enterprises in the region are 
expanding their activities and programmes to support the inclusion of the region’s 
SMEs in GVCs through various policies, such as supplier development programmes, 
better access to information on external markets and existing chains in the country, 
as well as training programmes within universities and businesses to provide 
specific skills required at different stages of the production within these chains.
The above considerations combine elements of industrial policy and regional 
development policy and define the main characteristics of an SME policy; however, there 
are also synergies with other policy areas.
Three areas of intervention are particularly useful for removing bottlenecks for the 
development of SMEs in Latin America:
•	  access to finance 
•	  innovation and technology policies, especially access to information and 
communication technologies (ICTs)
•	  the development of skills and human capital
Reducing the financing gap for SMEs: new instruments and public policy
Access to finance is one of the principal barriers limiting the development of SMEs.
 SMEs in the region receive only 12% of the total credit in the region, while in OECD 
countries SMEs are the recipients of 25% of total credit. One-third of small businesses 
in Latin America identify access to finance as a serious restriction. Long-term financing 
is also more expensive for SMEs, with high interest rates when compared to large 
enterprises, sometimes doubling the capital costs faced by the latter. This difference 
in cost is due in part to the transition of the region’s banking sector from a relational 
scheme into multi-service banks. The transition of the banking sector has led to a fall 
in net interest margins in Latin America to 8.6%, which is still considerably higher than 
the OECD area’s figure of 2.7%, revealing problems in the region’s financial structure 
and level of competition. While few small Latin American enterprises receive financing, 
the level of approval for loans to SMEs is relatively high (around 80% of applications in 
Brazil and Argentina are successful, for example). In short, the lack of financing in the 
region is not only a problem of insufficient supply or the availability of resources, but it 
also includes issues related to demand and self-exclusion. Other elements, including the 
ongoing asymmetry of information between the financial sector and SMEs, as well as the 
lack of collateral, show that new instruments are needed to provide innovative solutions 
to businesses’ requirements according to their sector of activity, stage of development 
or strategic potential. 
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In order to fill the gap in long-term financing provided by commercial banks, 
public financial institutions (PFI) are increasing their support to SMEs through various 
instruments, such as the provision of guarantees, long-term credit lines and other 
instruments adapted to the needs of SMEs. 
The participation of PFIs in Latin American banking systems is considerable, 
amounting to 23% of the loan portfolio in 2009 to the tune of USD 600 billion thanks to 
sustained annual growth of 15% in the 2000s. Furthermore, this has led to increased 
coverage by national guarantee systems. An interesting development is the growing 
supply of financial services provided by development banks that, beyond loans and 
guarantees, include products such as credit cards, electronic transaction systems 
and factoring. These services provide specific benefits to SMEs, in particular for those 
companies integrated with GVCs, by promoting increased liquidity, improving cash 
flow and reducing the risk of default. To facilitate the creation of new enterprises and 
improve access to credit for nascent businesses that encounter financing difficulties 
due to their lack of credit history, governments in the region have designed specific 
initiatives for the distinct stages of a business’s development (incubation, initiation, 
growth and consolidation). Programmes such as Financiadora de Estudios y Proyectos 
(FINEP) in Brazil, the entrepreneur programme Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) in Mexico, 
and the business angels network from Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO) 
in Chile combine different technical support instruments and actors (incubators, seed 
capital, angel investors and risk capital) in search of new ways to promote long-term 
investment.
Enhancing SME competitiveness through the incorporation of knowledge and the use 
of new technologies 
Within the innovative sphere, SMEs encounter significant barriers and demonstrate 
poor growth, which is aggravated by barriers in other areas.
In part this is due to the smaller size and lesser possibility of the productive use 
of technology. Given the high risks associated with innovative activities, SMEs need 
to associate and link more with other companies in order to innovate. In addition, 
other factors exist that block the innovative work of firms in Latin America, relating to 
the difficulties of credit access and the shortage of qualified personnel. For their part, 
Latin American companies have few linkages with the respective agents of national 
innovation systems, which illustrates the importance of co-ordinating different sectoral 
policies to boost SMEs’ systemic innovation capacity. There exist several challenges in 
designing public policies that foster innovation and the introduction of technology in 
the region, particularly in the areas of: infrastructure; investment in basic laboratories; 
human resources training to exploit new technology; and the establishment of specific 
programmes to promote business innovation in the SME segment.
More intensive use of ICTs can help SMEs augment their competitiveness, lower the 
costs of entering international markets and improve management. 
However, while access to basic ICT technology such as fixed and mobile telephones is 
at similar levels for SMEs and large enterprises in Latin America, there persist significant 
gaps between more advanced technologies, such as possessing websites or an intranet. 
For example, in Argentina 49% of small businesses have a website, in comparison to 83% 
of large enterprises. These gaps are even larger in Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Broadband 
access is critical to facilitate the efficient and productive use of ICTs, but the penetration 
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of fixed broadband access in the region is far below that of more developed nations. 
Therefore, there is significant room for creating policies aimed at improving broadband 
infrastructure, accessibility and the quality of service. Although most countries in the 
region have a digital agenda within their technology diffusion policies, only 11 countries 
in the region include a component of ICTs in their productive sectors.
Improving skills in the workforce and the connection between the education system 
and the productive sector
The region’s lag in education and skills represents one of the major challenges that 
SMEs are faced with. 
Low levels of training among the workforce and managers, the problems associated 
with the school dropout rate and the poor results achieved in the area of quality, as 
reflected in PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) assessments, 
constitute a major barrier to the development and improved productivity of SMEs 
Additionally, in this region there are big differences between the skills required by the 
production sector and the training provided by the education system. Indeed, almost 
37% of companies in the region believe finding a workforce with the necessary training 
is one of their main obstacles, a figure that is higher than the global average and the 
average for other developing regions. 
The difficulty in finding an adequately trained workforce affects SMEs in different 
ways, due to their heterogeneity and the specificity of required skills.  
The “skills gap” has a major impact on SMEs. How difficult it is to find the required 
workforce depends on several factors, including technological complexity, insertion into 
GVCs or export orientation. The type of capacities demanded by the SMEs in the region 
can be arranged in two groups: technical skills, which are closely linked to technological 
subjects and jobs in the new economy; and non-cognitive “soft skills”, where the region’s 
entrepreneurs face more deficiencies. These “soft skills” include aspects such as critical 
thinking, teamwork, problem-solving and change management, oral and written 
communication, responsibility at work, or the capacity to adapt to new environments.  
To overcome these limitations, better co-ordination is needed between the education 
system and the productive sector. 
Training deficiencies in the region pose a great challenge to SMEs, limiting their 
development and preventing productivity gains. Public policies are needed to help 
overcome these barriers. 
1)  First, one of the main recommendations for public policy must be to develop and 
strengthen the connection between the education system, especially in technical 
and vocational training, and the productive sector. This requires smooth dialogue 
between entrepreneurs, workers and instructors to develop mechanisms so 
that qualification needs can be defined jointly and the skills demanded by the 
job market can be anticipated. Brazil’s existing vocational training system is an 
excellent example of this type of strategy, though there are other examples in the 
region. Furthermore, countries in the region should promote training paths that 
combine classroom and workplace training which continue over the course of a 
worker’s adult life – much like the successful German dual-model system.
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2)  Second, the syllabus for technical and vocational training must be broadened and 
strengthened. Certain skills need bolstering, especially “soft skills” – including 
generic, cross-cutting skills – in the curriculum, since these skills will enable 
workers to be effectively integrated into employment. Moreover, these skills allow 
workers to adapt to the changing demands of the job market and to work in a 
professional environment in which technology is increasingly being used. Also it is 
important to bolster the professionalisation of management and senior executives 
in SMEs by focusing more on training for this sector.
3)  Finally, it is necessary to establish or strengthen the institutional structure, 
which provides incentives for SMEs to provide in-house training for their staff 
in conjunction with external training programmes. Reference frameworks are 
needed to better define and compare qualifications and accreditation systems for 
the recognition of practical training. SME networks are therefore needed to spark 
synergies and exploit economies of scale, develop tax incentives for training and 
increase the use of ICTs in training programmes.




This chapter analyses the main macroeconomic trends in Latin 
America for the next few years. In the short term, Latin America 
will continue to witness moderate economic growth amid strong 
uncertainty worldwide. Countries in the region have some fiscal and 
monetary space they can use to deal with falls in aggregate demand. 
But current forecasts suggest that developed countries are on the 
verge of a long period of sluggish growth. In response, countries in 
the region would do well to make sure their policies to stabilise the 
economy are consistent with the actions they need to take to boost 
medium-term growth while transforming the production structure. 
Region-wide, greater trade integration could be an effective response 
to poor demand from developed countries and would at the same time 
allow non-traditional sectors and activities to boost their competitive 
advantages. Special attention should be paid to currency fluctuations, 
which in several countries could threaten the competitiveness of 
goods that are not linked to commodities. Identifying the causes of 
these fluctuations and using the appropriate instruments to mitigate 
them is one of the challenges faced by current macroeconomic 
policies. 
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Introduction
This chapter presents the macroeconomic outlook for Latin America, addressing 
the short-term future as well as more structural aspects. The chapter is composed 
of five sections. First, it briefly examines the impact that the prevailing situation of 
sluggish growth, high uncertainty and volatility in the global economy is having on 
Latin America and the Caribbean’s economic growth, inflation, employment and wages. 
The next section analyses how prepared the region is to deal with trade shocks and 
financial shocks from other parts of the world in the short term. The third section looks 
at the space for fiscal and monetary policy in the region to act counter-cyclically and the 
specific tools countries can use. Next, the chapter considers the medium-term outlook 
in view of the forecasts of weak external demand and discusses its effects on the region. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief recap before proposing the main challenge for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, which is how to sustain economic growth amid the 
poor, uncertain external outlook.
The economic situation in Latin America 
and the international environment
Moderate growth will continue in the region in 2012 amid high uncertainty and 
volatility, primarily from the external sector. According to the latest growth projections, 
the region’s gross domestic product (GDP) will grow by around 3.2% in 2012 and 4.0% in 
2013 (ECLAC, 2012a). These are good figures for the region compared to previous years 
and especially when compared to projections for more developed economies, where far 
more sluggish growth is expected. We must remember these figures are highly uncertain 
and subject to complex risks that make it hard to evaluate and quantify what impact 
they will have on the region’s economies. 
Latin America and the Caribbean will grow around 3.2% in 2012 
and 4.0% in 2013.
Latin America and the Caribbean will record growth of 3.2% in 2012 and 4.0% in 
2013.There are signs that growth and inflation are slowing in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, despite the job market remaining strong. In the first quarter of 2012, the 
slowdown in GDP was less severe than in previous quarters (Table 1.1), helped by 
domestic demand. Generally, private consumption continued to expand, and it accounts 
for most of the growth in the region’s GDP in 2011. Private consumption was helped by 
improving job markets, with more and better-quality new jobs and higher wages, and by 
sustained credit growth to the private sector. In the early months of 2012 inflation fell in 
most countries, continuing the downward trend that began in the last quarter of 2011. 
In July 2012, average year-on-year inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean stood at 
5.5%, down from 6.7% and 7.0% respectively in March and December 2011. 
Falling international commodity prices caused a slowdown in the growth of exports 
in the first quarter of 2012, although this was offset somewhat by remittances and 
tourism. This slowdown began in the third quarter of 2011 in most countries. The year-
on-year rate of change in exports for the region fell from 29.3% in the second quarter of 
2011 to 10.4% in the first quarter of 2012. Exports to the European Union (EU) have fallen 
sharply since the start of 2011. 
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Table 1.1. Indicators of economic activity in Latin America and the Caribbeana, 2011-12
(percentage changes compared to same quarter the previous year)
2011 2012
I II III IV I II
Argentina 9.9 9.1 9.3 7.3 5.2 0.0b
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 5.6 4.2 5.4 5.5 5.1 5.1c
Brazild 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.4 0.8 0.5
Chile 9.9 6.3 3.7 4.5 5.3 5.5b
Colombiad 5.0 5.1 7.5 6.1 4.7 4.9
Costa Rica 1.9 3.6 4.6 5.4 7.9 5.7b
Dominican Republicd 4.3 3.6 4.6 5.1 3.8 3.8
Ecuadord 8.8 8.5 7.8 6.1 4.8 -
El Salvador 4.4 2.0 4.0 0.6 1.8 0.5b
Guatemala 4.8 4.1 3.3 4.6 3.3 3.6b
Honduras 5.8 5.1 4.8 6.7 5.3 5.0b
Mexico 4.4 3.1 4.3 3.9 4.5 4.1
Nicaragua 8.5 7.8 6.5 4.9 5.8 4.6b
Panama 5.9 8.5 7.0 9.8 9.4 9.6b
Paraguay 7.0 4.6 2.8 1.9 -2.6 -3.4c
Peru 8.6 6.9 6.6 5.6 6.1 6.1b
Uruguayd 6.7 5.1 7.7 3.5 4.2 3.8
Venezuela  (Bol. Rep. of)d 4.8 2.6 4.4 4.9 5.8 5.4
Latin Americae 5.7 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.6 2.4
Notes:
a) Percentage change in economic activity indices. Quarterly GDP is only used for countries without monthly 
activity indicators. For Mexico, although the country has an activity index, GDP was used.   
b) April-June 2012 average compared to the same period in 2011.  
c) April-May 2012 average compared to the same period in 2011. 
d) Percentage change in GDP compared to same quarter the previous year.
e) Region-wide weighted average.
Source: ECLAC (2012a), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2011-2012.
The external outlook across the globe for 2012-13 will be marked by slow growth 
in the global economy, which is likely to continue until several developed countries 
end their high-debt and unemployment problems and until emerging countries can 
rebalance growth towards more consumption, thus raising global demand. External, 
real and financial volatility will drag on. Because of their low growth and ongoing fiscal 
constraints, some developed countries are expected to face more problems with the 
lack of confidence in the sustainability of their sovereign debt. Although this is likely 
to lead to financial, monetary and fiscal measures to resolve the liquidity and solvency 
problems, uncertainty will persist.
In 2012, the main assumptions of the most likely scenario are: i) the US economy will 
still see moderate, variable growth; ii) euro-area countries will continue seeing low GDP 
growth, or even negative growth in some countries, but the sovereign-debt problems 
will not spark a global financial crisis; iii) the Chinese and Indian economies will slow 
down, but mainly due cyclical reasons, with growth remaining higher than in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
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The impact of the global scenario for Latin America and the 
Caribbean will differ by country and depend largely on their 
export structures by markets and products. 
As discussed below, the impact that the international economic situation will have 
on the region will vary from country to country, depending largely on their export 
structures by markets and products. While Mexico and some Central American and 
Caribbean countries will benefit from the moderate growth in the US economy, growth 
in countries that specialise in producing and exporting commodities will depend more 
on developments in the Asian economies, which are the main destinations for these 
kinds of exports.
 In 2013, slow growth will translate into continued sluggishness in the global 
economy. Euro-area countries will remain affected by households reducing their debts, 
banks restricting their lending as they reorganise their portfolios and increase capital, 
sluggish growth in domestic demand resulting from unemployment and pessimistic 
expectations, and low or negative fiscal impulses. This weak growth is likely to 
continue for a few years, as the experience of other developed countries has shown 
that recovering from similar events takes at least three to four years. In the United 
States, the main risk for 2013 is likely to be a slowdown in growth, depending on how 
the country tackles the debt problem and the impending automatic spending cuts in late 
2012. In China, the impact on overall demand will depend on how swiftly it changes its 
spending patterns from heavy investment to expansion of domestic consumption. Early 
estimates suggest that although consumers have seen their real income go up in recent 
years, the multiplier effect of growth in consumption is not yet enough to offset the 
projected drop in investment. This drop was caused by excess idle capacity following 
several years of very heavy investment (close to 50% of GDP). Several studies suggest 
that not only a reduction in Chinese economic growth but especially a change in its 
composition (e.g. reducing the rate of investment) would have a high spillover effect on 
demand for imports from the rest of the world and especially on international prices 
of certain metals. For instance, copper-producing countries are more exposed to lower 
investment in Chinese infrastructure than countries that export food and agricultural 
raw materials.1 Consequently, risks to growth originating in China are also on the 
downside. 
Short-term impacts
To assess how prepared Latin America is to face these risks one must separate 
the potential impact by country according to its level of exposure and its resilience or 
“defences” in terms of its economic structure and space for macroeconomic policy. Next, 
the region’s exposure to trade and financial shocks and the effectiveness of macroeconomic 
resilience measures and the space available for counter-cyclical policy are considered. 
Two useful indicators for a country’s exposure to external risk are: 
the exports-to-GDP ratio and the contribution of exports to the 
growth of internal demand.
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From a trade perspective, the level of exposure and the possible lines of defence vary 
from country to country in the region. The exports-to-GDP ratio and the contribution of 
exports to domestic income growth in current dollars are two indicators that can be used 
to analyse exposure to this risk. Remittances from Latin American migrants working in 
developing countries are another indicator of the transmission of growth from developed 
to developing countries. The differences in these indicators reflect different situations 
(Table 1.2). On the one hand, in some countries with large domestic markets, such as 
Brazil and to some extent Colombia, external demand is less important, with exports 
providing less than 20% of GDP in 2011 and less than 20% of domestic income growth 
for 2000-10. Remittances have no significant macroeconomic weight in these countries. 
Several countries are more exposed to risk due to the relative size of external demand 
(in smaller, more open economies) and/or remittances (especially in Central America 
and the Caribbean). 
Table 1.2. Latin America and the Caribbean: indicators
of exposure and resilience to shocks to the current account















Argentina 21.7 49.0 0.2 0.0 0.1
Bolivia (Plur. State of)) 41.2 56.2 5.5 0.2 0.2
Brazil 11.2 10.8 0.2 0.0 0.1
Chile 38.7 41.3 0.0 0.2 0.1
Colombia 15.7 15.6 1.4 0.2 0.2
Costa Rica 38.1 35.2 1.5 0.1 0.2
Dominican Republic 22.3 11.6 6.5 0.0 0.3
Ecuador 32.9 36.5 4.4 0.3 0.2
El Salvador 26.2 26.8 16.3 0.1 0.3
Guatemala 25.1 22.5 10.3 0.4 0.2
Honduras 43.9 36.6 17.2 0.1 0.3
Jamaica 25.6 70.8 14.1 0.2 0.3
Mexico 30.3 34.4 2.1 0.0 0.6
Nicaragua 41.3 72.7 12.6 0.1 0.1
Panama 65.2 59.3 0.9 0.1 0.1
Paraguay 57.1 69.2 3.7 0.2 0.1
Peru 25.1 30.1 1.6 0.1 0.1
Uruguay 26.9 38.5 0.7 0.1 0.1
Venezuela  (Bol. Rep. of) 28.7 31.4 0.0 0.5 0.3
Average 32.5 39.4 5.2 0.1 0.2
Notes: The figures refer to 2011 data, or in some cases 2010 or 2009 for concentration indices.  
a) This indicator is calculated as the percentage change in GDP in current dollars for the period 2000-10 versus 
the percentage change in exports in nominal dollars. 
b) Both concentration indices are Herfindahl-Hirschman indices, which can range from 0 to 1. Indices close to 0 
indicate greater diversification, while those close to 1 indicate greater concentration. The original data include 
re-exports and refer only to goods.  
Source: Based on ECLAC’s SIGCI databases and the World Bank’s 2012 World Development Indicators.
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Diversifying export products or destinations stands out among the economies’ 
forms of structural resilience against shocks to external demand. The more diversified 
a country’s exports are, the more flexibility it has to stand up to external shocks. But 
given the current plight, it could be easier to redirect exports of standardised goods, 
such as raw materials, than adapted or manufactured goods, depending on the traits 
of the target market. The impact of real external shocks on countries in the region 
depends more on how diversified each country’s exports are than on its openness to 
trade. Analysis of a broader set of emerging and developing countries delivers similar 
results. When developing and emerging countries’ economies were recovering from the 
2008-09 global crisis, a high concentration of exports to high-income countries had a 
negative effect, while openness to trade positively impacted growth (Box 1.1). External 
vulnerability, therefore, is a multidimensional concept that must be analysed on a case-
by-case basis. Developments in the level of exposure and resilience reflect the progress 
the vast majority of countries have made in recent decades and the still relatively 
concentrated structure of exports, which amplify external shocks (OECD, 2010). 
Fluctuations in the prices of raw materials, meanwhile, affect external accounts; in 
the economies of countries that are more specialised in producing and exporting natural 
resources they also affect their fiscal accounts. In several countries in the region, this 
income makes up a notable percentage of total tax revenues, either as revenue from 
public enterprises that are included in the fiscal accounts or that transfer monies to 
the treasury (such as the Mexican state oil firm PEMEX or the Chilean state copper firm 
CODELCO), or through royalties and taxes on corporate profits in the sector (such as in 
the Peruvian mining industry).2 A drop in the price of raw materials diminishes these 
countries’ tax revenue, reducing their response capacity. Turning to external accounts, 
if the prices of raw materials fall and the terms of trade deteriorate, export income is 
hit, damaging the trade balance. In Central America, the reverse is usually true. Since 
the area is a net importer of food and fuel, a fall in world prices of these goods benefits 
the countries’ terms of trade. However, since several Central American countries have 
schemes to subsidise power generation, a rise in world energy prices would negatively 
affect their fiscal balances. In the Caribbean, the effect is rather mixed, with some 
countries more specialised in producing and exporting natural resources while others 
are net importers.
The region’s financial situation improved significantly during the 
first decade of this century, and it was not largely altered by the  
2008/09 financial crisis.
A second important international transmission channel is the financial one. Looking 
at the region’s finances, the overall situation in the region has improved substantially 
over the past decade, with the 2008-09 crisis doing little to abate this progress. In 2010, 
average external debt in the region fell to just 1.2 percentage points of GDP above the 
pre-2009 figure. Only in Jamaica and Nicaragua was external debt much higher than in 
2008, and in several countries the 2010 figure was lower (Table 1.3). Private-sector debt 
showed similar trends. While the region has continued to integrate into global financial 
markets (assets and liabilities with the rest of the world), the private sector has brought 
down its net external debt (IDB, 2012). The region has maintained access to international 
financial markets while keeping country risk indicators relatively low. Looking at capital 
flows, current account balances have deteriorated slightly compared to the period 2003-
08, falling by just under 2 percentage points of GDP in 2011. However, at present the 
balances of most countries in the region, especially those integrated into international 
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financial markets and therefore prone to changes in global risk appetite, do not seem to 
be too negative or especially vulnerable to a sudden stop in capital flows. 
Several factors could lower the risk of disruptions in international capital markets 
causing a sudden stop and financing problems. This section emphasises aspects of 
the national balance sheet, such as the characteristics of the composition of external 
liabilities and the availability of liquid assets. International reserves remain high as a 
percentage of GDP and of short-term external debt. At the end of 2011, international 
reserves were one percentage point of GDP higher than at the end of 2008. Short-term 
debt represents only a small amount (about 15%) of total debt. Recent figures show that 
reserves exceed 100% of short-term debt in all countries. Though there are differences 
among countries, both indicators show that most countries should be able to cope with 
short-term external financing problems. In the international context, the expansion of 
contingent lines of credit and of currency swaps among central banks helps mitigate the 
associated risks. 
Table 1.3. Indicators of exposure and resilience to capital account shocks
in Latin America and the Caribbean
External debt (% GNI)a Current account balance (% GDP) Resistance indicators









Argentina 37.2 36.1 -1.1 3.0 -0.5 -3.5 10.3 27.4 67.1
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 34.3 27.8 -6.4 7.3 2.2 -5.1 52.4 2.0 1.1
Brazil 16.2 16.9 0.7 0.6 -2.1 -2.7 14.2 18.9 22.7
Chile 41.5 45.9 4.4 1.4 -1.3 -2.7 16.9 30.0 93.0
Colombia 19.8 22.8 3.0 -1.8 -2.8 -1.1 10.2 13.0 29.2
Costa Rica 31.8 26.8 -5.0 -5.7 -5.2 0.5 11.9 27.5 52.5
Dominican 
Republic
23.2 26.2 3.0 -1.7 -7.9 -6.2 6.6 14.9 55.6
Ecuador 32.7 23.1 -9.7 1.4 -0.3 -1.7 4.6 2.5 14.1
El Salvador 49.1 53.2 4.0 -5.0 -5.9 -0.9 11.1 10.0 38.1
Guatemala 38.7 35.9 -2.8 -4.8 -2.8 1.9 13.4 11.1 26.8
Honduras 25.9 28.2 2.3 -7.6 -8.7 -1.1 16.7 9.6 14.7
Jamaica 76.2 104.2 28.0 -11.4 -9.9 1.5 13.4 8.5 47.2
Mexico 17.3 19.5 2.2 -0.9 -0.8 0.1 12.3 19.5 32.4
Nicaragua 68.8 76.9 8.1 -16.7 -17.9 -1.2 23.5 14.6 38.7
Panama 44.7 45.8 1.1 -6.5 -12.7 -6.3 7.4 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 25.0 25.3 0.4 0.9 -1.2 -2.1 20.8 23.2 27.5
Peru 28.8 24.6 -4.2 0.0 -1.3 -1.3 28.0 16.7 13.7
Uruguay 31.7 29.0 -2.7 -1.5 -2.2 -0.7 22.0 13.7 20.2
Venezuela  
 (Bol. Rep. of)
16.9 14.3 -2.6 13.5 8.6 -4.9 12.3 27.8 52.0
Average 34.7 35.9 1.2 -1.9 -3.8 -2.0 16.2 15.3 34.0
Notes: Reserves are as of the end of 2011. All external debt indicators refer to 2010.
a) GNI refers to gross national income.
Source: Based on World Bank GDF, the IMF IFS, and IDB Latin Macro Watch data.
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Box 1.1. What explains the economic recovery in emerging
and developing countries?
Emerging and developing economies have been affected differently by the crisis. 
Several studies analyse how the initial conditions regarding structural characteristics 
and policies explain these differences. Berkmen et al. (2012) find that the trade channel 
(trade openness and manufactured exports) in 2009 had a negative impact on growth 
in developing countries. However, for a sub-sample of emerging economies the authors 
conclude that financial issues such as greater leverage of the financial system, credit 
growth and a higher proportion of short-term debt were more influential than the 
trade channel. They also find some evidence that the fiscal position and exchange-rate 
flexibility helped reduce the impact of the crisis, but the fiscal-soundness indicators are 
not significant enough to explain the different effects between one country and another. 
Similarly, Gallego et al. (2010) argue that differences in macroeconomic vulnerabilities 
explain the stronger recovery in Latin America compared to Eastern Europe. Cecchetti 
et al. (2011) argue that the strong domestic financial system, high levels of international 
reserves, current account surpluses and low levels of private debt explain why the 
region’s economic growth is higher than the global average. Economies that are less open 
to trade and have fewer financial ties to the United States suffered least. Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) argue that few indicators were able to predict where and how severely the crisis 
would affect economic growth. They argue that current account surpluses are the only 
consistent indicator that an economy would be dealt less of a blow by the crisis.
As the crisis has not ended, the studies provide no conclusive answer as to which factors 
will determine how economies perform after the crisis. In a study related to this chapter, 
Avendaño and Daude (2012) show that more financially open economies (with openness 
measured as the total value of external assets and liabilities as a percentage of GDP) 
and economies with a greater presence of European banks (percentage of total external 
liabilities) have had a slower recovery. Openness to trade, meaning a high exports-to-
GDP ratio, has a positive effect, although economies that export mainly to developed 
countries have been recovering more slowly. Finally, countries with financial systems 
where credit has grown quickly and has been more leveraged (domestic credit as a 
proportion of deposits) have also been hit harder by the crisis. There is some evidence 
that the crisis has been more costly to countries with a high debt-to-GDP ratio. For other 
factors, such as budget deficit and current account balance, there is no conclusive evidence 
of their effects. Some of these results are in line with the findings of other studies on the 
initial impact of the crisis (Berkmen et al., 2012), but others differ, such as the finding by 
Avendaño and Daude (2012) that financial openness had a significant negative effect on 
the economic recovery.
Source: Avendaño and Daude (2012).
 European banks entered the region mainly as subsidiary firms, that is, banks with 
their own capital, funded in the local market and subject to national regulation. This has 
mitigated much of the risk associated with Europe’s financial woes. However, if the euro-
area crisis were to get worse and the parent banks were to cut off lines of credit to their 
subsidiaries, credit in the local market could decline, with potential consequences on the 
region’s real economy and financial stability. The figures show a decline in external banking 
finance to the region, but only slightly, especially in the light of exchange-rate variations. 
Most international banks in the region have equity and financing, including, for example, 
in Chile (Banco Central de Chile, 2012). However, some Caribbean countries might be more 
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exposed to lower international banking flows (IDB, 2012). In any case, central banks and 
the banking supervisory superintendents of Latin American and Caribbean countries 
should be ready for potential asset sales by European banks in the region.
Macroeconomic policy spaces 
The region has some fiscal space available to address the problems resulting from 
sluggish growth in other parts of the world. In 2009, several Latin American countries 
with a relatively strong, solvent fiscal position used countercyclical fiscal policy to offset 
the recessionary effects of the global crisis (OECD and ECLAC, 2011). Public debt is at 
similar levels to 2008 in most countries of the region, with the simple average standing at 
around 39% of GDP. But this figure hides very different realities. Chile, Paraguay and Peru, 
for instance, have gross public debt levels below 20% of GDP, while other countries have 
much higher levels. Similar disparities exist in the budget balance figures. Bolivia, Chile, 
Paraguay and Peru have very sturdy figures, while other countries’ figures are much 
weaker (Table 1.4). These differences in fiscal fundamentals are reflected in the financing 
conditions, which in turn feed back into fiscal sustainability. Country risk or sovereign 
spreads are at historically low levels, in part thanks to good macroeconomic fundamentals, 
but also thanks to general factors such as low interest rates and international liquidity.
Table 1.4. Latin America and the Caribbean: fiscal indicators




 Budget balance 
(% GDP)
Country 2008 2011 2008 2011 2011
Argentina 57.8 40.0 2.4 2.7 -2.3
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 43.1 41.4 1.0 1.4 1.0
Brazil 57.4 54.2 6.6 6.1 -2.6
Chile 11.4 16.5 0.9 0.8 0.9
Colombia 42.7 41.2 3.5 3.2 -1.8
Costa Rica 29.9 38.4 2.2 2.2 -3.6
Dominican Republic 24.4 30.3 1.6 2.1 -2.6
Ecuador 25.0 22.2 1.3 0.8 -1.0
El Salvador 36.9 44.3 2.4 2.2 -3.9
Guatemala 20.1 24.1 1.4 1.5 -2.8
Honduras 20.1 27.7 0.3 0.3 -4.6
Jamaica 126.1 139.0 12.5 9.4 -5.7
Mexico 26.9 35.5 1.6 1.8 -2.5
Nicaragua 76.6 42.7 1.2 1.4 0.5
Panama 45.4 41.2 3.2 2.4 -2.3
Paraguay 19.2 13.4 0.7 0.6 1.3
Peru 24.5 19.2 1.6 1.2 1.8
Uruguay 52.4 42.2 2.9 2.5 -0.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 14.0 21.7 1.3 2.1 -3.4
Simple average 39.7 38.7 2.6 2.4 -1.8
Note: The figures are taken from the officially published public-sector data with the broadest institutional 
coverage. Data cover central government for Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica and 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of); and general government for gross government debt for Brazil (Brazilian Central Bank). 
Interest payments for Paraguay are for 2010. 
Source: Based on official figures.
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Despite public debt reduction, several countries have a lower primary balance than 
in 2008. The fiscal balance is influenced by the economic cycle and in some countries by 
commodity prices (if some fiscal revenue is linked to these). But of the eight countries for 
which an estimated fiscal balance adjusted for the economic cycle and raw-material prices 
is available, only one has improved its balance (Figure 1.1). From a flow perspective, the 
region is therefore in a weaker position than during the critical event of 2008/09. However, 
three factors would help economies better overcome any future international capital-
market volatilities like the one seen in September 2008 that followed the bankruptcy of 
the US investment bank Lehman Brothers: having savings available in sovereign wealth 
funds in some countries, having continued access to international markets, and drawing 
on the experience the region and the multilateral and regional financing organisations 
have acquired in dealing with severe shortages of international liquidity.
Chile, Paraguay and Perú have gross public debt levels below 20% 
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Figure 1.1.  Primary balance adjusted for the cycle and raw material prices
in 2008 and 2011 in selected countries Latin American countries
(Percentage of GDP)
Note: For methodology details, see Daude et al. (2011).
Source: Based on information from national governments, the Chilean Copper Commission (Cochilco),



















In addition, in the event of a short or moderate real-economy shock and/or financial 
shock, some countries in the region would have the necessary fiscal space to counter it, 
at least in part. But the current economic circumstances are highly complex due to both 
the magnitude and duration of external shocks. The situation that has gradually taken 
shape is one of sluggish growth in the region’s external demand while the world’s big 
economies (the euro area, the United States, China and India) are fighting against their 
own imbalances, which will likely lead to episodes of uncertainty. 
A prudent fiscal strategy for the region should be built around tools that ensure 
stimulus measures are temporary and are withdrawn when the time is right and that 
they protect the sustainability of public finances at all times. Because expenditure-side 
automatic stabilisers are small and there are so few revenue-side stabilisers (compared 
to the fiscal revenue collected and its composition), an alternative solution for the region 
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could be to create social spending programmes that are activated and deactivated 
automatically (for instance, by unemployment levels), depending on each country’s 
institutional capabilities. If the planning cycle contains infrastructure projects whose 
economic, social and environmental feasibility has been evaluated, investment plans 
could be brought forward or accelerated according to the economic cycle.
Various countries have the space and credibility to use countercyclical monetary 
policy, even if food and fuel prices once again push up price indexes in the region.
Monetary policy is another tool available to most countries in the region when faced 
with a decline in aggregate demand. Inflationary forecasts are generally moderate and 
stable for the medium term, despite sporadic rises in food prices in the first six months 
of 2012. Central banks that follow inflation targeting regimes have generally managed 
to keep inflation within the boundaries they set or moved inflation towards those levels 
(Figure 1.2, left panel). Several central banks have used some of their policy room to tackle 
the signs of a slowdown in economic growth and lower inflationary pressures, while 
others have decided not to act unless they see clearer signals. Various countries therefore 
have the space and credibility to use countercyclical monetary policy, even if food and fuel 
prices once again push up price indexes in the region. The strong uncertainty surrounding 
global economic growth and the trend towards lower external inflationary pressures led 
most countries in the region to maintain their prudent monetary policies during the 
first quarter of 2012, with few changes occurring to existing rates. Countries that saw a 
rise in inflation (Colombia) or high, albeit falling, inflation (Honduras and Uruguay) raise 
their reference rate. Interest rates fell further where there was a much clearer economic 
slowdown, such as in Brazil and Paraguay. The second quarter of 2012 confirmed these 
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Inflation target
Figure 1.2. Annual inflation rate forecasts for the next 12 months
and evolution of monetary policy rates in Latin America
(as percentages)
A. Expected inflation and ranges of inflation targets B. Evolution of monetary policy rates
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The region’s central banks still have space for expansionary monetary policy if 
necessary. Well-anchored inflation expectations – which most countries in the region 
have – are necessary for monetary policy to be effective in stabilising aggregate demand. 
Because nominal rates are well above the bottom limit of 0%, countries should have 
sufficient space to support aggregate demand. Estimates of monetary-policy reaction 
functions – called Taylor rules – show that at present countries with inflation targeting 
regimes have interest rates that reflect a neutral or slightly expansionary monetary 
policy (see Box 1.2 for the situation in Brazil).
A prudent fiscal strategy should be built around intervention tools 
that ensure stimulus measures are temporary and are withdrawn 
when the time is right and that public finances remain sustainable 
at all times.
Box 1.2. Alternative estimates of monetary-policy rules in Brazil 
Taylor rules are a tool traditionally used to check whether monetary policy is 
expansionary or contractionary. They became popular following the study by Taylor 
(1993) on US monetary policy in which he argues that a relatively simple equation can be 
used to base the monetary-policy rate on the deviation of inflation from the target rate 
and difference between potential and actual output (the output gap). However, there is 
much criticism regarding which additional variables (such as performance of long-term 
bonds, real exchange rates and asset prices) should be included in the analysis and what 
precise methodology should be used to correctly estimate these relationships. In this 
respect, Brazil is an example of the potential complications. 
For the period from January 2003 to August 2012, a series of alternative models were 
considered to assess Brazil’s monetary policy to estimate the following equation:
it = a + b (pt,t+12 –p*) + g (yt – y*) + et,
where i is the Selic monetary-policy rate, pt,t+12  is the expected rate of inflation for the 
next 12 months, p* is the inflation target, (yt – y
*) is the output gap and et is an error term. 
Normally, both coefficients (b y g) should be positive. The coefficient b should be greater 
than 1, so the real interest rate increases with inflation expectations and thus raises 
the real interest rate and cools the economy. The opposite occurs if inflation is below 
the target rate. Meanwhile, if g equals zero it means the government focuses purely on 
achieving the inflation target. 
An alternative approach often used includes a lagged interest rate to reflect the central 
bank’s aim of smoothing fluctuations in the interest rate and thus reducing financial 
markets’ uncertainty and volatility. Often additional variables are included, either 
because they contain information regarding the prices or GDP or because they are 
part of the central bank’s objectives. Here we will consider an open-economy version 
that includes the real exchange rate. Finally, the estimation of this single equation has 
potential problems because interest rates influence – although with some lag –inflation 
(and inflation expectations) and the output gap. The estimates could therefore be biased, 
especially if movements in the interest rate have a lot of inertia. A related problem in 
Brazil and other emerging economies is that the time series for interest rates and
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inflation are not usually stationary, so the estimated relationships may be spurious. A 
multivariate cointegration analysis can be performed to counter these problems. The 
estimated coefficients are shown in the following table: 










Constant 12.83 -43.65 -1.02 38.13
(0.33) (4.56) (1.28) -
Inflation 2.21 1.29 0.07 3.56
(0.21) (0.15) (0.04) (0.99)
GDP gap -0.27 -0.04 13.39 -0.33
(0.18) (0.12) (2.41) (0.64)
Real exchange rate - 12.58 0.32 -11.84
(1.01) (0.33) (4.37)
Lagged interest rate - - 0.96 -
(0.020)
R-squared 0.50 0.80 0.99 -
Durbin-Watson 0.04 0.11 0.43 -
Note: Standard error in parenthesis.
Source:  Authors’ estimates based on data from the Brazilian Central Bank.
The interest-rate projections based on these different econometric models show 
significant differences. For instance, the simplest model, shown in column (1), suggests 
the interest rate for August 2012 should be 14.5% instead of 7.5%. However, the Durbin-
Watson statistic shows a very high autocorrelation, which means the model is clearly 
not well specified. When open-economy aspects are included (the real exchange rate), 
the projection falls to 12.3% for July 2012, while the average interest rate is 8.2%, but the 
high autocorrelation persists. If the lagged interest rate is included too, the estimated 
rate would be 9.3% at the same date. The interest rate currently observed would fall 
within the confidence interval. This means that although the point estimate indicates 
that monetary policy might be slightly more expansionary than what the estimated rule 
suggests, the difference is small. However, the high coefficient for the lagged interest 
rate suggests the interest rate is probably not stationary. The high R-squared value and 
low Durbin-Watson statistic also indicate problems with the model, which is perhaps 
spurious. Therefore, the estimate based on a cointegration analysis could give more 
reliable estimates. In view of this, the projections based on column (4) confirm the above 
result. Although this equation suggests the interest rate should be 1.3 percentage points 
higher than at present, this is not a statistically significant difference. In short, at present 
there do not seem to be indications that Brazilian monetary policy is too expansionary.
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The medium-term international environment and its impact 
on the region
External demand from advanced countries will be fairly stagnant in the coming years. 
The crisis currently affecting several economies in the euro area will have medium- 
and long-term effects on many OECD countries. In particular, the significant increase 
in sovereign debt – coupled with spending pressures related to the ageing population – 
could stem growth for a long period due to the pressing need for fiscal consolidation.3 
For instance, to cut their gross debt to 50% of GDP by 2050, several countries, including 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, would need to improve their cyclically 
adjusted fiscal balances by more than 8 percentage points of GDP (OECD, 2012). In this 
scenario, several advanced economies could be faced with growth problems similar to 
those faced by Latin American economies following the external debt crisis of the early 
1980s. There are several ways this slower growth could come about. For instance, fiscal 
adjustments could significantly cut aggregate demand at a time when businesses’ and 
households’ balance sheets are still recovering. Since there is no clear roadmap for fiscal 
consolidation, high levels of debt could trigger expectations of a higher default risk. 
This would increase the risk premium, holding back private investment and therefore 
potential growth. Finally, the prolonged high unemployment could wind up raising 
structural unemployment, dealing a permanent blow to potential output in OECD 
economies (OECD, 2011).
Because of weak cyclical economic conditions and structural 
problems in OECD economies, interest rates are likely to stay low 
for a long time.
Because of weak cyclical economic conditions and structural problems, interest 
rates are likely to stay low for a long time. With GDP growth below potential in many 
OECD economies and idle capacity high, the next few years will see low inflationary 
pressures (Figure 1.3, left panel). If so, central banks should not raise monetary-policy 
rates, and those with mandates not only to meet inflation targets but also to achieve full 
employment can return to using unconventional monetary-policy tools to reduce long-
term interest rates. Several analysts believe governments in developed countries should 
allow higher inflation while introducing financial constraints to contain interest rates as 
a way of liquidating the high government debt and cutting debts with private debtors, 
thus facilitating the deleveraging of economies. This would result in a prolonged period 
of negative interest rates in real terms (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011).4 
Even if no country abandons the euro zone, international capital markets will 
remain highly volatile, with capital flows switching from inflows to outflows in emerging 
markets’ assets. Several of the current risks related to economic developments in the 
developed economies will not be resolved any time soon. Instead, given the significant 
institutional changes needed to solve the problems, there will be advances and relapses 
as reforms are implemented, for example in fiscal consolidation during an election cycle 
in the United States or changes to treaties in the European Union subject to ratification 
by referendum. Other uncertainties will only fade away gradually. For example, it will 
take today to assess what share of the slower growth in China that is due to cyclical 
reasons and what part is related to a reduction in potential output growth. Sporadic hikes 
in risk aversion in international capital markets are therefore to be expected. Global 
risk aversion has become one of the most important drivers of asset prices in emerging 
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markets. As these markets have become part of the international financial markets, 













































































Note: VIX refers to the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index.        
Source: FRED (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) database and Datastream. 
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732500        
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Greater economic integration to remove trade, administrative 
and infrastructure barriers among countries in the region could 
provide a way forward in jointly dealing with the medium-term 
economic outlook.
A regional response to sluggish growth in external demand is greater regional 
integration, which would allow the region’s economies to develop competitive 
advantages in non-traditional sectors and activities. Despite weak external demand, 
several countries in the region have maintained good economic growth by expanding 
their local markets. However, many countries’ domestic markets are small or can quickly 
face balance of payments problems due to the imports needed for this process. In this 
context, greater integration to remove trade, administrative and infrastructure barriers 
among countries in the region could provide a way forward in jointly dealing with the 
medium-term economic outlook. In addition to providing markets and scale, greater 
regional integration can also provide a platform for activities and sectors to learn and 
develop dynamic competitive advantages so they can export to the rest of the world. In 
many cases it can also improve macroeconomic resilience by diversifying the products 
exported and their destinations.
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Although, comparatively speaking, Latin America is in a strong position with its low 
debt and external strength, this scenario means the region will probably be subject to 
large-scale capital inflows and outflows for a long time. Furthermore, these capital flows 
could cause major exchange-rate fluctuations. After dropping dramatically in 2009, capital 
inflows to the region have boomed to historically high levels in recent years (Figure 1.4, 
upper panel). Since capital inflows can trigger unsustainable price hikes for certain assets 
(such as real estate and capital stock) or can be channelled into the banking system 
and cause excessive credit growth, they could jeopardise the region’s macroeconomic 
balance. This risk has recently given greater importance to macroprudential regulation 
measures and the openness of the capital account. The reasons why these are such 
important factors lie not only in their short-term macroeconomic effects, but also in the 
possible consequences of unsustainable real appreciations on the economic structure, 
since they could weaken the competitiveness of the tradeable-goods sectors and thus 
wear down future growth capacity (ECLAC, 2012b).
Macroprudential regulation and sterilised foreign-exchange 
intervention are the first line of defence against excessive 
fluctuations caused by short-term capital inflows. 
The fluctuations in the real exchange rates in Latin American countries show that 
generally currencies have appreciated compared to their average value for 2003-08 
– that is, before the economic crisis. Only the currencies of Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico 
and Nicaragua have depreciated, albeit only slightly. But the currency appreciations 
since that period are greater than 20% in several countries in the region, especially in 
South America and among commodity producers. There are various reasons for these 
fluctuations in real exchange rates. Some are those related to the real economy, such 
as terms of trade, fiscal policy, trade openness and level of net investment. There are 
also changes in international financial markets, such as a greater appetite for emerging-
market assets, and interest-rate differentials, which can trigger short-term capital 
inflows that could change direction once the external conditions change. 
Despite the methodological difficulties, it is important to study and monitor the 
causes of fluctuations in the real exchange rate to determine the situations in which 
government intervention is needed and to use the most effective policy tools for each 
situation. For instance, if the fluctuations are caused by short-term capital inflows, then 
macroprudential regulation and sterilised foreign-exchange intervention are the first 
line of defence against these excessive fluctuations (Daude et al., 2012). In other cases 
fluctuations may be due to short-term changes in the terms of trade. For instance, a 
drought somewhere else in the world can drive up the price of grain in a particular 
year. In such situations, foreign-exchange intervention can be effective, although 
countercyclical fiscal instruments such as stabilisation funds are usually more effective 
still. To avoid a temporary appreciation resulting from higher spending due to the quasi-
rents created, tax schemes can be used that collect a relevant portion of the quasi-rents 
and invest these funds abroad. Finally, an appreciation could be caused by a permanent 
or long-term rise in raw-material prices. This is a classic case of “Dutch disease”. When 
this occurs, foreign-exchange interventions are largely ineffective, but economic policy 
should still act to raise the competitiveness in the non-commodity sector. For instance, 
investing the additional tax revenue in the infrastructure, innovation and human 
capital needed by the tradeable-goods sector helps diversify production when the terms 
of trade do not generate the right market incentives.
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It is important to track appreciations and their causes and potential effects on 
the economic structure, as well as better co-ordination of macroeconomic policy 
with production-development objectives. Although Dutch disease is not always 
easy to diagnose in an economy, potential competitiveness problems can be spotted 
through monitoring and a careful assessment of the economic situation. Medium-term 
competitiveness problems can be caused even by temporary fluctuations if they influence 
important decisions and investments. In several countries there is some implicit 
co-ordination among policies, but greater transparency can make these measures more 
effective.
Conclusions and recommendations
The economic context described in this chapter presents a mixed outlook for Latin 
American and Caribbean firms. The region is faced with uncertainty in the external 
environment, although some economies are more affected than others, especially 
those where the uncertainty is amplified by an appreciation in the real exchange rate 
of the national currency or exports that are increasingly concentrated in primary 
products. Because of these and other structural issues, Latin American firms, especially 
smaller firms, are immersed in an environment that poses major challenges to their 
development. Smaller firms play a vital role in economic growth, and how the fruits 
of economic growth are shared in the society. It is through these production units 
that the savings and investments of middle-income households are channelled, and 
those of poorer households too in the case of microenterprises, and they provide many 
jobs. If backed up by good policies, such firms can help expand production linkages 
and improve systemic competitiveness by driving up the productivity of the overall 
production system, making the most of the benefits of specialisation and the synergies 
and externalities generated by production clusters. Furthermore, SMEs are frequently a 
powerful vehicle for innovation and technological progress, which they then infuse into 
the production structure.
The challenge now is to balance short-term stabilisation measures 
by introducing monetary and fiscal policies that will prop up 
aggregate demand if low growth continues in developed countries 
and take structural measures to raise medium-term growth.
The biggest challenge for the region’s macroeconomic policy in the current situation 
is to find the right balance for short-term stabilisation measures by introducing 
monetary and fiscal policies that will prop up aggregate demand if low growth continues 
in developed countries and take structural measures to raise medium-term growth. 
Governments in Latin America and the Caribbean need to find ways to combine 
demande policies and structural policies that help maintain macroeconomic stability 
and increase the region’s productive capabilities. Given a less favourable international 
context, failure to do so would most likely steer the region towards the kind of growth 
levels and patterns it experienced in previous decades, with  sluggish growth and a 
poor capacity to generate the necessary endogenous growth to transform the economic 
structure and foster a balanced distribution of income. 
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Notes
1. See IDB (2012) and IMF (2012).
2. For instance, Mexican oil revenue is worth close to 8% of GDP, the equivalent of almost 40% of total 
fiscal revenue.
3. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010); Kumar and Woo (2010).
4. Low yields could also be reflecting rising prices of risk-free assets, the supply of which has dropped 
significantly (primarily because AAA-rated assets, which are considered safe, such as secured 
mortgages in developed countries and the sovereign debts of several European countries, are no longer 
classified as risk-free).
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CHAPTER 
TWO 
Traits and policies of Latin American SMEs 
Given the right support policies, micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America can help raise productivity, 
complement the economies of scale of large firms, contribute to 
creating clusters in certain sectors and reduce social inequality and 
poverty. Over the past decade, the attention given to SMEs, a key 
component of the region’s business fabric, has grown. But efforts 
need to be redoubled to break the vicious cycle of low productivity 
and lack of competition among SMEs. Public policies need to be more 
mature so they will last longer, but also more flexible to the changing 
external environments that affect SMEs. Countries need to build the 
institutional capacities necessary to implement programmes and 
initiatives. In particular, policies need to be devised and implemented 
in a way that takes into account the full spectrum of SMEs, from 
subsistence-level microenterprises to fully modernised firms that 
supply large companies which export to foreign markets.
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Introduction
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are an essential component of 
the Latin American business fabric. There are various indicators of their importance 
in the region: the proportion of all businesses that are SMEs, the number of jobs they 
create, and in some countries even their contribution to gross domestic product (GDP). 
However, there are several sharp contrasts between SMEs’ contribution to GDP in Latin 
America and in OECD countries. In Latin America, around 70% of GDP is produced by large 
firms, while in OECD countries large firms contribute only 40%, with the rest produced 
by SMEs. So while SMEs provide many jobs in Latin America they contribute little to 
production. This reflects their heterogeneous production structure, their specialisation 
in low value-added products and the scant contribution SMEs make to exports (less 
than 5% in most countries). As a result, the productivity gap between Latin America and 
OECD countries tends to persist over time. 
These gaps in productivity and export capacity are caused by the highly diverse 
economic structures in the region. Latin America’s production structure is marked 
by “the large productivity differences – much larger than those found in developed 
countries – among sectors, within sectors and among companies within a given country. 
This is known as structural heterogeneity, which refers to marked asymmetries among 
segments of enterprises and workers and the concentration of employment in strata 
characterised by very low relative productivity” (ECLAC, 2010). This phenomenon 
is also one of the causes of the deep social inequality present in Latin America. The 
large productivity gaps (among sectors and among businesses), meanwhile, reflect and 
reinforce the gaps in other areas: skills, adoption of technical developments, negotiating 
skills, access to social networks, and upward occupational mobility during a career.
The production structure places Latin American SMEs at a disadvantage compared 
to other firms, so they need specific policies to counter this. Unless SMEs can overcome 
these difficulties their lack of competitiveness will continue, fuelling a vicious cycle of 
sluggish economic growth, poverty and slow structural change. Breaking the vicious 
cycle will require strong policies and institutions that will tackle this crucial challenge 
for the region (Cimoli, 2005).
This chapter argues that despite the progress made in this area, policies to support 
SMEs in the region need to advance toward strategies that will form the basis for new 
public policies with clear objectives for SMEs. These policies should: i) incorporate 
long maturation periods through coherent, prolonged actions; ii) build and strengthen 
institutional capacities to maintain, co-ordinate and implement these policies; iii) be 
flexible enough to adapt to changes in production structures, the international climate 
and the macroeconomic context, as well as to national and sub-national specificities; 
and iv) take into consideration the full spectrum of SMEs. 
If they are given the right policy framework, these firms, especially those that 
have the greatest growth potential, can become a lever to transform Latin American 
economies through the following processes: 
•	 Helping boost productivity by introducing technological and organisational 
changes. SMEs can thus become agents to bring about structural change, helping 
to create and spread innovations and develop new markets (OECD, 2010). Also, if 
new firms enter the market they can add to competition and open the way for new 
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business models that will challenge traditional models. This would create healthy 
shocks (or “creative destruction” as Schumpeter called it), leading to a constant 
search for more productive uses of resources1 and helping boost the economy’s 
aggregate productivity (Altenburg and Eckhardt, 2006). 
•	
If new firms join the market they can increase competition and 
open the way for new business models to come in and challenge 
traditional models. This would create healthy shocks that help 
boost an economy’s aggregate productivity.
Complementing economies of scale of large firms. Greater flexibility enables 
SMEs to reduce transaction costs through close contact with customers and fast 
decision-making. SMEs in particular would be in a position to access diversified 
markets (through exports or sales to large retail chains) and global value chains, 
and to benefit from technology transfer (Dini and Stumpo, 2004).
•	 Developing an important role in creating production clusters, which are designed 
as a form of local co-operation between economic agents and institutions with the 
aim of creating a competitive advantage. This interaction allows firms involved to 
increase production, adopt technologies more easily, speed up learning processes, 
and thus achieve a level of collective efficiency that is beyond the reach of an 
individual firm (Ferraro, 2010).
•	 Contributing to social inclusion by increasing microenterprises’ income and 
reducing their vulnerability. Many Latin American microenterprises were set up as 
a survival strategy due to the sluggishness of labour-intensive economic activity. 
Workers in microenterprises are usually not poor but are often among the most 
vulnerable sectors of society (OECD, 2011). Microenterprises are not guaranteed 
to be absorbed by dynamic sectors because this takes quite a long time and the 
staff may not have the necessary skills. Some policies to support microenterprises 
(such as multidimensional interventions related to microfinance) effectively and 
efficiently provide the tools to raise and stabilise incomes in a context of small or 
incomplete social safety nets. 
This chapter analyses the nature of SMEs’ involvement in the region’s production 
structure and the development of policies to support SMEs. The chapter is structured 
in seven sections. It begins by providing a regional overview of SMEs in Latin America, 
focusing on their huge diversity and poor productivity and on their distribution by 
sectors and their contribution to employment and exports. Next it analyses the regional 
environment in which SMEs are operating, especially the business climate and their 
incorporation into the production structure. The next section examines how the region’s 
development policies for SMEs have evolved. The text then describes the institutional 
environment of organisations devoted to supporting SMEs, especially their structure and 
regulatory aspects. The next section looks very briefly at the objectives and strategies of 
development policies, and the following section addresses the problems resulting from 
how those policies are designed and implemented. The chapter ends with a series of 
conclusions and recommendations, putting forward a new vision to move forward under 
a new public-policy agenda for the sector. 
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Regional overview of SMEs
A fundamental aspect of Latin American SMEs is how extremely diverse they are. 
Some microenterprises were born out of an individual person’s need for self-employment. 
Such businesses often operate informally and have low human capital, difficulty 
in accessing external financial resources, very little internationalisation, and work 
activities with very few technical requirements. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
are high-growth SMEs, known as “gazelle companies”, which are much more dynamic in 
terms of sales revenue and job creation and which exploit market opportunities through 
efficient, innovative business management. Therefore, the concept of company size 
conceals what is in fact a very diverse reality for this type of production unit.
One of the defining characteristics of Latin American SMEs is 
that they are highly diverse, ranging from those set up out of a 
need for self-employment and subsistence to those able to exploit 
market opportunities through efficient, innovative management.
The diverse nature of SMEs conditions how policies geared towards them are 
designed. Because the concept of an SME covers such a vast array of different types of 
businesses, a one-size-fits-all approach to policy making is not advisable. In addition to 
having different growth potentials for productivity and employment, SMEs of different 
types are usually confronted with very disparate obstacles. For some, most of the 
obstacles are internal constraints on the company (for instance, the limited capacity 
of the entrepreneur), while for others they are the result of an unfavourable external 
environment for the sector, production chain or cluster, or even an unfavourable 
macroeconomic environment. 
Among Latin American countries there are at least two different definitions of an 
SME. One is based on the number of employees in the firm, and the other uses sales 
revenue to determine the economic size of production units. The first definition ignores 
what are usually major differences among sectors (and among branches within each 
sector), often resulting in SMEs’ contribution to the economy being overestimated.2 
However, this is the criterion used in national statistics departments, which often 
provide the data available in these countries, while the policy-making bodies define 
company sizes based on the sales-revenue criterion.
Despite these difficulties in comparing data between one country and another, there 
are certain general patterns in the relative productivity and distribution of firms by 
size among the region’s SMEs. Latin American SMEs’ relative productivity levels are, on 
average, below those recorded in selected OECD countries. For example, the national 
productivity levels of small firms relative to large firms range from 16% to 36% in Latin 
America, but from 63% to 75% in Europe (Figure 2.1). The discrepancies in productivity 
affect the wage gap (Table 2.1), which has major consequences for income distribution 
and inequality in the region.
The productivity of small firms relative to large firms in Latin 
America ranges from 16% to 36%, compared with relative 
productivites of 63% to 75%  in Europe.
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Figure 2.1. Relative productivity in selected Latin American and OECD countries
(as percentages, productivity of large firms = 100%)
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Table 2.1. Wage gaps relative to large firms, 2006
(as percentages)
Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Germany Spain France Italy
Micro 36 43 - 21 69 63 - -
Small 44 42 52 56 73 74 88 69
Medium 57 64 69 55 81 89 91 79
Large 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: For Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico: based on official figures from the countries; for Germany, Spain, 
France and Italy: Eurostat (2006).
Differences in productivity among businesses are closely related to the production 
structure and how jobs are distributed across sectors. In 2008, over 70% of workers in 
the region were employed in low-productivity sectors, such as agriculture, construction, 
retail and personal services; 20% were employed in medium-productivity sectors, such 
as industry and transport; and 8% were employed in high-productivity sectors, such as 
mining, finance and energy (ECLAC, 2010). 
In the distribution of firms by size in Latin America, as in OECD countries, about 
99% of firms are SMEs. This underlines the importance of SMEs in production and their 
potential as agents of structural change. Because they are so numerous in the production 
fabric, any industrial policy and structural change must take into account the variety of 
characteristics, peculiarities and dynamics of SMEs (Table 2.2).
In 2008, out of every hundred Latin American workers, 8 worked in 
high-productivity sectors (mining, energy, finance), 20 worked in medium-
productivity sectors (industry and transport) and over 70 worked in low-
productivity sectors (agriculture, construction, commerce and services).
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Table 2.2. Proportion of firms by size in selected 
Latin American and OECD countries
(as percentages)
Country Micro Small Medium Large
Argentina 81.6 16.1 1.9 0.4
Brazil 85.4 12.1 1.4 1.0
Chile 90.4 7.8 1.2 0.6
Colombia 93.2 5.5 1.0 0.3
Ecuador 95.4 3.8 0.6 0.2
Mexico 95.5 3.6 0.8 0.2
Peru 98.1 1.54 0.34 0.02
Uruguay 83.8 13.4 3.1 0.6
Germany 83.0 14.1 2.4 0.5
Spain 92.6 6.5 0.8 0.1
France 93.0 5.9 0.9 0.2
Italy 94.4 5.0 0.5 0.1
 Source: For Latin American countries: based on official figures from the countries; for France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain: OECD (2011).
Jobs in microenterprises are mainly in retail and in some low value-added services; 
small firms’ employees work mainly in retail and, to a lesser extent, the manufacturing 
sector, and in construction in some countries. In medium-sized firms, meanwhile, in 
several countries manufacturing is the sector that employs most people, but retail is 
also relatively important. In large firms, manufacturing and certain higher value-added 
services (telecommunications and financial intermediation) provide most employment.
This distribution of employment varies somewhat depending on the shape of 
each country’s production structure. For instance, in countries with less industrial 
development, commerce can be important for employment and for large firms and 
in some countries is as large as or larger than the industrial sector. For large firms, 
telecommunications and financial intermediation services can have a greater impact on 
smaller economies that are more highly specialised in these sectors.
In all countries in the region, smaller firms, especially micro and small enterprises, 
operate in the least productive sectors of the economy. These sectors have low entry 
barriers, and little need and few incentives to work in conjunction with other firms (to 
create networks or clusters). Consequently, they also have less chance of generating 
externalities to increase their specialisation (and that of the workforce), their propensity 
to innovate and their productivity.
Another aspect of the productive environment of Latin American SMEs is its low 
level of internationalisation (Table 2.3). A huge constraint for these companies to 
access foreign markets is the structure of the region’s exports. Exports focus mainly 
on natural resources and their derivatives, an area dominated by large firms because of 
the heavy investment it requires, which leaves little space for the involvement of small 
and medium-sized firms. Furthermore, this composition of regional exports feeds the 
heterogeneity of the Latin American production structure because it does not encourage 
SMEs to access more innovative processes through a stimulus to export. Also, the low 
internationalisation of SMEs means that many of them supply only the domestic market. 
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These companies thus become highly dependent on the macroeconomic conditions 
of the domestic economy (Peres and Stumpo, 2002). It is therefore not surprising that 
during highly volatile economic cycles the mortality rate of firms is inversely correlated 
to their size and the entry rate of new firms contracts more among smaller, formal firms 
(Castillo et al., 2004; Crespi, 2003).
Table 2.3. Proportion of exports by company size
(as percentages)
Argentina Brazil Chile Spain Italy Germany France
Micro 0.3 0.1 - 11.1 9 8 17
Small 1.6 0.9 0.4 13.3 19 12 10
Medium 6.5 9.5 1.5 22.6 28 18 15
Large 91.6 82.9 97.9 47.1 44 62 58
Note: The figures for Brazil do not include special micro and small enterprises, which provide 6.6% of total 
exports; for Chile, the figure for small businesses includes microenterprises; for Spain, 5.9% of exports are 
by companies of unknown size, and are therefore not included; for Germany, the figures are only for exports 
within Europe. 
Source: For Argentina, Rotondo et al. (2009); for Brazil, SEBRAE (2011); for Chile, ILO/SERCOTEC (2010); for Spain, 
OECD (2012); for France, Germany and Italy, Eurostat (2008).
According to a comparison of firms’ entry and survival rates between Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia and Mexico and European countries, there are huge differences in the business 
dynamics (Bartelsman et al., 2004). Mexico has higher entry rates than Argentina, Brazil 
and most European countries. However, the survival rate of Mexican SMEs is lower than 
in other countries in the region, indicating a business environment in which entry is 
easy but medium-term survival is more difficult. Although there is no detailed analysis 
of these dynamics in all Latin American countries, it is important to remind ourselves 
that the region’s diversity shows how important the production environment is in 
determining SMEs’ performance.
During highly volatile economic cycles the mortality rate of firms 
is inversely correlated to their size and the entry rate of new firms 
contracts more among smaller, formal firms.
The economic context in which firms operate
Sensitive factors that can be adjusted through public policy and that affect SMEs’ 
performance include the business climate and the production structure, which in turn 
include access to finance, technology, human resources and the existence of production 
linkages. Both the business climate and the production structure in the region place 
major limitations on the development of SMEs.
The business climate 
Comparison between advanced economies and Latin America shows a sharp 
contrast in the cost of market entry for new firms. The experience of more developed 
countries shows that institutional strength, programmes to support the industrial 
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sector, the educational system, especially in science and technology, macroeconomic 
conditions, market size, and the accessibility and quality of finance, among other 
factors, strongly impact SMEs’ characteristics and capacities (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993; Lazonick, 2008). The healthy interconnections among these factors facilitate the 
existence of “Schumpeterian-type” SMEs, that is, SMEs with capacities to forge radical 
innovations that will contribute to economic growth. Although these kinds of firms 
are also found in less-developed countries, they are less frequent. Instead there are 
firms marked by sluggishness and few incremental innovations, if any at all. For firms 
in less-developed countries it is harder to close the technology and competitiveness 
gaps. 
As is seen in more developed countries, factors such as institutional 
strength, programmes to promote the industrial sector, the educational 
system, especially in science and technology, macroeconomic 
conditions, market size and the accessibility and quality of finance 
strongly impact SMEs’ characteristics and capacities.
A variety of factors make it harder for SMEs in Latin America to close these gaps. First, 
there are socio-economic factors such as the unequal distribution of national income, 
high levels of poverty, and the poor development of institutions. This context makes it 
harder to access knowledge and financial resources and to create dynamic, innovative 
businesses (Stam and van Stel, 2011). Second, there is the regulatory framework: 
the cost and time needed to complete the procedures required to register and start 
up a business in Latin America are among the main obstacles to their development 
(Figure 2.2). Despite the region’s progress in the three indicators shown in Figure 2.2, 
Latin America still lags behind other regions and the global average. These problems 
translate into higher business costs, which as a percentage of per capita income are 
almost eight times higher in Latin America than in OECD countries (ECLAC/IDB/OAS, 
2011). There are similar administrative problems when closing a business. According 
to International Labour Organization (ILO) and World Bank data, it takes an average 
of four years to close a business and liquidate its assets in Latin America, while the 
percentage of debt recovered by creditors amounts to 17%. By contrast, in the OECD it 
takes an average of just 1.7 years to close a business and liquidate its assets, and the 
percentage of debt recovered by creditors is 68% (Tueros et al., 2009; World Bank, 2012). 
Latin American regulations hinder creating and liquidating businesses and encourage 
micro and small enterprises to operate informally (Capelleras and Kantis, 2009). There 
are also major differences among Latin American countries in these aspects. For 
instance, Chile, Colombia and Mexico present similar indicators to more developed 
countries in the three dimensions analysed in this chapter, while other countries lag 
far behind (Table 2.4). 
51LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
2. TRAITs AND pOLICIEs Of LATIN AMERICAN sMEs















0 2 4 6 8 10 12 
A. Number of procedures B. Duration (days)


























EU (15)  
Figure 2.2. Cost indicators for starting a business
(number of procedures, days and share of per capita income)
Source: World Bank (2012).
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Table 2.4.  Cost indicators for starting a business in 2011
Country Number of procedures Duration (days) Cost (% of per capita income)
Argentina 14 26 11.9
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 15 50 90.4
Brazil 13 119 5.4
Chile 7 7 5.1
Colombia 9 14 8.0
Costa Rica 12 60 11.1
Dominican Republic 7 19 18.2
Ecuador 13 56 28.8
El Salvador 8 17 45.1
Guatemala 12 37 52.5
Honduras 13 14 46.7
Mexico 6 9 11.2
Nicaragua 8 39 107.9
Paraguay 7 35 47.2
Peru 5 26 11.9
Suriname 13 694 115
Uruguay 5 7 24.9
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 17 141 26.1
Source: World Bank (2012).
Integration of firms in the productive structure
Another key element that determines the performance of SMEs in Latin America 
is the productive structure seen in most firms in the region. The most modern SMEs 
in Latin America do not make the same contribution to their country’s production 
system as their counterparts in OECD countries (Diagrammes 2.1 and 2.2). In OECD 
countries, SMEs can only survive in the industrial development process if they produce 
specific goods and services that do not compete with products mass-produced by 
large industrial firms. These goods and services are normally designed specifically 
for their customers’ needs. They are produced in small runs for market niches or are 
closely related to customer service (installation, customisation, maintenance, etc.). 
These SMEs also produce services for large firms or to complement their catalogue of 
services. Economies of scale play a minor role in these areas, pushing the benefits of the 
flexibility and customer proximity offered by SMEs to the fore. This kind of specialisation 
demands greater technical and business qualifications, and one particular prerequisite 
is the capacity to innovate continuously. Most Latin American SMEs do not have these 
qualifications, and almost all of them operate in standardised forms of production that 
are not knowledge-intensive, thus competing directly with mass producers and/or large 
commercial enterprises. An example of this is the mass production of consumer goods 
(generic food products, footwear, clothing), in which Latin American SMEs do not have 
competitive advantages.
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Source: Altenburg and Eckhardt (2006).
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SMEs produce for niche markets
Very few specialised niche providers
Diagram 2.2. Typical industrial organisation in developing countries
This structure of production also affects SMEs’ ability to establish linkages with 
other real-economy agents. Since many Latin American SMEs produce traditional 
consumer goods for segments of the market with low prices and use standard processes 
that leave very little room for innovation, they are vastly limited in their ability to 
forge linkages with larger fi rms. The larger fi rms rarely choose domestic suppliers, 
which struggle to meet the necessary quality or volume of production. This results 
in a vicious cycle, with the initial low productivity fuelling an absence of knowledge 
transfer among businesses, and vice versa (Altenburg, 2011). So, the landscape is 
substantially different from that seen in developed countries, where SMEs operate 
more as suppliers of large fi rms or specialise in market niches, and are less involved 
in mass production.
Changes in development policies 
Over the past four decades, Latin American policies for SMEs have moved through 
various stages. In the 1970s, and to a certain extent in the 1980s, certain isolated 
measures were taken in a way that was not strategically tailored for this segment. 
54 LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
2. TRAITs AND pOLICIEs Of LATIN AMERICAN sMEs
Governments would generally intervene actively in the economy, but their actions 
would target specific sectors or groups of companies. Most countries had not yet begun 
structural reforms. In this context, SMEs were seen as economic agents that at best 
should be protected; they were not targeted by competitiveness policy3 or by economic 
development projects. The main form of intervention for SMEs at that time was through 
first-tier credit programmes.
Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s (possibly due to an extreme view of state 
neutrality but also due to the poor results achieved by previous action) Latin America 
adopted the view that “the best policy was no policy”. This viewpoint was reinforced in 
the early 1990s by the recommendations put forward by the Washington Consensus, 
which said that the market was the best co-ordinator and allocator of resources in the 
economy.
Paradoxically, the Washington Consensus helped bring about a resurgence of interest 
in SMEs. The scant success of the mid-1990s reforms sparked high unemployment in 
many countries in the region, among other consequences. The high unemployment gave 
rise to a change in mindset, with SMEs now seen as potential creators of jobs, thus 
renewing interest in these firms in both academic and political circles. During this period 
various institutions to promote SMEs sprang up: the SME Secretariat in Argentina (1997), 
the Undersecretariat for Small and Medium Industries and Crafts in Ecuador (1999) and 
the National Micro and Small Enterprise Commission (CONAMYPE) in El Salvador (1996). 
However, this new interest in SMEs was not always accompanied by real progress in 
implementing policies, which often went no further than declarations or documents 
that were well publicised but produced little tangible fruit.
The last ten years have seen many institutional and regulatory 
changes and areas of intervention have been expanded and improved. 
These changes have benefited SMEs, and have been accompanied by 
greater efforts by the region’s governments to promote these firms, 
allowing new, innovative instruments to emerge.
In several countries of the region, concerns about job creation have led governments 
to include microenterprises in the scope of policies that were initially designed for 
SMEs. This is particularly visible in Chile, Ecuador and El Salvador. In Peru, meanwhile, 
policies are geared solely to micro and small enterprises, and exclude medium-sized 
firms.4 Normally when governments have included microenterprises in their policies 
it has been the result not so much of a period of reflection on business development as 
of an attempt to address unemployment, marginalisation and the informal economy in 
the country.
Because there is no clear analytical framework, the policies’ focus has been able to 
shift to reducing poverty and increasing employment, with the objectives of improving 
competitiveness and developing exports fading into the background. Medium-sized 
firms run the risk of being marginalised by the support policies, as do certain areas 
of intervention geared towards more dynamic firms (for example, gazelle companies, 
new ventures in dynamic, more knowledge-intensive sectors, and companies with the 
potential to enter international markets). 
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The last ten years have seen many institutional and regulatory changes, and 
areas of intervention have expanded and improved. The growing interest in SMEs 
led governments to be more resolute in introducing initiatives that focus specifically 
on developing these economic agents, many of which have created innovative 
new instruments. This is especially true with regard to the promotion of business 
co-operation, production linkages and finance. However, in most countries too little 
time is still given to considering the contribution SMEs make to growing and changing 
the economy’s production patterns. The only recognition they get is limited to generic 
statements on their potential to contribute to job creation. The role of development 
policies for SMEs is also ignored. 
The institutional context of policies
To understand the specific features of the context in which policies are designed we 
must analyse two aspects of the context: the institutional framework and the regulatory 
framework. For SMEs, the political situation is basically marked by their dependence 
on macroeconomic policy and their subjection to competitiveness policies, though it is 
true that regarding the latter there have been positive developments over the last ten 
years. In the 1990s, policies to support SMEs were just one segment of a whole range of 
initiatives aimed toward boosting competitiveness. Since then the situation has evolved 
to where it seems that competitiveness policies are limited almost entirely to providing 
support for SMEs. Brazil, however, has used industrial policy to support SMEs.
Giving greater autonomy to agencies responsible for supporting 
SMEs could increase their capacity to design and implement policies, 
help improve the stability and professionalism of staff and make 
administrative procedures swifter and more flexible. But greater 
autonomy could also break many of the links between policies to 
support SMEs and national guidelines on productive development.
The institutional framework
For practical purposes, the institutional framework is complex because it is formed 
by various bodies and agencies and not just by the institution that is formally responsible 
for promoting SMEs. Even in countries without a federal political-administrative 
structure, even if they have a body specifically responsible for promoting SMEs, normally 
there are various institutions responsible for designing and implementing programmes 
to support this sector, whether they are banks, institutions to promote exports, public 
training institutes, government labour ministries, foreign affairs ministries and even 
home affairs ministries.
There are significant differences among countries in the level of independence and 
the political weight of the main institution to support SMEs. Institutions that have a 
certain level of independence can generate a greater capacity to design and implement 
policies. These institutions can plan further ahead and give greater continuity to their 
policies and programmes, more stability and professionalism to their staff, and faster 
and more flexible administrative processes in general (Angelelli, 2007). These factors can 
foster the development of an institutional learning mechanism. In two Latin American 
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countries the main agency to promote SMEs enjoys great levels of autonomy: SEBRAE 
in Brazil and the Production Development Corporation in Chile (CORFO). But even in 
these two countries, some of the potential benefits of autonomy have not been realised 
in recent years. Because of changes of government or a shift in their priorities, in Brazil 
and Chile both the programmes and the technical staff responsible for implementing 
them have been changed, and at times even suspended (Kulfas and Goldstein, 2011). 
It is unclear whether these institutions are truly independent of political cycles, even 
those that enjoy greater autonomy than their counterparts in other countries in the 
region.5
Giving development agencies greater autonomy increases the risk that their 
strategies might move away from national guidelines on productive development (if, 
indeed, such guidelines have been set out). One potential advantage of organisations 
to support SMEs working more closely with government ministries (production, 
industry or finance) is that it can make it easier to match policies aimed at SMEs with 
the national economic development agenda. However, there is no clear evidence that 
this happens in Latin America (Ferraro, 2011; Ferraro and Stumpo, 2010).
Regarding the inclusion of development agencies to support SMEs in the 
government structure, although many countries made institutional changes in the 
last two decades to promote the agencies to the level of vice-ministry or secretariat, 
their new rank in government has not translated into greater executive political power. 
Whether the agencies have become vice-ministries, secretariats or undersecretariats, 
the main institution to support SMEs remains a national or regional department 
(Table 2.5). The type of institution responsible for developing SMEs also varies greatly 
across the region, ranging from private corporations (often dependent on a ministry) 
to vice-ministries. There are some major differences among countries in terms of 
institutional development. Various factors have helped turn these institutions into 
powerful bodies: national strategic guidelines on SMEs have been continued, the 
institutions have now existed for a long time, and, albeit a less important factor, the 
institutions have been given greater autonomy. In addition to agencies with vast 
experience, scope and operational capacity, such as SEBRAE in Brazil, or bodies set up 
more recently, like Mexico’s SME Fund, which has vastly developed its organisational 
and institutional role, there are other agencies where the process is at a much earlier 
stage, such as CONAMYPE in El Salvador. There are also agencies that have carried out 
a series of isolated actions, with very little co-ordination or continuity, as occurred in 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Ferraro, 
2011; Ferraro and Stumpo, 2010).
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Table 2.5.  Development institutions in Latin America
Country Institution Ministry
Argentina Secretariat for SMEs and Regional Development Ministry of Industry
Bolivia (Plur. State of) Vice-Ministry of Micro and Small Enterprises
Ministry of Productive Development and the Plural 
Economy
Bolivia (Plur. State of)
Vice-Ministry of Medium and Large Scale 
Production
Ministry of Productive Development and the Plural 
Economy
Brazil
Brazilian Micro and Small Enterprise Support 
Service (SEBRAE)
Independent
Chile Production Development Corporation (CORFO) Independent
Chile Technical Co-operation Service (SERCOTEC) Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism
Colombia MSME Bureau Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism
Dominican Republic Council for Promoting and Supporting MSMEs Ministry of Industry and Commerce
Ecuador Undersecretariat of MSMEs and Crafts Ministry of Industry and Productivity
El Salvador
National Micro and Small Enterprise Commission 
(CONAMYPE)
Ministry of Economy
Guatemala Vice-Ministry of MSMEs Ministry of Economy
Honduras
The Undersecretariat of the Bureau for MSMEs 
and the Social Sector of the Economy
Secretariat of Industry and Commerce
Mexico Undersecretariat for SMEs Secretariat of Economics
Nicaragua
Nicaraguan Development Programme for MSMEs 
(PROPYMES)
Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce
Peru
Directorate-General for Micro and Small 
Enterprises and Co-operatives
Ministry of Production
Uruguay National Bureau for Crafts and SMEs Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Small and Medium-Sized Industry Development 
Institute
Ministry of People’s Power for Industries
Source: Based on official information from the countries.
Institutions responsible for designing and implementing policies must deal with 
huge limits on human and financial resources. All the institutions have a budget of 
less than 0.1% of GDP, and in many countries it is less than 0.01% (Table 2.6). These 
figures are in stark contrast to the contribution SMEs make to the production fabric 
of most of these economies, both in terms of the number of firms and the number of 
jobs they create. Aware of this situation, some countries have increased the amount of 
financial resources available in recent years (Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador and 
Mexico). But these larger budgets have not represented significant changes in terms of 
percentage of GDP or government spending.6 Furthermore, a large share of many of these 
institutions’ funds do not come from the national budget. In El Salvador, for instance, 
58% of CONAMYPE’s budget came from external resources in 2006, and almost all of 
the budget for Paraguay’s agency came from international co-operation in 2007. In other 
countries, certain strategically important areas, such as credit, function essentially 
with external resources.7 Where this happens, the availability of resources depends 
on strategic decisions that are not adopted by the national authorities responsible for 
implementing policies. These decisions can affect the continuity of the programmes.
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Table 2.6. Expenditure by institutions to develop SMEs, 2005
(percentage of GDP)  
Country Expenditure Country Expenditure
Argentina 0.004 Honduras 0.005
Brazil 0.085 Mexico 0.015
Chile 0.030 Nicaragua 0.022
Colombia 0.008 Panama 0.027
Costa Rica 0.004 Paraguay 0.005
Dominican Republic 0.033 Peru 0.004
Ecuador 0.005 Uruguay 0.002
El Salvador 0.019 Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 0.024
Guatemala 0.006 Latin America 0.018
Source: ECLAC, based on official information from the countries. 
Very often poor institutional capacity is combined with budgetary constraints that 
limit measures to make policies for SMEs more effective. It is therefore important not 
only to increase the budgets assigned to these development institutions but also to 
markedly improve their capacity to mark out strategies, draw up policies and roll out 
the support instruments and mechanisms.
The regulatory framework
Defining a specific legal framework for SMEs is the second important aspect to 
consider, as it may help give policies greater stability and continuity and make their 
results easier to forecast. In addition to including a definition of the beneficiaries of 
development actions, this legal framework reflects the strategy’s objectives, or at 
least its general guidelines, and in some cases may indicate specific policies (Kulfas 
and Goldstein, 2011). While some countries began drawing up specific regulations for 
SMEs back in the 1980s,8 only more recently have such initiatives begun to spread. For 
instance, in Argentina, the SMEs Act was passed in 1997 and amended in 2000, while in 
Brazil the Micro and Small Enterprises Act (Law 9317) was passed in 1996 and the Micro 
and Small Enterprises Ordinance was passed in 1999 (Law 9841), and later, in 2006, the 
General Law on Micro and Small Enterprises built a new legal framework. Chile passed 
the SME Ordinance (Law 20 416) in 2010 and Mexico passed the Development of MSME 
Competitiveness Act in 2002. These initiatives confirm the gradual trend towards greater 
inclusion of SMEs in countries’ strategies and more precise definitions of the role they 
are given.
In some countries, these new laws enabled existing initiatives to be consolidated 
and organised, strengthening guidelines that had been in place for many years. This was 
the case in Brazil and Chile, for instance. In other countries, meanwhile, the new laws 
laid the foundations for adopting a new strategy of action. The most relevant experience 
in this regard is that of Mexico. It began its reforms by creating the Undersecretariat 
for SMEs (SPYME) in 2001 and passing the Development of MSME Competitiveness 
Act in 2002. In this framework, three programmes were developed to support MSMEs: 
the Support Fund for MSMEs (FANPYME), the Fund to Support Access to Finance for 
MSMEs (FOAFI) and the Fund to Support Production Chain Integration (FIDECAP). The 
undersecretariat merged these three programmes together in 2004 to create the SME 
Fund, which has become the country’s main body for promoting SMEs, using a novel, 
integrated approach.
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Objectives and strategies
SME’s role in the development process is reflected in the objectives of the 
development policies designed for these companies. In this regard, there are differences 
among countries in the region resulting from the potential role each country gives SMEs 
and the underlying conceptual framework.
While having numerous objectives for policies and initiatives to 
support SMEs should not pose a problem per se, in practice it 
requires an institutional capacity and a coherence among political 
instruments that are sometimes lacking in Latin America.
While it is true that the number of objectives associated with support policies and 
initiatives has gradually been cut down over the last two decades, there is still a plethora 
of objectives, which in many cases are unjustified. In theory, policies to support SMEs are 
geared toward creating jobs, increasing exports, triggering productivity gains, improving 
innovation capacity and competitiveness, fostering the development of human capital 
and reducing market failures. In some countries in the region, promoting regional 
development is another objective. These objectives are not sought in all countries at 
the same time. Some countries adopt three or four objectives, such as in Ecuador and 
Colombia (Burneo and Grijalva, 2010; Zuleta, 2011). But some countries set as many as six 
or more objectives at the same time, such as Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Mexico (Belmar 
and Maggi, 2010; Pessoa de Matos and Arrojo, 2011; Cabal, 2010; Brown and Domínguez, 
2010). While taking on numerous objectives should not pose a problem per se, in practice 
it requires an institutional capacity and coherence among political instruments that are 
sometimes lacking in Latin America. 
Another problem with multiple objectives is prioritising them. Some institutions 
responsible for designing and implementing policies still have difficulties with 
prioritising their objectives. Creating jobs and improving competitiveness usually figure 
among the essential objectives. But improving competitiveness is only sometimes 
defined as a clear, unequivocal goal. Sometimes the quest for greater inclusion of SMEs 
in national and international markets (substituting imports) is cited as one of the 
objectives. The potential for SMEs to actively take part in developing the economy as a 
whole is considered explicitly and implicitly. In other cases, improving competitiveness 
is synonymous with strengthening SMEs to “survive” in contexts in which domestic 
markets are fully open (Kulfas and Goldstein, 2011).
Design and implementation
Policies that seek to change the situation of SMEs have achieved limited results.9 
This has been blamed on problems in the design and implementation stages. Other 
aspects that have hindered results are the theoretical framework behind the policies, 
co-ordination among institutions and programmes, and the capacity of agencies 
responsible for public policies to produce correct diagnoses.
The theoretical framework
In relation to the theoretical framework, it is important to take into account that 
SMEs are a highly diverse set of economic agents. This affects which policies are chosen 
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and should be reflected in their objectives, instruments and forms of implementation. 
Studies on SMEs in Latin America acknowledge their diversity, and policy makers largely 
do so too. However, this has not resulted in a coherent model to justify the selectiveness 
of these interventions.
Some countries, though, have made progress in this area. Brazil, for instance, 
includes various stages of the business life cycle: entrepreneurs who want to start a 
business; firms that are less than two years old; and firms that are more than two years 
old. In Mexico, however, beginning with the process initiated when the SPYME was set 
up in 2001, the 2002 legislation was passed and the SME Fund was set up in 2004, a 
model has been drawn up that covers five types of firms (reflecting the possible stages of 
development of SMEs): new enterprises, microenterprises, SMEs, gazelle companies and 
market-driving companies.10 The Mexican business development strategy is built around 
five stages, beginning with training “new individual entrepreneurs”, who turn their 
businesses into microenterprises and then into SMEs. The SMEs that mature and achieve 
sustained high growth (20% a year or higher) turn into gazelle companies, which qualifies 
them to receive support from non-governmental bodies called business accelerators. 
This support allows them to move into the next phase, associated with market-driving 
companies (large firms), by integrating into supply chains or becoming exporting SMEs. 
Each stage is associated with a specific set of instruments according to the particular 
characteristics of each business segment. The role of the SME Fund is essentially to 
provide demand-side subsidies, which can generate constraints, particularly for smaller 
and less dynamic firms. However, an important new characteristic of this policy is that 
it plans, designs and implements support actions as part of an integrated model.
Despite these examples, in most Latin American countries implicit or explicit 
acknowledgement of how diverse beneficiaries are has not translated into a coherent 
model that is able to direct all the interventions. This is reflected in the “horizontal”,11 
excessive use of instruments based on the philosophy of demand-side subsidies. Although 
programmes such as these have had interesting results, they involve assumptions that 
could prove to be exaggerated. For example, these programmes assume firms are in a 
position to properly express their demand, and that doing so is enough to create markets. 
But this seems unlikely for smaller firms. Consequently, demand created by subsidies 
will not necessarily be for services that respond to the real constraints these firms face.
The assumption that subsidies create new markets for services for SMEs does not 
always hold true. Stable, efficient policies do not necessarily cause relevant markets to 
emerge. Particularly in the areas of technological innovation and training the results 
have been quite poor. A major problem seems to be that it is hard to create a services 
market for SMEs in areas that require heavy investment by the firms that should be 
offering the services. Subsidies do seem to successfully generate services in areas that do 
not need heavy investment by consultancy firms, such as administration, management, 
computing and marketing. But more sophisticated activities, such as training in 
industrial processes and the activities of technology centres, represent a hurdle that is 
too large for private companies whose market consists of SMEs.
Strict application of a policy of demand-side subsidies has strong 
negative consequences for SMEs: markets that need large-scale 
investment are not generated and instruments to develop production 
are designed for the most efficient SMEs, which most are not.
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Strict application of a policy of demand-side subsidies has strong negative 
consequences for SMEs. Certain markets are not generated, such as those that need 
large-scale investment from companies that want to participate and provide services 
to SMEs. Moreover, it is difficult to spread the use of instruments to develop production 
that have proved to be efficient, because they were designed specifically for the most 
dynamic companies, which are in a position to clearly define their market demand. Most 
SMEs do not fall under this category.
So, if intervention is built solely around demand-side subsidies it probably will only 
amplify the differences among firms. Though a small group of highly dynamic firms is 
able to use the available instruments efficiently, a much larger number of firms cannot. 
Consequently, only the dynamic companies will reap the rewards of the development 
programmes, thus widening the performance and efficiency gaps between them and 
less dynamic firms (Ferraro and Stumpo, 2010).
Co-ordination among institutions and programmes
The vast range of public institutions involved in designing and implementing policies 
creates problems in co-ordinating intervention measures. These problems are even 
more complex when the main agency in charge lacks the capacities, rank and resources 
to exercise the necessary leadership, which unfortunately happens more often than not 
in the region.
The situation becomes even more complex when the programmes are implemented 
through second-tier and third-tier systems. In these cases, a set of intermediary agents 
– sometimes created by the programmes themselves – must be used that require a 
high control and certification capacity from public agencies. In particular, they need 
co-ordination to ensure there is coherence among the overall policy objectives, the 
results achieved and the beneficiaries that are reached effectively. The problems are 
caused because the policies do not have an integrated vision (or they have a poorly 
defined perspective) or a guiding theoretical model12 in which the programmes and 
instruments are effectively co-ordinated in such a way as to complement each other. 
SMEs have problems related to innovation, human resources, capital, and specialist 
technical assistance, but there are few initiatives to co-ordinate the tools available and 
maximise their impact on the beneficiary firms.13
The lack of an integrated vision and institutional co-ordination is also reflected in 
the duplication of instruments. For example, in several countries in the region, multiple 
ministries in the same country (finance, foreign affairs, home affairs, etc.) have their 
own unrelated programmes encouraging SMEs to work together in partnerships, and 
these projects have different objectives and methodologies, and have little to no contact 
with one another.
Because there is so little co-ordination among the vast number of 
existing programmes for SMEs in the region’s countries, many 
experiences have been repeated over and over again without being 
assessed and without any lessons being learned from them.
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Although SMEs are highly diverse and operate in many different sectors and 
locations, which partly justifies why there are so many programmes, a lot of 
co-ordination is needed among these different programmes. As a result, experiences 
have been repeated, sometimes over and over again, without any corresponding 
assessment taking place and, more importantly, without any lessons being learned to 
help redesign and adapt them. This makes the transaction costs for companies to access 
and obtain information on these programmes expensive (Ferraro and Stumpo, 2010).
Diagnostic capacity
The development institutions’ strategic guidelines and programmes make 
assumptions about the SMEs that are not always justified by thorough strict analyses. 
This can lead to mistakes in selecting the groups of beneficiaries, instruments, and 
even objectives. In Latin America, there are still too few permanent mechanisms to 
help better understand the characteristics of the firms targeted by the policies, verify 
their performance and monitor the results achieved by the instruments. It is therefore 
necessary to consider the situation of the information systems and assessment 
mechanisms associated with the design and implementation of development policies 
in the region.
In Latin America, the information systems that support policies are either weak 
or do not exist. In recent years, development institutions have shown more interest in 
statistical data covering the policies’ beneficiaries. This is because it has been recognised 
that for a long time policies were designed based on isolated, unreliable data. In Argentina, 
for instance, the experience of the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory 
(OEDE), which is run by the Directorate-General for Employment Research and Policy 
Making, part of the Ministry of Employment’s Undersecretariat for Technical Planning 
and Labour Studies. The OEDE was formed in 2003 through a technical assistance 
programme between ECLAC and the Ministry of Employment. The observatory gathers 
information every month on 900 000 formal businesses (400 000 if excluding sole traders). 
This is a unique project in the region because it uses administrative records collected by 
public institutions.14 Another important experience is the implementation of SEPYME’s 
MAPA PyME programme in Argentina in 2007, which has provided new information on 
SMEs through a survey taken twice a year among 10 000 firms, gathering data on certain 
key variables on the economic dynamics of smaller firms.15 In Brazil, SEBRAE conducts 
research with a large quantitative component to analyse the general characteristics of 
micro and small enterprises and certain specific aspects such as their access to credit or 
survival factors and mortality rate.
In recent years, policy makers have shown a growing interest in mechanisms to 
assess SME support projects. In Chile an external institution, the University of Chile, 
evaluated the PROFO development programmes in 1996 and 2002 and the National 
Technology and Production Development Fund (FONTEC) in 2004. In El Salvador, the 
programme to support the development of micro and small enterprises was assessed in 
2004 and the Technical Assistance Fund (FAT) in 2005. In Mexico, the SME Fund has been 
assessed several times since its inception.
In sum, there is still no systematic effort to introduce assessments as an integral 
part of programmes or feedback mechanisms used for intervention instruments and 
modes of intervention. Nevertheless, the experiences described show that progress has 
been made over the past decade and policy makers are more concerned than in the past 
about measuring the results of interventions to support SMEs.
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Conclusions and recommendations: towards a new vision 
of policies for SMEs
Since the second half of the 1990s, major changes have been made to policies to 
support SMEs. In some countries, including Brazil and Mexico, these changes have 
probably been more pronounced, but in other countries changes have been made to 
the regulatory framework and institutional structure and the areas of intervention 
have been broadened (especially through production-linkage programmes). Despite the 
results achieved by a few individual initiatives, overall the policies have not significantly 
affected the performance of SMEs.
Certain key aspects need to be dealt with before a new policy agenda can be built. 
First, it seems necessary to make progress in defining an analytical framework to steer 
interventions and make them coherent. This involves specifying the roles assigned to 
SMEs as a whole and within each segment of SMEs in the country’s production and 
businesses. It also involves acknowledging the heterogeneity of the beneficiaries and 
the potentialities of each business sector, and marking the boundaries that define which 
businesses can be beneficiaries. These boundaries are not always clear, despite most 
countries having included microenterprises in their business-development policies. For 
instance, in the context of policies to support SMEs, there are doubts over the wisdom 
of including informal enterprises and sole traders and, more generally, all subsistence 
firms that have no real growth potential in programmes that assume beneficiaries have 
growth potential. Second, there needs to be a clear separation between economic and 
competitiveness objectives with other objectives, such as social objectives and poverty 
reduction.
Policies to support SMEs must match the productive-development 
guidelines of the countries in the region and become part of those 
efforts.
Once the heterogeneity of the beneficiaries has been acknowledged, these objectives 
must be consistent with the specific characteristics of these businesses. Certain areas 
generate complementary assets for firms, allowing for horizontal policies and approaches. 
However, it is much more important to define objectives, instruments and intervention 
methodologies that are effectively adapted to the full range of firms’ capacities and 
potentialities. Smaller firms, for instance, are unlikely to contribute to competitiveness 
objectives and will not be in a position to sufficiently respond to approaches based 
on demand-side subsidies. Instead, they will need much more intensive support and 
monitoring. Medium-sized and high-growth firms can associate with objectives to 
generate new sectors, enter international markets and develop production chains, and 
they are more likely to respond to specific incentives. Marking the boundaries of the 
beneficiaries does not mean excluding certain business sectors, but rather adapting 
and homing in on the objectives and mechanisms to support the specificities of the 
economic agents.
 In relation to this, there also needs to be greater co-ordination between countries’ 
policies to support SMEs and their broader plans to transform production, if any. If the 
policy to support SMEs does not include social objectives, it should be integrated into the 
efforts to change the productive structures. One of the characteristics of Latin America’s 
structural diversity is the highly segmented web of businesses and structures. Given 
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the little integration of many SMEs in the most important sectors of the production 
fabric, policies to support them need to be consistent with the countries’ guidelines for 
developing production to become part of those efforts. This is especially important for 
the most dynamic SMEs, which can successfully become part of national production 
chains, linking up with large firms to access international markets or helping generate 
new sectors. Initiatives geared towards SMEs should collectively be considered as a piece 
in the larger framework of industrial policy.
Policies need to go through a period of maturing and ongoing feedback. This requires 
an institutional maturing to guarantee the continuity and sustainability of interventions, 
whatever the political cycle. It also requires spaces for reflection on the results achieved, 
the effectiveness of the instruments and methodologies adopted, and the coherence 
and validity of the elements mentioned (analytical framework, objectives, focusing 
capacity, and coherence and integration with national development plans). At the same 
time, mechanisms are needed to monitor and adjust interventions, which means that 
monitoring systems and assessment instruments are vitally important.
Moreover, another element is necessary as a prerequisite for building an analytical 
framework and focusing actions according to the characteristics of the economic agents: 
the capacity to generate and update diagnoses through an information system built 
according to policy needs. Because quantitative information is so scarce in Latin America, 
it is difficult to diagnose the beneficiary firms’ circumstances and performance, and to 
evaluate the application of assessment mechanisms. Several countries have sources of 
information they do not use or they underuse.16 In most countries in the region, the 
results in this area have been rather poor, despite the innovative projects mentioned. The 
meagre results reflect the lack of commitment and the inability to see the importance 
of information in enabling the institutions responsible for the development of SMEs to 
design and assess policy. 
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Notes
1. For instance, it is estimated that the entry and exit of firms has accounted for between 20% and 40% of 
labour productivity growth in some European countries and the United States (OECD, 2003). Similarly, 
Baldwin (1995) found that 20-25% of productivity growth in US manufacturing was a result of this 
process.
2. In Argentina and Chile, the two criteria have been used to estimate the difference between the official 
figures and the real figures. The results found that the official figure for the contribution of SMEs to the 
total number of jobs was 7 percentage points too high in Argentina and more than 20 points too high in 
Chile (Stumpo, 2007). 
3.  “Competitive policy” is used here to mean the set of measures targeting the most dynamic economic 
agents with the aim of improving the country’s integration into the global economy.
4. Brazil is a different case altogether. Although SEBRAE has been dedicated to supporting micro and small 
enterprises ever since its inception, it does not exclude medium-sized firms from its public policies and 
has created several industrial development and competitiveness programmes. 
5. A case in point is Argentina’s Secretariat of SMEs and Regional Development (SEPYME), which since its 
inception in 1997 (as the “SME Department” in the Ministry of Finance) showed unusual institutional 
volatility for at least a decade (Sztulwark, 2010).
6. The funds available for implementing policies are greater than what is shown in Table 2.6, since in 
addition to the main body responsible for supporting SMEs there are other institutions involved in 
programmes that directly or indirectly benefit SMEs. Nevertheless, the figures suggest there is a 
huge discrepancy between, on the one hand, the statements, intentions and institutional mandates 
associated with these policies (which often aspire to cover more than 90% of the country’s businesses), 
and, on the other hand, the real possibility they have of having an effect on SMEs. 
7. This is what has happened in Argentina in Chile (Belmar and Maggi, 2010; Sztulwark, 2010).
8. In Colombia, for instance, Law 78 was passed in 1988 with a series of provisions to promote micro-
enterprises and small and medium-sized industries. Later, in 2004, Law 905 set a new institutional 
framework for the development of policies geared to SMEs.
9. However, there are programmes, some of which are quite innovative, that have achieved positive 
results for specific, usually quite limited groups of beneficiaries, as discussed in other chapters. 
10. Market-driving companies are large firms that create jobs and growth for the country. They are a 
fundamental market for the growth of SMEs and can forge opportunities for SMEs to outsource.
11. It is important to clarify that “horizontal” here refers to both the decision not to set priority sectors and 
areas for intervention and to the trend to consider all firms that benefit from these policies as having 
the same capacity to respond to market stimuli.
12. Irrespective of which model is chosen.
13. An example is the separation between financial and non-financial instruments. Often, financial 
instruments involve different institutions, objectives and beneficiaries from non-financial instruments.
14. Although this experience arose from concerns related to the study of the job market, incorporating 
a dimension of analysis related to business development has yielded information on SMEs and the 
creation of areas of study that are relevant to SMEs. For more information, see the OEDE’s website 
(www.trabajo.gov.ar/left/estadisticas/oede/index.asp). 
15. Regrettably, this programme has become very weak.
16. Especially those sources related to administrative, fiscal and social security records. 
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CHAPTER 
THREE 
Financing SMEs in Latin America 
In Latin America, SMEs still have poorer access to finance, less 
favourable conditions and higher costs than large firms, despite 
the major improvements in the region in recent years. This gap 
hinders a greater contribution to development by micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises, i.e. most production units in the region. 
The changes experienced by the Latin American financial system, 
particularly the shift from relationship banking to multi-service 
banking, have contributed to limiting access to credit for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Public financial institutions have 
contributed greatly to narrowing the financing gap, and recently 
new tools have proliferated to meet the needs of SMEs. However, for 
smaller companies to live up to their full potential they need greater 
access to financial and non-financial resources. There is ample space 
for public action through instruments and services to support (SMEs), 
a task that must involve national governments and the private sector. 
The region needs flexible, comprehensive public policies to finance 
businesses, with options for training, production linkages and 
innovation.
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Introduction
Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises are the economy’s main drivers of 
productivity growth, job creation and a more diverse business structure. However, 
the importance of smaller firms in Latin America contrasts with the limited finance 
available to them. The level of finance is essential to understanding how these firms 
have developed in the region and for understanding their productivity levels, innovative 
capacity and integration into global value chains, among other traits. Also, the problems 
faced by SMEs in accessing credit and the unfavourable conditions under which they 
obtain it, compared to larger firms, remain some of the main obstacles preventing 
them from growing and developing. Before we can understand the nature of financing 
for smaller Latin American firms we must first analyse how the financial system has 
developed, what its structure is and which of its characteristics most affect financing 
mechanisms for SMEs. An appropriate, beneficial financial system is essential to spur 
growth in production, especially among SMEs in the region.1 
This chapter addresses the financing challenges of smaller firms in Latin America. 
The text is structured in four sections, followed by an appendix. The first section 
describes recent trends in access to finance, particularly how the credit model for SMEs 
has developed, and the factors that help explain the funding gap that affects smaller 
firms. Next, the chapter examines the role that public financial institutions such as first- 
and second-tier development banks and public guarantee funds play in lending to these 
firms and stimulating new sectors. The third section presents new financial and non-
financial instruments that provide opportunities to improve finance, including access 
and conditions, for SMEs. The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for 
public policy. These recommendations reflect the need for an integral approach that 
takes training, production linkages and innovation into account. Finally, the Appendix 
goes into greater detail on the structure of finance for firms in the region.
Trends in the financing of SMEs in Latin America
A significant proportion of Latin American SMEs still have limited access to finance. 
Less than 15% of lending in the region goes to smaller firms, even though they form the 
bulk of production units and provide almost 80% of jobs. This suggests recent changes 
to the financial systems in the region have not sufficiently matched the demand for 
lending instruments for businesses (Figure 3.1).
Although few small Latin American companies manage to obtain finance, the loan-
approval rate for SMEs is relatively high.2 This shows that the shortage of financing 
in the region is due not only to a supply problem or a lack of available resources, but 
also to aspects related to demand and/or self-exclusion (for failure to meet eligibility 
standards), which affects SMEs’ capacity for financial access.
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Notes: The definition of an SME varies from country to country, so the following ratios are not directly comparable. 
The variables used for the classification include number of employees, annual sales, and loan size. For more information,
see the CGAP’s Financial Access Report.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Botswana, Cape Verde, Liberia, South Africa.
East Asia: China; Chinese Taipei; Hong Kong, China; Mongolia.
Europe and Central Asia: Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan.
OECD: Australia, Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, South Korea,
Turkey, United States.
Middle East, North Africa: Iran, Jordan, Morocco.
South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand.   
The figure in brackets indicates the number of countries considered.
Source: CGAP (Consulting Group of Assistance to the Poor), Financial Access Report 2010.
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732614          
Latin Ameria Other regions
Figure 3.1. Credit to SMEs as a percentage of total credit, 2010
Latin American average
Historically, Latin American economies have been lagging behind in terms of depth3 
and financial development compared to other emerging economies and OECD countries. 
With traditionally low levels of saving and lending, the lack of depth in the region’s 
financial system partly explains the gap in the coverage, quality and cost of borrowing 
for the business sector. Although in recent years borrowing has significantly increased 
in several Latin American countries, most of it has concentrated on consumer and 
mortgage loans rather than business loans. 
Despite the fact that SMEs account for a large part of the 
productive sector and nearly 80% of employment, their access to 
financing continues to be limited. Less than 15% of total credit in 
the region is targeted towards SMEs. 
The transition of the banking business model from relationship banking to multi-
service banking is one of the major factors behind the limits on financing for SMEs.4 In 
relationship banking, there was a personal relationship between the financial institution 
and the customer for awarding loans. Multi-service banking, meanwhile, introduced 
more functional lending technologies that focused on solvency and payment capacity. 
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For SMEs, this led to poor credit risk assessments, less-flexible financing schemes, high 
collateral requirements, higher banking fees and high borrowing costs. The effects of 
this transition still make it harder for SMEs to borrow.
As various studies have shown, in Latin America access to finance for businesses 
is closely related to a company’s size, its presence on the international market and 
its export capacity. This leads to a higher proportion of large firms that export having 
greater access to credit (Greenaway et al., 2007; Berman and Héricourt, 2008; Muûls, 2008). 
Although some countries have expanded corporate credit, the funding gap between 
SMEs and large firms remains a major challenge for the region. The main differences 



















































Note: SMEs are defined based on the amount of the loan. Each country uses a different threshold, so the interest
rates are not directly comparable among countries.
Source: OECD Development Centre, based on national data (2012).




















































































Figure 3.2. Interest rates for SMEs and large firms:


































































































































































Difficult access to finance for SMEs is strongly linked to the 
transition of retail banking’s  business model, from a relationship 
lending scheme to a multi-service banking one.
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The shortage of funding for SMEs in Latin America is most prominent for long-term 
bank loans. SMEs focus on the short term, and a large proportion of working capital 
loans is funded through equity (Appendix, Figure A.1). Of the little long-term credit that 
does exist, larger firms take the lion’s share, giving them an additional advantage over 
SMEs and widening the credit gap by company size (Appendix, Figure A.2). 
Moreover, because smaller firms are not able to provide as much collateral, it is 
harder for them to borrow money. SMEs cite the absence of collateral as a major obstacle 
for obtaining credit in Latin America.5 As in other regions, the main sources of collateral 
are fixed assets (buildings, machinery and equipment), with personal assets becoming 
less important as the size of the company increases.
Although it is still necessary to strengthen the implementation of appropriate 
finance mechanisms in the region, the recent expansion of instruments specifically for 
SMEs shows that financial institutions are increasingly adapting their products to SMEs’ 
demands.6 In several countries in the region, financial institutions have successfully 
begun introducing instruments that take into account how diverse SMEs are. These 
innovative instruments are customised to the needs of companies in specific sectors, 
stages of development and strategic potential. 
Development of the financial system in Latin America: 
the funding gap
This section explores the credit system for SMEs in Latin America to analyse the 
causes of the sector’s funding gap. It describes the history and current state of the 
region’s financial system, particularly the development of the business model in retail 
banking, the increased presence of foreign banks, the changes in net interest margins 
and dollarisation levels, and regulatory changes introduced in recent years. In addition, 
it examines how these elements affect the characteristics of finance for SMEs in the 
region.
Development and structure of the credit model for SMEs
The financial system in Latin America has gone through major changes over the past 
two decades. From the 1990s governments in the region began to introduce reforms to 
liberalise the financial sector, with less government involvement and greater private-
sector participation. In particular there was a rise in foreign ownership and banking 
concentration. Concentration increased substantially in the 2000s, with the three largest 
banks increasing their average assets from 51% in 2000 to 71% in 2009. Major banks grew 
in importance in the region while the business model shifted from relationship banking 
to multi-service banking. Foreign banks have gradually increased their presence in Latin 
America, raising their share of assets to 31%, one of the highest rates in the world.7 
This figure is far above the rates of foreign ownership in South Asia (8%) and the OECD 
countries (12%), but close to the rates in sub-Saharan Africa (28%) and Eastern Europe 
(28%). However, bank ownership varies hugely across the region, with almost all banks 
in Central America and the Caribbean being foreign-owned.
The changes in the Latin American banking system have affected the finance 
mechanisms for SMEs. The arrival of larger banks with a multi-service business model 
instilled the idea that, unlike smaller banks, which have more of a relationship model, 
large banks provide fewer resources to SMEs, since they would not be interested in doing 
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business with these kinds of firms because of information problems, high fixed costs for 
relatively small transactions, and the impossibility of using the economies of scale that 
exist when lending to large firms. However, in recent years large banks in the region 
have shown a growing interest in providing services to SMEs, but their supply is still 
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Small banks Medium-sized banks Large banks
Figure 3.3. Type of loans offered to SMEs
by size of financial institution, 2011
(as percentages)
Notes: Small banks: Banks with fewer than 300 employees, or more than 300 employees and 10 or fewer branches.
Medium-sized banks: Banks with 301-5 000 employees and 11-150 branches.
Large banks: Banks with more than 150 branches.
Source: IDB (2011), Banks and SMEs: Raising the Game: 4th Regional Survey in Latin America and the Caribbean.         
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732652
Various studies on the presence of foreign banks in Latin America have examined 
their impact on efficiency and competition in the banking sector, stability, the import 
of external shocks and credit to SMEs. The studies generally show that these banks 
are operationally more efficient than domestic banks, with lower interest margins and 
overhead costs (Yeyati and Micco, 2007). In addition, several studies have found no 
significant difference in lending to SMEs between foreign banks and major domestic and 
public banks (de la Torre et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2011). However, there is mixed evidence 
regarding the relationship between foreign banks and lending to SMEs, or at least there 
is not such a positive correlation with lending to such firms. Foreign banks seem to be 
more reluctant to lend to small firms without clear information proving their solvency. 
When they do lend, they prefer providing short-term loans to larger companies (Berger et 
al., 2001; Mian, 2006 and Ferraro, 2011). While the presence of foreign banks helped bring 
stability during the crises of the late 1990s, lending by foreign banks fell sharply during 
the 2008 crisis, increasing the risk of shocks being imported from developed countries 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Gianetti and Laeven, 2012).
Despite considerable improvements in recent years, the Latin American credit model 
for SMEs is still faced with challenges both in the supply and demand of finance. From 
the point of view of supply, the current multi-service banking model, with methods 
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based solely on the company’s solvency and not its projected profitability, has brought 
about an inflexible way of assessing and measuring risk, a low debt-recovery rate among 
financial institutions (due to the lack of information and transparency of balance sheets), 
lower economies of scale (due to the fixed costs of small transactions) and problems 
with selection methods, which have segmented the credit market. From the point of 
view of demand, SMEs are faced with various obstacles limiting their access to finance. 
These include technical requirements for obtaining a loan, collateral requirements, and 
high interest rates. Because of the nature of supply and demand for finance, commercial 
banks tend to lend very little to SMEs, which must therefore rely heavily on self-
financing and resources from suppliers. So, although credit is available, bureaucracy, 
such as balance-sheet requirements (which often SMEs report incomplete) or collateral 
requirements make it hard to access. Financial institutions and financing mechanisms 
have a crucial role to play in breaking down these barriers and thus improving access to 
credit for SMEs, providing them with specific instruments and support in applying for 
and managing loans.
Net interest margins in Latin America
Net interest margins and other factors such as taxation on financial intermediation, 
market structure and risk determine how efficiently banks can use their resources for 
financial intermediation. Though there are large differences among countries, several 
Latin American countries have net interest margins that are among the highest in 
the world, higher than in OECD countries and other emerging regions (Figure 3.4). For 
example, Chile’s and Mexico’s margins are below the Eastern European average, while 
Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Guatemala have the highest margins among the 
countries analysed. High net interest margins can reduce the number of profitable 
investment projects and raise borrowing costs, so they can limit the availability of credit 
to businesses, especially SMEs.
Net interest margins in several Latin American countries rank 
among the highest in the world. By increasing the final cost 
of capital, in particular for SMEs, they have affected credit 
availability. 
Net interest margins cannot be explained only by the risk associated to loans in Latin 
America, since the percentage of non-performing loans has become one of the lowest in 
the world (World Bank, 2012a). Another factor behind the region’s high margins is the 
banks’ overhead costs8, which are among the highest in the world, hence the differences 
with other emerging economies. Reserve requirements and differences in rights of 
ownership also push margins up, albeit to a lesser extent (Gelos, 2009). To reduce these 
margins, it is necessary to stimulate competition and bank efficiency, reduce reserve 
requirements where they have no negative impact on financial stability and improve the 
legal environment. 
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Figure 3.4. Net interest margin, 2009
(as percentages)
Notes:  Net interest margin refers to the accounting value (or carrying value) of net interest revenue
as a share of total earning assets. The figure in brackets indicates the number of countries considered.       
Source:  Bankscope, Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, “Financial Institutions and Markets Across
Countries and over Time: Data and Analysis”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4943, May 2009. 
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732671         
Dollarisation 
Dollarisation refers to dollar-denominated debt, and it too has played a role in financing 
business in the region, especially medium-sized firms. Dollarisation increased in Latin 
America in the 1990s due to high inflation and large interest rate differentials (Rennhack 
and Nozaki, 2006; Fernández-Arias et al., 2006). Although macroeconomic stability and 
the introduction of floating exchange rates led to a decline in foreign-currency debt, 
many firms, often those with links to the export sector, continued to rely on this form of 
finance (Zettelmayer et al., 2010). In Peru and Bolivia, the dollarisation of loans for small 
businesses reached almost 30% and 50% respectively during the last decade (García-
Escribano and Sosa, 2011). In addition to the lower cost of capital, foreign-currency loans 
tend to have longer maturities, which favours medium- and long-term investment. 
The higher maturity of loans made this mechanism more relevant for medium-sized 
firms, as is reflected in the rise in foreign loans to manufacturing and tourism firms 
in various countries in the region (Bodnár, 2009). Although it is an alternative form of 
credit, foreign-currency borrowing undermined the domestic development of other 
kinds of instruments for medium-sized firms. Since many medium-sized firms with 
access to foreign credit lack the financial infrastructure for foreign-exchange hedging, 
dollarisation has also increased the currency risk for firms using this mechanism.
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Although dollarisation represents a borrowing option for some 
firms, reaching levels of 30% to 50% in some countries, the lack 
of financial infrastructure for hedging has resulted in a higher 
currency risk for some SMEs. 
International financial regulation and access to credit for SMEs
International financial regulation has been highlighted as a possible explaining 
factor for why the banking sector largely ignores SMEs (OECD, 2012a). Although Basel II9 
is still being implemented in the region, its effects need evaluating, especially on 
lending practices for businesses. The gradual, delayed implementation of Basel II in 
Latin America has focused particularly on capital adjustments (de la Torre et al., 2012). 
By requiring larger provisions, the capital available for borrowing (personal or corporate) 
may have declined in some segments of commercial banking. However, previous 
financial crises endowed countries in the region with domestic regulations to tackle the 
problems associated with credit risk. But in several countries it is national rather than 
international regulations that have tended to damage the availability of credit to SMEs. 
New regulations for managing liquidity introduced as part of Basel III in 2009 in 
response to the international economic crisis seek to strengthen certain key measures 
to prevent the kind of liquidity problems that have come to the fore during the crisis, 
especially those related to capital requirements.10 The new regulation can generate 
two opposite effects on lending to SMEs: it can increase liquidity requirements for the 
banking sector and reclassify loans to small businesses with a lower risk level. As in 
other episodes of crisis, higher capital requirements can trigger commercial credit 
rationing or higher financing costs (OECD, 2012a; Elliot, 2010). Moreover, classifying loans 
to SMEs as retail banking could allow financial institutions to reduce the sector’s risk 
classification. This approach, unlike a corporate loan classification, can allow the risk 
premium charged to small businesses to be cut. The net effect on SMEs in the coming 
years will depend on these two factors, once the regulation has come into force.
Table 3.1. Implementation of Basel III Regulations in Latin America
Argentina Brazil Chile  Colombia Mexico Peru
Capital adequacy ratio (% of risk-weighted assets) 8 11 8 9 8 10
Standard Basel I Basel II Basel I Basel I Basel II Basel II
Authorisation for Basel II internal models No Yes No No Yes Yes
Power to require a higher capital adequacy ratio for 
each bank based on regulatory risk assessment
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: de la Torre et al., (2012).
Credit guarantee schemes allow SMEs to use low-risk assets (financial and non-
financial) as collateral and can help downgrade the assessed risk, thus facilitating the 
provision of credit to such firms. The Basel III regulations allow guarantees to be used to 
reduce companies’ risk weight and therefore cut down the reserve capital requirements. 
This may be one of the most significant changes to finance for SMEs, since it encourages 
financial institutions to become involved in such programmes. National regulations 
can complement these schemes, allowing the use of mobile assets (e.g. machinery) as 
collateral. These possibilities open the door for targeted government intervention. 
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The role of public financial institutions in financing SMEs
Historically, public financial institutions have played an important role in lending to 
SMEs. In particular they have served to guarantee the availability of medium- and long-term 
resources for investment by devising financial instruments and by financing segments in 
which the private sector has not been particularly active.These institutions are heavily 
involved in the region’s banking system, with their participation averaging close to 23% 
(Figure 3.5) (de Olloqui and Palma, 2012).
With an average participation of 23% in the Latin American 
financial system, PFIs have played a relevant role in facilitating 
credit and guarantee schemes for SMEs. Long-term financing by 








Figure 3.5.  Public financial institutions’ participation
in Latin American banking systems: 2007-09































































Source:  de Olloqui and Palma, 2012, based on data from the Latin American Association of Development
Financing Institutions (ALIDE).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732690
The landscape of public financial institutions is diverse, ranging from agencies 
that support SMEs to guarantee companies, public banks and development banks. 
Their problems with governance and their mandate are varied, and depend on each 
institution’s nature and objectives. For instance, besides their importance in financing 
SMEs, development banks play a crucial role in supporting the production sector. Public 
banks often try to compensate for the lack of commercial banking services in places 
where they are not available, or act as a countercyclical instrument when private banks 
retract, or when the banking system is underdeveloped or unstable. Development banks, 
however, rather than trying to emulate the private sector or necessarily turn a profit, 
are an effective tool for government intervention in sectors or projects with positive 
externalities, in strategic areas or the development of innovative businesses. 
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Public financial institutions implement finance policies for different types of 
programmes. Their products include direct and indirect credit, subsidies to make loans 
cheaper and the provision of guarantees. Recently, a burst of new instruments seek to 































Source: de Olloqui and Palma (2012), based on information from 30 public financial institutions, compiled
by ALIDE.
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732709        
Figure 3.6. Variation in the main financial-statement indicators
of public financial institutions, 2007-09
(percentage variation)
Along with increasing their participation in the credit market, public financial 
institutions increased their long-term lending by 85% between 2007 and 2009, reflecting 
the important role they have played in the region. Furthermore, their performance 
indicators (Figure 3.6) show that their financial sustainability has not been hit in the 
medium term (de Olloqui and Palma, 2012). However, the effectiveness and sustainability 
of these institutions’ programmes in Latin America has still not been sufficiently tested 
or guaranteed, and experience suggests it is important to have appropriate governance 
structures and mechanisms to ensure transparency.
Development banks in Latin America
Although public financial institutions have been operating since the 19th century, 
development banks began operating in Latin America in the 1930s. The 1929 Great 
Depression created the scenario for inception of development banks to promote 
production in certain sectors of the economy (ECLAC, 2010), but the height of activity 
of development banks was from 1950 to 1980. During this period, the banks responded 
to the lack of financial depth of production activities, with more than 100 government 
institutions providing financial aid. The banks thus played a leading role in supporting 
the import-replacement strategy. At the time, policies to support financing mainly 
involved providing credit lines at subsidised rates through banks and other first-tier 
public financial institutions. Private banks and institutions were limited to acting 
as brokers for second-tier credit lines opened up by central banks and other public 
institutions (Held, 1999).
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Inadequate government intervention and poor financial management left public 
financial institutions with major losses. Resources were allocated based on credit 
quotas per sector, interest rates were subsidised and the portfolio was not well assessed, 
turning the institutions into providers of direct public subsidies rather than facilitators 
of finance for long-term production activities. As a result, confidence in development 
banks dropped, and this, along with a wave of reforms in the region in the early 1990s, 
gave rise to an institutional restructuring process that eventually weakened the role of 
development banks in industrial policy.
Economic reforms introduced since the 1990s have seen the public sector’s role in 
the economy largely replaced by the private sector, thus redefining the institutional and 
functional structure of development banks. In terms of policies to support finance for 
SMEs, this resulted in subsidies on interest rates gradually being abolished (subsidies are 
directed towards transaction costs and the development of guarantee systems) and the 
credit process being moved to first-tier institutions. Greater attention began to be given 
to risk management, reducing overheads and cutting the number of non-performing 
loans (ECLAC, 2010). A focus on specialist topics such as financing exports (Argentina, 
Colombia and Venezuela) or lending to microenterprises (Ecuador and Venezuela) 
enabled public action to focus on areas where it was expected to be most effective. 
As the subsidiary view of the state’s role in the economy gained ground, development 
banks became less important. Their role as second-tier banks moved to the fore as they 
stopped financing production directly (ECLAC, 2012).
The view of the role of development banks in Latin America has changed again in 
recent years (ALIDE, 2010; ECLAC, 2012): between 2000 and 2009 their loan portfolio grew 
by an average of 15% a year, tripling in value to reach about USD 600 billion in 2009 
(Figure 3.7). These data reflect a change in perspective on the role of development banks, 
with first-tier lending institutions previously being considered inefficient. One reason 
for the change is the recognition of the role of development banks in financing economic 
and social demands. Other factors that help explain why development banks have 
once again become key players in production include the lack of interest among first-
tier private banks in channelling funds from second-tier banks, the specialisation of 
development banks in sectors or types of firms in which private banks lack experience, 
or the fact that clients chosen by private banks are different from the population targeted 
by development banks (Yeyati et al., 2004). 
The role of development banks in Latin America has evolved 
considerably: between 2000 and 2009 their credit portfolio 
increased by 15% annually, tripling their value, and reaching 
nearly USD 600 billion in 2009.
Development banks are adopting an institutional structure in which different 
models to support the financing of SMEs coexist. Whereas previously development 
banks’ second-tier functions in Latin America were most prominent, today each country 
has a different institutional structure, with first-tier-only or second-tier-only banks and 
hybrid systems.11 Most Latin American countries have development banks, including 
the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) in Brazil; Nacional Financiera (NAFIN) and 
the Foreign Trade Bank (BANCOMEXT) in Mexico; the Colombian Development Bank 
(BANCOLDEX), a mixed development bank; Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo S.A. 
(COFIDE) in Peru; and Corporación Financiera Nacional (CFN) in Ecuador. Alternatively, 
where there are no development banks, first-tier public banks usually play an important 
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role in lending and directing loans to smaller firms. Banks that have this role include 
Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA) and the Bank of Investment and Foreign Trade (BICE) 
in Argentina; BancoEstado in Chile; and Banco Multisectorial de Inversiones (BMI), Banco 
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Figure 3.7.  Loan portfolio of development banks in Latin America, 2001-04 and 2006-09
(billions of dollars)
Source:  ALIDE (2010).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732728
The change in the role of public banks and development banks also raises questions 
as to the most appropriate form of regulation. Public banks are usually guaranteed 
by the treasury, so they do not need ordinary prudential regulation (including capital 
requirements), since the state virtually acts as a guarantor. For development banks, 
meanwhile, this problem is partly remedied by the nature of their mission. Today, it 
is widely acknowledged that development banks should not compete with the private 
sector but should complement it. They should not be required to have the same level 
of financial returns, since their performance level should not only take into account 
performance criteria used to evaluate private banks, especially when their purpose is to 
boost sectors that are strategic, innovative or have a high growth potential.12 
Financing programmes for SMEs are normally run by promotion agencies in 
co-ordination with development banks, usually using second-tier systems or mechanisms 
for channelling direct loans. The main purposes of these programmes are to acquire 
capital assets, working capital and, to a lesser extent, investments. However, today, public 
financial institutions in Latin America are diversifying their support systems for SMEs 
by introducing new programmes with more specific lines of finance, such as introducing 
productivity gains to improve environmental sustainability and supporting specific 
production sectors. An interesting development is the growing trend of development 
banks to promote the use of financial-service packages that include products such as 
credit cards and online and electronic transaction systems. One particularly successful 
case is the BNDES Card in Brazil (Box 3.1).13
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Box 3.1. The BNDES card
Introduced in 2004 by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), the purpose of this card 
is to help microenterprises and SMEs access working capital, investment and machinery. 
The development bank does not issue the card directly but acts as a second-tier bank, 
allowing private and public financial institutions to issue it. Firms with a BNDES card 
receive a revolving credit facility. The amount they can borrow depends on the issuing 
bank’s financial analysis, up to a maximum of BRL 1 million (Brazilian reais) – about 
USD 500 000 – to buy products from suppliers accredited by the bank that appear on the 
card’s transactions portal. Cardholding firms can also use the system as a sales channel 
by obtaining accreditation as suppliers in the programme, provided that at least 60% of 
their goods or services are produced in Brazil and they comply with certain requirements 
set by the development bank in certain areas. 
Since the scheme was introduced, 250 000 cards have been issued, 72 000 entrepreneurs 
have made at least one purchase and 11 000 companies have made at least one sale. 
The total credit disbursed through the card has risen sharply in recent years, from 
BRL 845 million (about USD 360 000) in 2008 to BRL 7 billion (about USD 3.45 billion) in 2011. 
The BNDES card has grown from representing less than 1% of total BNDES disbursements 
to micro and small enterprises in 2004 and 2005 to 13% in 2009 and more than 18% in 
2011, making it one of the main instruments to support SMEs, behind other programmes 
such as BNDES Automático and the FINAME programme for financing machinery and 
equipment. 
The product owes its success not only to being relatively cheaper than other quickly 
accessible financial products, but also largely to its accessibility and flexibility, with 
information available on the BNDES website, where users can make transactions and 
purchases quickly and simply. 
Source: ECLAC, IDB and OAS (2011). 
Guarantees requested by commercial banks, in particular for long-
term loans, prevented a large number of SMEs from applying for 
credit. Reciprocal guarantee societies (RGS) are organised through 
firms’ associations and facilitate technical assistance for their 
members, encouraging their financial sustainability.
In Colombia and Mexico there are other examples of financing programmes for 
SMEs. In Colombia, BANCOLDEX has gradually moved its activity from the export sector 
to SMEs,14 and operates as a second-tier bank using a rediscount mechanism to finance 
loans.15 There was a marked rise in its operations for SMEs, both in terms of the amounts 
disbursed and the number of beneficiaries: in 2010 BANCOLDEX disbursed 40% of its 
credit to SMEs, and for the period 2005-10 credit disbursed by BANCOLDEX amounted 
to 10-15% of commercial loans of all Colombian financial institutions to SMEs.16 In 
Mexico, too, there was a significant rise in support programmes for SMEs. For example, 
the NAFIN development programme accounted for 0.8% of GDP in 2001 but had grown 
to 2.5% of GDP by 2008.17 Nevertheless, NAFIN’s financing programmes still have little 
impact on Mexican SMEs’ access to credit, since their main focus is on short-term credit.
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 Since the 1990s, there has been less financial support for SMEs through subsidised 
interest rates or compensation for transaction costs, making space for new financial 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are still some relevant examples of such support. 
Argentina’s Secretariat of SMEs and Regional Development (SEPYME) has the PBT 
interest-rate reduction scheme, which between 2009 and the first quarter of 2011 has 
provided ARS 1.6 billion (Argentine pesos), or a little more than USD 400 million. Several 
factors explain the programmes’ lack of continuity, especially the little additional credit 
they generate. So once again we see how the difficulty smaller firms have in gaining 
greater access to credit is related not only to the cost of borrowing but also to loan 
applications and requirements. 
Despite the advances that have been made, Latin American development banks’ 
financing programmes for SMEs have several limitations. First, credit normally has a 
short-term focus and is concentrated on working capital. Furthermore, the bureaucracy 
of the lines of finance between first-tier and second-tier institutions can inhibit the loan’s 
effectiveness. When approval is needed from a second-tier bank, the process can take a long 
time, making credit less attractive to both the firm and the first-tier bank that would use 
the line of finance. Also, a way to improve the definition of development banks’ financing 
programmes is through better assessment of them, which would make it possible to 
measure the impact and the amount of additional credits disbursed by these institutions. 
Guarantee systems in Latin America 
The main barriers SMEs must overcome to access credit include the high guarantees 
commercial banks require for loans, especially long-term loans. Usually, these guarantees 
must partially or totally cover the debts, nearly always with assets (movable or immovable), 
which are transferred to the bank as compensation if the borrower defaults. This system 
has the disadvantage that it selects those firms that probably least need access to credit 
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Note: Regional averages calculated for the most recent year available.
Source: World Bank, (2012b), Enterprise Surveys 2012,  
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Figure 3.8. Value of required collateral for a loan (as % of the loan) by firm size
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National guarantee systems have grown in strength in Latin America. There are 
83 guarantee institutions that have provided guarantees amounting to USD 20 billion 
for more than 2.2 million SMEs, which mobilise a total balance of around USD 30 billion. 
This represents a significant increase in amounts and coverage since 2000, when there 
were only 23 guarantee institutions and 358 000 SME beneficiaries, with total loans of 
USD 2 billion (ALIDE, 2011). There is not just one guarantee model, and usually one of 
two types of systems is used: guarantee funds and guarantee societies. 
Most countries have guarantee funds consisting mainly of public capital, such as 
NAFIN in Mexico; the National Guarantee Fund in Colombia (see Box 3.2); the FOGAPE 
fund for small-business owners and FOGAIN fund for investments in Chile, both 
belonging to BancoEstado; the Brazilian Micro and Small Enterprise Support Service 
(SEBRAE) and the Brazilian Development Fund (BNDES) in Brazil; and the FOGABA fund 
for the province of Buenos Aires in Argentina. The maximum amount covered by the 
funds is between 50% and 80% of the loan.18 Although public resources are still very 
prominent, there is growing interest among SME-support agencies, development banks 
and governments to encourage the involvement of the private sector, particularly by 
promoting new guarantee societies.19
Box 3.2. Colombia’s National Guarantee Fund
In 1981, the Colombian government set up the National Guarantee Fund (FNG), which 
was tied to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, with contributions from the now-defunct 
Industrial Development Institute. The fund facilitates access to credit for SMEsa by 
providing guarantees for credits related to working capital, investment, capitalisation, 
leasing, revolving credit, loans from BANCOLDEX and Colciencias (the Colombian 
Administrative Department for Science, Technology and Innovation), and business 
start-up loans. Requests for guarantees are submitted to the financial intermediary to 
which the firm applied for the loan and the amount guaranteed varies between 50% (for 
BANCOLDEX loans) and 60% (capital and fixed investments). 
The number of beneficiary SMEs has mushroomed, from 50 000 in 2002 to more than 
200 000 in 2008, as have the resources mobilised by the FNG, from COP 950 billion 
(Colombian pesos) (about USD 350 million) to about COP 5.2 billion (about USD 2.8 billion) 
over a similar period. Between 2003 and 2009, the amount of credit guaranteed by the 
FNG grew from 33% to 59% of the total commercial credit of financial intermediaries 
specialising in SMEs. According to recent studies assessing the impact on firms 
benefiting from the fund’s guarantees compared to those that do not, beneficiaries 
have 5.8% higher growth in production and a 4.6% higher employment rate. Since 2008 
the number of beneficiaries has fallen by 2.6% while the default rate has risen 5.7%, 
reflecting the global economic crisis. 
Notes: a) The FNG only provides guarantees to SMEs, which are defined in Law 905 of 2004 as firms with 
assets worth less than the equivalent of 30 000 minimum wages, which is about USD 8.3 million.
Source: Based on Zuleta (2011).
Public guarantee schemes (PGS) represent the main guarantee 
instrument in emerging and developing economies; they can have 
additional effects by encouraging SME financing through short-
term counter-cyclical lending.
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In Latin America the importance of guarantee societies has increased dramatically.20 
They can be financed with public or private resources, and generally it is the guarantee 
society itself that analyses and assesses the risk associated with the transaction, 
assumes the risk of defaults and bankruptcies and takes on responsibility for recovering 
unpaid repayments. SMEs that have obtained guarantees have better access to credit, 
better loan conditions and longer loans.
A unique case is that of mutual guarantee schemes (MGSs), in which those who 
receive the guarantees are integrated into the society as part of an association. In this 
type of society, SMEs that receive guarantee and consultancy services are defined as 
participating partners, contributing capital stock (Class A shares) and they cannot 
receive guarantees for more than 5% of the total amount guaranteed by the society. 
The sponsoring members may be national, regional, local or foreign public or private 
entities of various sizes (small, medium-sized and large firms) that contribute to the 
capital stock (Class B shares) of the risk fund, receiving income and tax exemptions. The 
tax exemptions make this mechanism attractive to private investors, since although 
MGSs may initially rely on public funds, their aim is to function autonomously, limiting 
the state almost exclusively to eliminating tax collection (REGAR, 2008). MGSs were 
developed particularly in Argentina, and their growth has accelerated in recent years 
(Box 3.3).
Credit guarantee schemes (CGSs) can have knock-on effects by promoting the 
financing of SMEs. In addition to providing guarantees, CGSs provide short-term and 
countercyclical loans, which enable the postponement of loan-guarantee repayments, 
the provision of support to mutual-guarantee associations, the bundling of guarantee 
loans with other business services, and the guarantee of venture capital (OECD, 2012b). 
Public guarantee schemes are CGSs’ main guarantee instruments in emerging and 
developing economies, where they have spread.21 In 1995 Brazil launched the FAMPE 
fund for micro and small enterprises, the country’s largest guarantee fund. Operated 
by SEBRAE, it provided guarantees for around 44 000 firms in 2009. The MGSs are 
characterised by the active participation of the private sector, SME associations and 
banks. They generally have a thorough knowledge of the businesses, and participants 
continuously monitor each other. This prevents firms that need credit from taking 
excessive risks and increases the likelihood of the loan being repaid. 
In addition to reaching their target users, MGSs must guarantee financial 
sustainability. The experience of Asian countries shows the importance of guarantee 
funds having enough capital and prudent risk-management practices. The financial 
sustainability of MGSs is difficult to examine because of the operational and financial 
differences among the different schemes. One study that compared 76 MGSs around the 
world found that new schemes recorded lower losses (as a percentage of the total) (Beck 
et al., 2009). Schemes with greater private-sector involvement have lower average default 
rates, which suggests the private sector has an important role to play in managing risk.
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Box 3.3. Guarantee societies in Argentina: the case of Garantizar SGR 
The system of guarantee societies in Argentina is formed largely by private investment, 
with heavily subsidised taxes on investment, supervised and supported by SEPYME 
and the Argentine Chamber of Guarantee Societies and Funds (CASFOG). The country 
has 24 private MGSs,a with all but one funded exclusively by the private sector. Only 
Garantizar SGR receives state contributions, which still provide a large proportion of the 
society’s risk fund.b Garantizar SGR has significantly improved its performance in the 
last five years, having increased its share of guarantees issued by Argentine guarantee 
societies from around 30% in 2006 to almost 40% in 2010, making it the national market 
leader for such guarantees for SMEs. Meanwhile, the default rate fell to less than half of 
1% of guarantees in 2010.c 
Officially formed in 1997, Garantizar SGR was the result of an agreement among the 
leading professional business associations that represent SMEs. The society began with 
a core group of 120 SMEs from various sectors as participating partners and a risk fund 
formed by the contribution of the Banco de la Nación Argentina, which was the first and 
only sustaining partner. The number of partners and the amounts guaranteed have both 
continued to rise. In 2010 there were more than 4 900 participating partners and the 
risk exposured had almost doubled since 2007, reaching close to ARS 830 million (around 
USD 180 million). 
Garantizar SGR’s participating partners hold 51% of the capital stock and the sustaining 
partners hold the remaining 49%, with the latter also contributing to the risk funds. 
The resources that form the general risk fund and the specific risk funds are of mixed 
origin (public and private), but the MGS must remain self-sustainable, except for the 
indirect state subsidy of a tax exemption on contributions to the capital stock and the 
risk fund. Private-sector contributions have been brought up to 75%, with public financial 
institutions contributing the remaining 25%: Banco de la Nación Argentina, which is the 
main contributor, Banco Ciudad de Buenos Aires and the Bank of Investment and Foreign 
Trade (BICE).
In response to the economic crisis that hit Argentina in 2001-02, Garantizar SGR developed 
new products offering a comprehensive financial alternative to SMEs. These products 
include, in particular, financial trusts for productive value chains, paycheque negotiation 
(factoring) and leasing services, the guarantees for which accounted for almost 20% of the 
value of the society’s risk exposure in 2010 (the remaining 80% consisted of guarantees 
for bank loans, in line with Garantizar SGR’s traditional mission).
Note: a) Some Argentine MGSs are tied to specific sectors, such as steel, dairy, oil, agriculture and trade 
(REGAR, 2008).
b) REGAR (2008). 
c) Ferraro (2011). 
d) Risk exposure refers to guarantee certificates that have been issued and are still valid that provide a 
guarantee on returns not yet fully or partially settled (www.garantizar.com.ar).
Source: Based on REGAR (2008) and www.garantizar.com.ar. 
Experience shows that MGSs can leverage financial access for SMEs, assuming they 
work with the target population that requires the support and not companies that would 
have access anyway (OECD, 2012b). The financial additionality brought by MGSs depends 
strongly on low-risk companies with a low payment capacity having access to the credit 
market without needing these schemes while higher-risk firms without collateral do 
use them. A study of what effects guarantee schemes had in Indonesia found that most 
companies with access to them had access to credit anyway (BRI, 2009).
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In Latin America, the implementation of guarantee programmes has been effective in 
making credit cheaper and more widely available, but the programmes still have various 
limitations. Firstly, public guarantee fund programmes frequently have problems with 
defaults, insufficient resources to meet commitments, and slow approval and payment 
processes for guarantees (OECD, 2006). Further, the banks’ lack of confidence in public 
funds has led to cases of public guarantees being undervalued and not widely accepted. 
One possible response to these limitations is to develop guarantee systems in which 
the private sector is most prominent. In this respect, the trend in the region for more 
guarantee societies and MGSs to be formed is positive, but in most countries they are still 
in their infancy and provide only a small proportion of total borrowing by SMEs. Despite 
their private funding, guarantee societies and MGSs are also a policy instrument, so 
their autonomy and self-sustainability must be compatible with the general framework 
of public policy for SMEs (REGAR, 2008). 
Improving credit and financing for SMEs in the region: trends 
and innovative instruments
More innovative solutions to support financing are beginning to join the traditional 
instruments used in Latin America to try to meet the specific demands of SMEs according 
to the type of company. The last few years have seen an explosion of new types of 
initiatives, such as sector-specific programmes to support the financing of SMEs that 
are specifically designed for a certain sector, size of business or type of business; funds 
to finance innovations and exports; and non-financial support to improve management 
and the business culture. In some countries, but not all, initiatives are being rolled out 
to support businesses, taking into account their stage in the business cycle and potential 
growth. These initiatives foster the creation of innovative or technology-based firms 
through business incubators and programmes for the provision of seed and venture 
capital.22 Moreover, the expansion of the Internet has enabled the development of 
new online support mechanisms, which have often represented huge steps forward in 
streamlining and accelerating the processes.
The next section presents the main trends and developments in instruments to 
support the financing of SMEs in Latin America.
Innovative programmes for firms include SME financing support 
by sector, size and firm type, special funds for innovation and 
exporting firms, and non-financial assistance for improving 
managerial and corporate culture among SMEs.
Cutting down information problems
One of the main obstacles preventing SMEs in the region from accessing credit is 
information asymmetries and deficiencies. These problems are reflected in the excessive 
red tape required when applying for a loan, disproportionate requirements for putting 
together projects to be financed and even little knowledge of the products available 
among SMEs. To reduce these barriers, strengthening and improving business services 
has begun to be seen as an additional, effective way of improving access to credit for SMEs 
in many countries. Thus non-financial support for SMEs through alternative measures is 
growing. These measures include consultancy, training and services to support business 
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management. Prominent examples of these non-financial services are SEBRAE in Brazil 
and the Financial Outreach Programme in Mexico.23
Public financial institutions and governments in the region could be essential in 
fostering a business-friendly environment. In recent years there has been growing 
interest in the study of public institutions and public policies aimed at fostering 
entrepreneurship among SMEs and developing a favourable business climate for them 
(Kantis et al., 2005). There is a consensus on the importance of governments’ role in 
creating the right institutional environment, especially in terms of the problem of 
asymmetrical information. Although several Latin American countries are taking 
measures in this direction, there is still plenty of scope in public policy to reduce the 
lack of knowledge among entrepreneurs in SMEs on finance instruments, budgeting 
tools and accounting. Transparency in accounting practices and the adoption of various 
corporate governance regulations are areas where entrepreneurs in Latin American 
SMEs can make progress (OECD, 2006). 
Factoring and leasing
The instruments to support SMEs have multiplied in the region, prioritising the 
possibility of an integrated package of financial services. Commercial banks, development 
agencies and development banks are promoting the use of new financial instruments, 
including electronic payment systems, credit cards and leasing and factoring services.24 
With factoring, SMEs receive immediate liquidity on credit sales, improving the firm’s 
cash flow and enabling the risk of default to be transferred.25 E-factoring enables firms to 
obtain immediate liquidity from a financial institution for outstanding invoices. It is fast 
becoming a better alternative to traditional factoring, in which the supply firm uses a third 
party (called a “factor”) to discount outstanding invoices received by the buying company. 
The expansion of the available financial products with new instruments responds 
to the need to serve all SMEs in all business segments. The development of these 
instruments has also been facilitated by the expansion of online banking services, 
allowing businesses to use banking services even if they do not have any branches nearby.
One of the main forms of electronic factoring is NAFIN’s Production Chains 
Programme in Mexico, which lets companies in production chains have immediate 
liquidity for receivables through an electronic discount on their invoices before the due 
date. In practice, the finance is provided by NAFIN, which as a second-tier institution 
encourages the participation of other bank and non-bank financial institutions with 
attractive interest rates. The loans mature after 30 to 120 days and no fees are charged. 
The programme thus provides a supplier with more liquidity more quickly than 
traditional factoring and avoids the problems of costs and maturity dates that affect 
credit for SMEs (Leucona Valenzuela, 2009). The programme has been very successful 
in terms of the number of firms that have used it and the amount of finance it has 
provided.26 It also allows large firms to strengthen their relations with suppliers and 
SMEs to build up a credit history that will help them obtain longer loans.
Within the examples of factoring, NAFIN’s Production Chain 
Programme in Mexico stands out, letting companies have 
immediate liquidity for receivables through an electronic discount 
on their invoices before the due date.
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Financing for firms in production chains 
An example of a specific instrument for certain SMEs developed in the last decade 
is the funding programmes for production chains. In Mexico, NAFIN’s Production 
Chain Programme has been providing this kind of assistance to SMEs since 2002,27 and 
currently has 584 chains in operation. The programme takes into account the need for 
these agents to co-operate and network and seeks to promote the inclusion of SMEs in 
value chains. It has managed to successfully cut down the procedures SMEs must go 
through to access credit, with the help of new instruments such as e-factoring, and 
has helped reduce one of the most critical problems in Mexico’s production system: the 
disintegration of production chains since the 1990s.28 
Start-up finance and creating new businesses
The lack of finance remains one of the main obstacles to creating new businesses 
in Latin America. Banks tend to consider start-ups as high-risk with no credit history. 
This limits their access to commercial loans and forces them to use self-financing or 
take on informal loans from acquaintances, relatives or suppliers in the early stages 
of their development. Public-sector intervention is therefore vitally important for new 
businesses to help them become part of the financial systems, since firms of this kind are 
usually highly dynamic and can transform economies and create positive externalities 
through innovation, productivity and employment. Since businesses’ financial needs 
change as they move through different stages of development, a financial support 
strategy must offer alternatives for these different stages, allocating resources to firms 
during their start-up phase and their first few years in business. Furthermore, in the 
four stages of a business’s development (seed, start-up, growth and maturity) there are 
four categories of financial-support instruments: technical support and incubators, seed 
capital, business angels and venture capital (Echecopar et al., 2006). 
Latin America is beginning to promote comprehensive technical- and financial-
support mechanisms for business start-up, especially for the firms with the greatest 
growth potential, such as innovative and technology-based firms. Although there is 
very little empirical evidence of their results, most countries are promoting business 
incubators. Various countries also have seed-capital programmes and incentives to boost 
the venture-capital industry, which is still in its infancy, as seen by the small number 
of capitalist angels. Despite some progress, the initiatives have seen mixed results, and 
there are too few impact-assessment mechanisms to show how effective they are. 
Seed: initial technical support and business incubators. Most countries in the region have 
initiatives of this kind.29 During this initial phase, instruments to support business 
start-ups cover not only financial aspects but also technical-support programmes run 
by agencies that promote SMEs for business incubators and local support centres, as well 
as other business-development services. In Colombia, the National Learning Service 
(SENA) has led the development of the National Business Start-Up and Incubation 
System. The service was created through an alliance between public (governments 
and local councils), private (businesses, chambers of commerce and trade unions) and 
educational (technical schools and university) agents. The programme provides training 
services in business management and aims to improve training for entrepreneurs by 
focusing on business skills and interaction with customers and suppliers.30
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 Start-up: seed capital. In many countries, the most common form of intervention to 
support start-ups is through direct seed-capital subsidies. Successful examples of such 
projects can be found in various countries: the Brazilian Development Bank’s Criatec 
Fund and the Innovation Programme run by the Studies and Projects Funding Agency 
(FINEP) in Brazil; the Seed Capital programme run by CORFO and the Venture Capital 
programme run by the Technical Co-operation Service (SERCOTEC) in Chile (Box 3.4); 
and programmes in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico. In Colombia, the 
Entrepreneurs’ Fund was set up as part of the SENA to support innovative business 
projects by professionals who have recently graduated. In Brazil, the Criatec Fund was 
created in 2007 with Brazilian Development Bank funds and focuses on innovative 
firms in high-technology sectors such as information technology, biotechnology, new 
materials, nanotechnology and agribusiness. 
The National Business Start-Up and Incubation System in 
Colombia, the Criatec fund in Brazil and CORFO in Chile are 
examples of technical and financial  assistance to help in the 
creation of new firms.
Growth and maturity: business angels and venture capital. In the area of venture capital, 
in some countries agencies and/or development banks encourage the creation of 
investment funds and in some cases even make financial contributions. In Brazil, where 
the capital market is heavily regulated by independent bodies, FINEP and the Brazilian 
Development Bank play an important role in promoting venture capital and both are 
involved in investment funds, such as the Brazilian Development Bank’s Investment 
Funds Programme (BNDESPAR), with the aim of increasing the capitalisation of firms of 
various sizes. Launched in 2000, FINEP’s innovation programme promotes the creation of 
a venture-capital system for technology-based SMEs. Up to 2009 around USD 45 million 
had been leveraged with the aim of benefiting 100 firms over the following three years 
(de Matos and Arroio, 2011). In Chile, CORFO also provides long-term loans so that 
investment funds contribute to innovative firms (Box 3.4). In Mexico there is NAFIN’s 
Entrepreneurs Programme, while in Colombia BANCOLDEX offers incentives for creating 
private equity funds. Furthermore, business angel networks are still poorly developed 
in the region, and those that do exist, such as those set up by CORFO in Chile (Business 
Angels Network) and SEPYME in Argentina, have been underutilised.31 Because 
programmes to identify early-stage investors have not been successful, there must be 
space for improving such mechanisms. It seems that sufficient financial incentives are 
needed for these kinds of initiatives to develop in the future (OECD, 2006).
Despite these new instruments, start-ups still find it difficult to access credit. 
Commercial banks and private investors are still reluctant to lend to this segment of 
business, especially firms with no credit history and innovative firms. Instead, these 
firms must use their own equity or sources other than bank loans, such as vendor 
finance. Many problems still persist: credit programmes by second-tier institutions are 
biased towards larger firms, there are not enough long-term resources, and loans take 
too long to process. 
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Box 3.4. CORFO’s support strategy for Chile
The experience of the Chilean Production Development Agency (CORFO) to support 
SMEs, especially innovative ones, is an excellent example of the region’s mechanisms to 
promote business start-up. CORFO offers a comprehensive support strategy and provides 
firms with options that, depending on their stage of development, go beyond mere 
financial support. 
For start-ups, CORFO uses the SSAF seed grant system to channel grants to incubators. 
The programme is aimed at start-ups with a high growth potential that are seeking 
a strong commitment from incubators and incubated projects, which must make a 
mandatory contribution to cover 25% of the project costs. 
In addition, there are two types of cofinancing programmes for start-up firms to support 
the creation and growth of competitive, highly productive companies of excellence: the 
SERCOTEC, which aims to benefit 2 000 small entrepreneurs a year, and InnovaChile, which 
has focused mainly on innovative firms since 2005. InnovaChile promotes innovation 
and technology transfer in business and the development of a national innovation 
system. The body consists of four main areas: pre-competitive innovation, business 
innovation, technology transfer and entrepreneurship. The programme includes tools 
like business incubators, seed capital in the form of non-repayable grants for innovative 
entrepreneurship (including innovation in services), business angel networks, support 
for creating an entrepreneurial environment, and attracting foreign entrepreneurs. 
In the area of venture capital, CORFO’s management has significantly changed the 
nature of its support to businesses since 2010, closing the direct financing programmes 
and focusing on credit guarantee schemes and the development of venture capital. Its 
strategy is to encourage the rise of a venture-capital industry through programmes to 
provide long-term finance and credit so the investment funds channel their investment 
towards innovative firms. It also seeks to encourage the foreign capital inflows to interact 
with local funds. 
Source: Ferraro (2011); ECLAC, IDB and OAS (2011). 
As for non-bank financial instruments (e.g. venture capital), public institutions can 
play an important role in ushering in an investment-friendly climate and a suitable 
economic environment. Information problems in the venture-capital market are 
varied and the government can help reduce them through education and training for 
entrepreneurs, managers and investors, by supporting clusters and incubators, and by 
encouraging networking between investors and entrepreneurs (OECD, 2006). 
Microfinance in Latin America
Given the importance of microenterprises in Latin America’s business fabric, 
microcredit plays a fundamental role in financing the production sector. Access to 
finance for microenterprises in Latin America is inseparable from the recent major 
growth of microfinance in the region. This growth has enabled the financing of work for 
people on low, unstable incomes who are refused credit by other institutions. Microcredit 
involves small, short-term loans (usually one year), with short repayment periods and 
high hidden interest rates.32
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Traditionally, the main reasons for the lack of microcredit have been the high 
perceived risk of these loans and the lack of profit they generate. However, the region’s 
past experience shows that microcredit is profitable and the risk is moderate. In the 
last decade, microcredit grew to around 45% of total lending (EIU, 2011), and in 2011 
Latin America had a total portfolio of USD 27.6 billion for 18 million customers. The vast 
experience gained by some countries in the region in managing microcredit in recent 
years has resulted in more services being offered and greater penetration in formal 
financial institutions. Despite this progress, the portfolio remains relatively small 
compared to total lending. 
During the last decade microfinance in Latin America has grown 
at an annual  rate of 45% (EIU, 2011), and in 2011 the regional 
portfolio reached USD 27.6 billion for 18 million customers.
However, there remain various challenges to the stability and growth of microfinance 
in Latin America, especially in the area of the regulatory and supervisory system. The 
regulatory aspects are essential to ensure the finance system is fair and affordable.33 
The development of regulatory standards has not kept up with the pace of growth in 
the sector, and supervision remains weak, so stronger systems are needed to monitor 
lending institutions, while customer protection needs bolstering.34 Furthermore, the 
demand for credit from microenterprises has still not been clearly identified (whether it 
is for working capital, the purchase of assets or consumption). 
Microcredit can be an intermediate platform towards more formal, more complex 
instruments and channels for access to credit. If microcredit were expanded in Latin 
America, the finance sector would become more formal as people and microenterprises 
build up a good credit history, giving them access to a wider range of services.
Conclusions and recommendations
Finance remains one of the main obstacles to the development of SMEs in Latin 
America, despite the progress that has been made in developing and deepening the 
financial system. Many SMEs are unable to access formal credit conditions due to 
high interest, high collateral requirements and complex technical and bureaucratic 
requirements brought about by asymmetrical information. Instead, they are forced to use 
internal funds or request credit from suppliers. The other problem they have is the type 
of access, as SMEs that receive finance regularly cannot access the instruments or loan 
maturities they need. These kinds of limitations are in stark contrast to the conditions 
offered to large firms, which have better and greater access to commercial credit. The 
unequal conditions of access to credit have become another form of inequality and 
structural heterogeneity for the region’s production sector, holding back development. 
The development and structure of Latin America’s financial system partly explain 
the failures in the finance mechanisms for SMEs and their access to credit. Commercial 
banks’ business models have moved from relationship banking to multi-service banking 
due to the introduction of unique credit-risk assessment methods based on payment 
capacity rather than the feasibility of the project, together with inflexible finance 
schemes, high collateral requirements and banks’ increased dependence on banking 
fees; this transition made it harder for smaller firms to access finance. Other features of 
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the financial system, such as banking consolidation, high margins, foreign ownership 
and even dollarisation also affect credit mechanisms and can help shed light on the 
ongoing difficulty of ensuring there is greater access to credit. 
SMEs must prepare for new international regulations on managing liquidity (Basel 
III), which will have implications for the cost and availability of credit. Higher capital 
requirements for banks could result in less available credit. In terms of regulation, 
the recent crisis seen in OECD countries illustrates the importance of having a set of 
indicators exclusively for SMEs, which would enable supervisory bodies to act in real 
time. These indicators can be put together using information available from financial 
regulatory bodies.
Since commercial banks continue to prefer financing large firms, public financial 
institutions are essential to improve the financing of SMEs in Latin America, as they can 
gear their policies towards SMEs. Development banks are particularly important. They 
have different criteria on profitability, risk management and funds, so they play a key 
role in providing countercyclical finance in sectors with no private-sector involvement 
or in economically important sectors with growth potential. 
In recent years there has been a new change of perspective on the role of development 
banks in Latin America. The development banks are returning to the fore, and some 
countries are seeing a transition to a system that combines first-tier and second-tier 
institutions, which has proved to be beneficial. However, the financial sustainability 
and additionality of these institutions must be ensured, and they must be given the 
appropriate governance structures, control mechanisms and incentives. The choice 
between a first-tier or second-tier development-banking scheme depends on the context 
of the financial system. Consideration must be given for how developed the financial 
system is and whether there are other public financial agents, such as public banks 
and guarantee funds, that can complement the work development banks do to support 
SMEs. A business-friendly environment will only come about if there is co-ordination 
and complementarity among public financial institutions. 
Guarantee systems have become more firmly established almost throughout the 
region in recent years as an effective form of public action. Although guarantee systems 
that use public or mixed finance have spread, they encounter a number of problems 
(repayment arrears, lack of resources, instalments, etc.), which strain the relations with 
the banks that provide the loans. To overcome these problems commercial banks must 
work together with the guarantee systems so that the guarantees are accepted and 
properly valued, and so that the credit lines are managed together with the guarantees. 
Guarantees should generate additionality by enabling banks to increase their customer 
base, bringing in new business customers. 
Guarantee societies are one possible answer to the limitations of guarantee funds, 
which are mainly privately owned. These societies have begun to spring up across the 
region, but their coverage is still very limited. A special case is MGSs, which aim to be 
financially self-sufficient and stimulate greater private-sector involvement through tax 
exemptions for partners who finance the risk funds. Despite being private, guarantee 
schemes are a public-policy instrument that should be considered when defining how 
institutions will be used to promote the development of production. The state’s role 
in this area is crucial and involves fitting the necessary, essential independence of 
guarantee societies into the framework of general policies for SMEs. 
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Thanks to the presence of public institutions such as development banks and 
development agencies, the development of a financial system is being promoted in the 
region that will be able to respond to the needs of the entire, diverse production sector by 
incorporating new, novel instruments specifically designed for smaller firms. Successful 
examples of these mechanisms include the development of online instruments, lease-
purchase contracts, factoring, guarantee schemes, incubators, seed-capital initiatives 
and the development of venture-capital markets. In particular, as Internet access 
has grown, new online instruments have been developed that have often markedly 
streamlined the process of providing credit and other financial services. 
Since one of the main obstacles making it difficult for Latin American SMEs to access 
credit is asymmetrical information and a lack of information, many new instruments 
are being introduced to provide a broader package of business services that reaches 
beyond credit and to improve knowledge of the financial instruments available to 
smaller firms. Public policy can play a leading role in this respect by helping supply to 
match demand and by furnishing businesses and retail banks with legal and financial 
training. Financial assistance for SMEs must therefore be accompanied by technical-
assistance policies.
Public policy must be sufficiently flexible to stimulate private equity funds. For 
innovative and technology-based start-ups, public intervention is important to encourage 
their inclusion, since these kinds of firms are highly dynamic and can generate positive 
externalities through their innovation, productivity and jobs. A financial support 
strategy must offer alternatives for the different business stages, allocating resources 
to firms during their start-up phase and their first few years in business. Initial support 
is key, fostering, for example, business incubation, the creation of seed capital or the 
involvement of business angels rather than venture-capital investors, who usually focus 
on later stages of the cycle. Due to the limited development of these support mechanisms 
in Latin America, appropriate initiatives need creating to open the way for more private 
capital. Such initiatives could include, for instance, tax reductions for investors. 
In addition to entirely new instruments and a stronger institutional structure, the 
introduction of monitoring and impact-assessments mechanisms is also vital. Impact 
assessments must monitor the programmes’ coverage and how they affect additionality, 
their development goals (productivity and employment), their role as a catalyst for 
attracting the financial sector, and knowledge transfer, among other objectives.
Although more instruments and services to support SMEs have been introduced 
in recent years, they are still in the early stages of their development and reach only 
a small fraction of the sector. There is ample space in the region for a wide range of 
financial products to be developed that take into account the diversity and specificities 
of the production sphere. Public policy has a duty to play a key role by generating 
incentives and necessary instruments. Policies need to be designed and implemented 
with the inclusion of tools to support businesses in their various stages of development 
and the provision of services to improve business management, training and technical 
consultancy.
Finally, systems to finance and provide access to credit for SMEs cannot be defined 
in isolation. These systems are part of a comprehensive system of support for smaller 
firms in which supporting training, production linkages and innovation are also critical. 
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Annex 3.A1. Financial structure of companies in Latin 












Internal funds or retained earnings Bank loans (private and public)
Borrowed from non-bank financial institutions Purchases on credit from suppliers
and advances from customersOther (moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc.) 




































































































Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of) 
Notes: Micro: Firms with fewer than 5 employees. Small: Firms with 5-19 employees. Medium: Firms with
20-99 employees. Large: Firms with 100 or more employees.
Survey results for 2010 and 2011.
Source: OECD Development Centre, based on the Enterprise Surveys, (World Bank, 2012b).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732766         
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Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)  
Other (moneylenders, friends, relatives, etc.) 
Purchases on credit from suppliers and advances from customers
Borrowed from non-bank financial institutions
Bank loans (private and public)
Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares
Internal funds or retained earnings
Notes:  Firms with fewer than 5 employees. Small: Firms with 5-19 employees. Medium: Firms with 20-99 employees.
Large: Firms with 100 or more employees.
Survey results for 2010 and 2011.
Source: OECD Development Centre, based on the Enterprise Surveys, (World Bank, 2012b).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732785          
         













































































Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru (Bol. Rep. of) 
Notes: Micro: Firms with fewer than 5 employees. Small: Firms with 5-19 employees. Medium: Firms with 20-99
employees. Large: Firms with 100 or more employees.        
Source: OECD Development Centre, based on the Enterprise Surveys, (World Bank, 2012b).
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Notes
1. See Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997); Beck et al. (2009); Beck et al. (2011); Beck and Dermirgüç-Kunt (2005); 
Levine et al. (2000). 
2. Argentine SMEs received an estimated 20% of total lending to the private sector in 2008-10. A similar 
level was recorded in Brazil in 2006: 20% if including loans from public banks, but only 13% if only 
including Brazil’s five leading private banks (Morais, 2006). One study shows that the percentage of 
SMEs obtaining credit in Bolivia was no more than 14% in the first quarter of 2010 (Ferraro, 2011). 
However, there seems to be a high loan-approval rate for SMEs, with studies in Argentina finding that 
33% of SMEs applied for a loan in 2003-06 and 80% of applicants were successful (Ferraro, 2011); similar 
figures were found in Brazil (SEBRAE, 2006). 
3. The term “financial depth” refers to the amount of private credit or bank loans as a percentage of GDP.
4. For a description of the relationship and multi-service banking models, see de la Torre et al. (2010).
5. For 24% of Latin American companies, lack of income or collateral is the reason why they do not apply 
for loans (de la Torre et al. 2012). 
6. Loans, leasing, factoring and other instruments are expected to cause credit to SMEs to grow by 60% 
among small banks and 90% among large banks (IDB, 2011).
7. Since Mexico legalised majority foreign ownership of banks in 1999, significant foreign capital has been 
invested in commercial banks: in April 2009, the six largest banks in the country held more than 80% of 
total assets in the sector, and the four largest banks, which are foreign-owned, held more than 70%. El 
Salvador is a more extreme case: in 2009, only 1% of the shares of financial conglomerates were owned 
domestically (Ferraro, 2011). 
8.  “Overhead costs” refers to a financial institution’s indirect, fixed or variable operating costs, including 
administrative costs, depreciation of assets, accounting costs and office equipment, etc.
9. The Basel Accords are recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Published in 2004, the Basel II Accord extensively updated the 
regulations established by the original 1988 Accord, and introduced elements to distinguish between 
and evaluate various loan portfolios.
10. The main regulations included increasing the solvency ratio (Tier 1 capital) and the liquidity ratio and 
introducing an additional 3% leverage on the increase in the solvency ratio (OECD, 2012a).
11. Most development finance institutions (DFIs) in the region are publicly owned (70% in 2009). There are 
more first-tier DFIs (62%) than second-tier ones (21%) (ALIDE, 2010). 
12. However, applying standard regulations could magnify the Sisyphus syndrome (named after the king in 
Greek mythology). The metaphor suggests that if public banks are restricted by the same performance 
parameters as private banks, they will end up emulating them.
13. In 2009, BNDES disbursements to SMEs amounted to 22% of total credit. In addition to BNDES Automático, 
BNDES FINAME and the BNDES card, the bank offers alternative forms of financing exports and sectoral 
development programmes for sectors deemed “strategic” (computer software, telecommunications, 
aeronautics). BNDES loans to SMEs have almost double the maturity (60 months) of market loans (36 
months) (Ferraro, 2011). 
14. BANCOLDEX has two financing instruments for SMEs: the three-year “countercyclical liquidity 
mechanism”, and “aProgresar”, which provides loans for up to 12 years for firms to increase and 
modernise their production capacity. These tools lengthened the average term of loans from 7 to 
12 years between 2006 and 2010 (Zuleta, 2011). 
15. Firms apply for the loan from a private financial institution, which uses the BANCOLDEX rediscount 
mechanism, assesses the application and assumes the credit risk. As a result, there is significant 
interaction between the public instruments and the private intermediary, which improves access to 
credit for SMEs (Zuleta, 2011). 
16. BANCOLDEX also operates in co-ordination with the Colombian National Guarantee Fund (FNG) to 
provide automatic guarantees that cover 50% of the loan amount without the need for another 
assessment in addition to that already carried out by the financial intermediary (Meléndez and Perry, 
2009).
17. During the international crisis that hit the Mexican economy, NAFIN played an important role in 
maintaining the supply of financial resources for SMEs, which grew by 52% in 2009 (Ferraro, 2011). 
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18. In Colombia, the National Guarantee Fund (FNG) guarantees up to 50% of the value of loans; in El 
Salvador, the PROGAIN programme for industry and agro-industry guarantees up to 50% and the 
PROGAPE programme for small businesses guarantees up to 70%; the funds in Brazil and Argentina 
guarantee up to 80% and 75% respectively (Ferraro, 2011); in Mexico, the Undersecretariat for SMEs’ 
fund, financed by NAFIN’s SME fund, guarantees up to 75% of operations and has cut down the 
requirements imposed by banks, which, for instance, now accept bank statements instead of audited 
financial statements (Garrido, 2011). 
19. Guarantee funds with “mixed” and public–private finance are springing up in the region. Although 
the government provides part of the capital, the funds are managed by private firms. One example 
is Chile’s FOGAPE fund, in which the public sector guarantees private banks’ portfolios in exchange 
for a risk-adjusted commission and banks bid on the public guarantees. The Brazilian Development 
Bank launched the Investment Guarantee Fund (FGI) in 2010, which uses private resources and is a 
fluid mechanism that allows online processing of applications and payments, which helps reduce 
bureaucracy and operational problems (Ferraro, 2011).
20. Some examples of the early development of guarantee societies in countries where the guarantee 
system is most widespread are the Brazilian and Chilean funds. In Brazil, SEBRAE issued a public call 
to support the creation of credit-guarantee societies with technical and financial assistance with the 
aim of offering alternatives to cover corporate loans; in Chile, the Production Development Corporation 
(CORFO) has a programme to strengthen mutual guarantee institutions (Pombo González et al., 2008). 
21. In India, for example, the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) has 
grown considerably over the last decade, eventually providing 22% of guaranteed loans according 
to the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Reserve Bank of India, 2010). In Indonesia, 
the Business Credit Programme (Kredit Usaha Rakyat, KUR) provides credit through various public 
financial institutions.
22. For example, in Brazil SEBRAE offers support to companies according to their stage of development. In 
Chile, CORFO offers a comprehensive support strategy that follows the development and potentialities 
of firms (see Box 3.4).
23. SEBRAE is undertaking initiatives to reduce these information problems among SMEs by disseminating 
information about the programmes available, training entrepreneurs and banks to tailor credit 
assessments to the realities of smaller businesses, and strengthening credit unions and micro-finance 
institutions for micro and small enterprises. The Mexican Financial Outreach Programme has a 
similar objective but different systems. The programme is set up as a fund for hiring executives that 
advise SMEs on accessing credit offered by financial intermediaries authorised by the SME Fund. The 
consultants help companies check their finance needs and payment capacities, identifying the best 
financial product for them, and help them through the application process and to properly manage 
their financial information. They also ensure the financing is properly granted (Ferraro, 2011). 
24. For example, in Argentina SEPYME introduced a leasing line into the PBT interest-rate reduction 
scheme, and the Brazilian Development Bank has leasing products and is studying the introduction 
of e-factoring systems. In Colombia, BANCOLDEX offers SMEs leasing and factoring products and they 
have been very popular in recent years. In 2010 the leasing line represented almost 10% of the bank’s 
total commercial portfolio and was used to finance leasing contracts for fixed movable and immovable 
assets, including machinery, vehicles, equipment, land, factory buildings and premises. Its factoring 
portfolio is much smaller (0.42% of the commercial portfolio in 2010), but offers specific products such 
as Liquidex Pesos-Dollars, which allows firms to buy up to 80% of the value of bills of exchange with a 
discount, under a predefined BANCOLDEX credit insurance policy (Zuleta, 2011). 
25. There is also a form of “reverse factoring”, where buyers give financial institutions access to their 
accounts payable to supplier SMEs that require a discount. 
26. Participating in the programme are 39 financial intermediaries who provide their services to 68 000 
affiliated suppliers and complete 10 000 transactions a day. As of May 2010, over 10.7 million discount 
operations had been recorded over the previous decade, amounting to MXN 1 billion (Mexican pesos) 
(USD 77.5 million) (ECLAC, IDB and OAS, 2011). 
27. In 2009, 75% of NAFIN’s second-level finance was for the Production Chains Programme. This is a 
significant increase on the first-year figure of 32% in 2002 (ECLAC, IDB and OAS, 2011).
28. Large corporate participants and participating government institutions invite their suppliers (SMEs and 
individuals) to form a chain. NAFIN offers the chain attractive finance options and the development 
of an online tool for information exchange and as a platform for technical assistance and marketing 
(Ferraro, 2011; ECLAC, IDB and OAS, 2011). 
29. For instance, the SEBRAE-FINEP incubator programme in Brazil; the incubators and technology 
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services of the Argentine Technology Fund (FONTAR); the Incubator Programme run by the Mexican 
Undersecretariat for SMEs (SPYME) and the SME Fund; CONAMYPE’s business and incubator 
development services in El Salvador; and various business incubator and accelerator programmes, 
especially for companies with the potential for innovation, in Costa Rica, according to the sectors 
marked out as being a priority in each region of the country (Ferraro, 2011).  
30. Another interesting experience is the Peruvian NGO “Colectivo Integral de Desarrollo”, which promotes 
the creation of businesses by young entrepreneurs, improving their business skills by providing 
management training, consultancy services on markets, taxes, the formal economy and access to seed 
capital (ECLAC, IDB and OAS, 2011). 
31. Other examples of networks include the Uruguayan Business Angel Network, the Business Angel 
Network of the Andes (Colombia), Gávea Angels and the Business Angel Network (Brazil) and the Invest 
Business Angel Network (Peru).
32. In 2011, the average microloan was for about USD 1 000 (Mix Market, 2012).
33. Although the bulk of the portfolio and most customers are in regulated institutions (banks, co-operatives 
and credit unions, regulated NGOs), in terms of their actual number unregulated institutions make up 
nearly 70% of all institutions that provide credit (Pedroza and Navajas, 2010).
34. Peru and Bolivia stand out as the countries with the best regulatory framework in the region according 
to the results of an Economist Intelligence Unit study (EIU, 2011). The countries have clear, well-
established regulatory standards and a good supervisory capacity. Together the two countries account 
for 40% of microcredit in the region. 
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CHAPTER 
FOUR
SMEs, innovation and technological 
development
This chapter analyses the position of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in Latin America in terms of their capacity 
for innovation and technological development. It addresses the 
obstacles that hinder SMEs from accessing technology and benefiting 
from knowledge dissemination and transfer. The chapter pays 
special attention to SMEs’ use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) and their reaction to the innovation policies being 
implemented. It looks at how these restrictions lead to productivity 
gaps and structural heterogeneity. The chapter concludes by 
presenting a series of recommendations and identifying opportunities 
and challenges for the design of public policy.
104 LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
4. SMEs, INNOvATION AND TEChNOLOgICAL DEvELOpMENT
Introduction
The new techno-economic paradigms, which are creating a “third industrial 
revolution”, increase the dependency of economic growth and development on capacities 
to create value by incorporating knowledge, innovation and the dissemination of 
productive technology use (ECLAC, 2012). These are essential factors to accelerate growth 
and make productivity gains, create good-quality jobs, reduce structural heterogeneity 
and move forward in long-term processes to improve income distribution and increase 
equality. Technological development and innovation play a leading role in this dynamic. 
It is a complex social process that evolves from the interaction between individual 
people who create social ties and relationships. 
In 2009, investment in R&D in Latin America was equal to 0.7% 
of GDP, way below the level of investment seen in OECD countries 
(2.4%). This gap and the concentration of R&D in only a few countries 
help explain why the region is lagging behind in this area.
This chapter focuses on the factors that determine to what extent firms, particularly 
SMEs, are able to innovate and incorporate new technologies into their production 
activities, as well as on the key policies and instruments to achieve this. In particular, 
increasing the intensity and changing the orientation of the innovation process requires: 
i) developing firms’ and institutions’ technological and organisational capacities; 
ii) strengthening the architectures of the networks that the companies belong to and 
creating “small-world networks”;1 iii) creating a more virtuous connection between 
the parts of existing networks (companies, universities and technology centres, and 
consultancies and intermediate institutions); iv) creating larger markets and a broader 
division of labour to bring about a cumulative causation;2 v) taking into consideration 
the form of competition (how salaries are set and the relative importance of “creative 
destruction”); and vi) analysing institutions open to innovation (if they exist) and their 
capacities. An innovation process is necessary both because of the characteristics 
of firms and because of the macroeconomic environment and the socio-economic 
characteristics that are defined by the national innovation system (NIS). The system of 
competition and the processes of structural change and creative destruction, as well as 
the dynamics of learning and the linkages and capacities of firms, determine business 
innovation (ECLAC/SEGIB, 2008).
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section analyses the state of innovation 
region-wide. The next section focuses in on SMEs’ capacities and what they are doing to 
foster innovation. The third section identifies SMEs’ strengths, weaknesses, results and 
main obstacles. In the fourth section, the focus shifts to the access and use of ICTs and 
new opportunities for the computerisation of SMEs and regional broadband connectivity. 
In the fifth section, we present some recommendations on the institutional structure 
and public policies needed to drive forward innovation and dissemination of technology 
in Latin American SMEs. 
Innovation in the regional context
Latin America is lagging behind the OECD economies in terms of innovation and 
technology adoption, but performance varies from country to country across the region 
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(OECD/ECLAC, 2011). This is in contrast to developing countries such as China, which 
have narrowed their technology gaps by making their production structures more 
complex, more sophisticated, more knowledge-intensive and more technology-intensive. 
Latin America has made little progress in this area and remains well behind advanced 
countries (ECLAC, 2010). 
One reason the region still lags behind is because investment in research and 
development (R&D) is low and is concentrated in only a few countries. In 2009, OECD 
economies invested 2.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) in R&D, more than three times 
the figure for Latin America (0.7%). The gap has remained over the past few decades 
(Figure 4.1). There are also large differences among countries in the region. For instance, 
in 2009 Brazil invested 1.2% of GDP in R&D, while Bolivia spent less than 0.2%. Even within 
Latin American countries there are equally large differences in the nature of investment 
in R&D depending on the type of company and the economic sector. Moreover, Latin 
America is also lagging way behind in terms of the sources of investment in innovation. 
While in OECD countries businesses provide 60% of investment in R&D, in Latin America 
the business sector tends not to prioritise innovation and technological development, 
providing only around 40% of investment in R&D. 
Various factors influence a firm’s capacity to innovate. A general factor is the 
institutional environment, which has a bearing on the firm’s innovative behaviour. A 
sector-specific factor is the characteristics of the business activity and its linkages with 
organisations involved in the national innovation system [businesses, universities, 
technology centres, consultancies, government institutions, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society]. A company-specific factor is the firm’s internal 
capacities and the efforts it makes. Innovation improves the quality of products and 
processes, increases productivity and competitiveness, and helps a company better 
position itself in national and international markets and move towards activities with a 
higher added value (Cimoli et al. 2011; Dini and Stumpo, 2011). As firms strive to innovate, 
they need good learning and knowledge-accumulation processes developed within the 
company and through their relations with other actors. 
Companies are key stakeholders in an NIS because they use 
scientific and technological advances in production to develop new 
products and processes or improve upon existing ones, enabling 
greater productivity and competitiveness.
Four factors, among others, determine a firm’s innovative capacity: its ability 
to absorb knowledge, the size of its workforce, its sector and the context in which it 
operates. Given the business diversity and the importance of SMEs in the production 
fabric of Latin American countries, we must examine companies’ innovation capacities 
and limitations. Innovation by SMEs is usually a spontaneous reaction to competitive 
pressure from large firms, and their innovative strategies and activities are often part of 
informal strategies rather than the result of planning. Given their limited capacities, they 
usually seek to capture market niches rather than work their way into mass markets.
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Figure 4.1. Latin America and the OECD: investment in R&D
and distribution by origin of finance, 1990-2009
Source: Based on RICYT and OECD.Stat.
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732823
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A. Latin America
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A company’s size directly affects its capacity to innovate. While large firms benefit 
from growing profits from R&D activities, SMEs are heavily restricted by their size, so 
their innovations are weaker and they are less likely to use technologies productively. 
Despite their heterogeneity, SMEs share many constraints. These notably include access 
to credit and qualified human resources, a lower tendency to export, a lower capacity 
to interact with other companies and institutions that train human resources and 
carry out research, and their limited membership in networks. Diversity among and 
within sectors influences their tendency to innovate. Latin American SMEs are usually 
concentrated in sectors whose characteristics in the region mean they require little 
knowledge (trade, informal services and basic manufacturing).
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Companies are key stakeholders in an NIS because they use 
scientific and technological advances in production to develop new 
products and processes or improve existing ones, enabling greater 
productivity and competitiveness.
Public research centres and universities provide essential support for the 
development of technology and innovation for SMEs. A central theme for innovation 
is co-operation and linkages between public and private actors (Nelson, 1993; Dosi and 
Cimoli, 1994; ECLAC/SEGIB, 2010). Alongside institutions and current regulations, these 
actors form the national innovation system (NIS). This system sets out the processes for 
incorporating technology and determines the rate at which technological knowledge will 
be generated, adapted, acquired and disseminated in production activities (Lundvall, 
1992). The linkages and interaction between NIS actors are important for a country’s 
scientific and technological development and the drive that knowledge can give to the 
production sector (Nelson, 1993; Dosi and Cimoli, 1994; ECLAC/SEGIB, 2010). 
Other key players include government bodies, higher education institutions, 
research centres and businesses. Businesses are essential, since in collaboration with 
other actors they use scientific and technological advances in production, developing 
new products and processes and improving existing ones to increase productivity and 
competitiveness (ECLAC/SEGIB, 2010). Large firms generally develop different levels of 
co-operation within Latin American NISs, but SMEs often have neither the resources to 
carry out research nor the capacity to link up with other NIS actors.
The weaknesses of the region’s NISs make it harder for companies, especially smaller 
ones, to have the capacities to compete when technology is moving forward so quickly 
and there is growing specialisation. Latin American NISs are faced with restrictions in the 
capacities of their members, whose diversity makes co-ordination difficult. In science, 
technology and innovation (STI), Latin America is lagging way behind more developed 
economies because demand for STI by the production sectors is low and investment 
in R&D is scant, especially in the private sector. SMEs can only achieve the capacities 
they need by working in networks, where information and technology can flow between 
businesses and organisations as abundantly as inputs and goods. The SMEs can thus 
increase their added value and markedly boost productivity (ECLAC, 2010).
Innovations and SMEs: activities, strengths and weaknesses 
Economic development and innovation processes are associated with companies 
generating and accumulating the technological capacities to function and trade. They 
are also associated with knowledge flows, which greatly impact the results of innovation 
activities, which in turn impact the flows. Learning and knowledge accumulation are 
essential for a firm to develop its skills and innovative capacities. A company’s experience 
and its interaction with other companies and other types of agents influence its learning 
process. Innovation processes are brought about by complex social interactions that do 
not occur spontaneously, in isolation, but are the cause and consequence of knowledge 
flows and interaction between NIS agents. Other important variables also exist, 
especially sector-specific and region-specific variables and the competition dynamic 
among companies. 
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SMEs and their capacities to innovate
Despite the differences among countries, sectors and companies and their effects on 
a firm’s export prospects, innovation is always important to drive forward productivity 
and competitiveness (Box 4.1). 
Compared to larger firms, SMEs face major constraints that make it harder for them 
to innovate. Investment in R&D requires large-scale initial spending and there is much 
uncertainty regarding the resulting benefits. This is not an obstacle for larger firms, but 
it is for smaller ones. Restrictions on access to domestic and foreign financing, as well as 
requests for guarantees and high interest rates, represent major barriers to innovation 
and the incorporation of knowledge in smaller firms. Furthermore, innovation requires 
economies of scale and of scope, adding a further difficulty for SMEs. Large companies 
are better placed to take on the high risks associated with innovation and benefit from 
its returns (Box 4.1). SMEs have to team up with other firms to promote and facilitate the 
integration of learning and knowledge. Despite these constraints, SMEs bring flexibility 
to innovation processes, thanks to their more malleable organisational structure. 
They can respond quickly to changes and they make decisions quickly, with their staff 
participating in the process. 
Innovation processes do not occur spontaneously, in isolation, but are the 
cause and consequence of knowledge flows and interaction between the 
actors that form the NIS. The sector in which a company operates, its 
location and the competition it faces are factors that influence innovation.
Differences in innovative behaviour also exist among SMEs. Those targeting 
international markets have a greater capacity to innovate, and indeed innovate more, 
especially if they operate in sectors dominated by dynamic efficiencies (Schumpeterian 
and Keynesian).3 Access to international markets requires technologies, encourages 
firms to strengthen their technology skills and improve their organisational and business 
models, making it easier for them to innovate. Qualified human resources (absorption 
capacity) are essential to improve firms’ innovative capacity in products and processes. 
Some sectors are more likely to innovate, often because they have a greater capacity to 
accumulate knowledge. 
Government support is good for business innovation, with 
significant “crowding-in” effects on investment in innovation.
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Box 4.1. Innovation, exports and productivity: a positive relationship in Latin 
American and OECD countries
Large firms perform more innovation than SMEs, according to comparative studies 
on Latin American and OECD countries. The effects that larger production units have 
on innovation are similar in several countries. For instance, large firms are 10% more 
innovative than small ones in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica, 8% in Panama, 
and 17% in Uruguay (where the figure is highest). As in Latin America, in OECD countries 
there is a clear positive correlation between company size and propensity to innovate. 
While in Norway (the country with the largest gap) large firms are 32% more innovative, 
in the UK the figure falls to 4.6%. 
Several studies confirm that companies that export are more likely to engage in 
innovative activities than those that serve only the domestic market. This relationship is 
evident in Latin American countries including Argentina (15%), Chile (11%) and Colombia 
(7%). The same pattern is found in OECD countries, especially in France (78%), Norway 
(64%), Denmark (64%) and Belgium (62%). The OECD countries where the relationship 
is least evident are Canada (29%), Switzerland (31%) and New Zealand (35%), but these 
figures are still higher than those found in Latin America. 
There is a positive correlation between innovation and productivity. After controlling for 
relevant variables such as human capital, the relationship between these variables in OECD 
countries is positive and statistically significant. In European countries, the correlation 
between sales from product innovations and productivity is high for large firms, while in 
Canada and New Zealand this correlation is more pronounced among SMEs. 
Government financial support for innovation has positive effects on businesses. In Latin 
American countries such as Chile and Colombia, the firms that received financial support 
invested 80% more in technological development than other firms. Costa Rican firms 
benefit most, with those receiving such funding investing twice as much as those that do 
not. A similar pattern occurs in OECD countries. In Germany, Finland, the Netherlands 
and Italy, firms that receive government financing invested 40-50% more than average, 
while in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and Norway the difference rises to 70%. This 
shows the tremendous impact public innovation policies have on companies’ innovative 
effort, which has a strong “crowding-in” effect on investment in innovation. 
Source: Based on OECD (2009) and Crespi and Zúñiga (2010)
Two features stand out in relation to the innovative capacity of SMEs:
•	 SMEs’ innovation strategies are less formal than those of larger firms. These 
differences also exist between SMEs, as well as between different sectors of the 
economy. Generally, companies operating in knowledge-intensive sectors have 
more formal strategies and consistently invest more money in R&D.
•	 There is little interaction with their peers, other institutions and other agents, which 
prevents their innovation strategies from having a greater impact. SMEs can access 
formal innovation strategies through their linkages with other economic agents 
that do not face restrictions of scale, such as large firms (Dini and Stumpo, 2011). 
Access to international markets for SMEs increases their propensity 
to innovate because they need new technologies, greater technological 
skills and better organisational and business models.
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Activities, results and obstacles 
Companies innovate to increase their productivity and competitiveness and reduce 
their operational costs. When analysing business-innovation activities and production 
structures in Latin America, the concept of innovation should be used “in the broadest 
sense”, since most of the companies operate in non-knowledge-intensive and non-
technology-intensive industries. SMEs generally focus their efforts on informal, 
incremental innovation activities, investing little in radical innovation activities 
such as investment in R&D, so unless we expand the definition of innovation we will 
underestimate the innovative capacity of SMEs and non-technology-intensive sectors.
The latest innovation surveys carried out in several Latin American countries 
reveal certain patterns in the behaviour of SMEs. Company innovation processes have 
only just started being measured in the region, through national innovation surveys. 
Based on data from surveys in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Uruguay), the next section analyses and describes the main innovation and 
technological dissemination activities conducted by Latin American companies. But 
we must remember that much work still needs to be done in the region for surveys to 
provide homogeneous, comparable data that can be used to obtain true measures of 
firms’ technological and organisational capacities and their ability to absorb technology 
and connect with other firms. The surveys need an improved design and the focus of 
the data extracted needs to shift in order to capture companies’ innovation capacities, 
effort and obstacles. This would make the surveys and other tools for obtaining data 
useful for developing and evaluating public policies to innovate and develop technology 
(Cimoli et al., 2011). 
The data from these surveys provide only a partial view of innovation activities 
in companies, especially SMEs. While they do not allow an exhaustive analysis of 
the region and the different aspects of scientific and technological development at 
the company level, these surveys do reveal certain common characteristics of their 
innovative capacities, as well as the main results of those activities and the obstacles 
that companies face.
Latin American SMEs concentrate their innovation activities on technology 
transfer and imitation. This is reflected in the high level of investment in machinery 
and equipment compared to investment in radical innovations such as R&D (Figure 
4.2). While large firms share their investments more evenly between R&D and capital 
goods, SMEs invest more heavily in the latter. Furthermore, company size and sector 
are key factors in determining the type of innovation activity carried out. The nature 
of the innovation activities also varies from country to country in Latin America. Some 
countries, like Uruguay, are increasing the percentage of investment used to acquire 
machinery and equipment, while others, like Argentina, have shifted the balance more 
towards R&D.
Latin American SMEs concentrate their innovation activities on 
technology transfer and imitation. This is reflected in the high level 
of investment in machinery and equipment compared to that in 
R&D.
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Figure 4.2. Investment in capital goods and R&D
according to company size and sector






















































Note:  The company sizes are those defined by each country for their surveys. 
Source: National Business Survey on Innovation, R&D and ICTs (2002-04) Argentina, Survey of Innovation
Technology in Brazil (IBGE, 2010), (Gutiérrez, 2011), 3rd Uruguayan Industry Innovation Survey (2004-06) (ANII, 2008a)
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There is a strong correlation between company size and the results 
of innovation activities, with large companies obtaining better 
results than SMEs. 
Turning to human resources and sources of funding, in these areas too there are vast 
differences according to company sector and company size. Human resources devoted 
wholly or partially to innovation activities are an indicator of companies’ commitment to 
technological and organisational innovations. In the countries surveyed, firms devoted 
to innovation in the strictest sense of the term allocated more staff to this area than 
firms that innovate in a broader sense. In Uruguay, in 2006, firms devoted to innovation 
in the narrow sense allocated 7% of their staff to developing innovation activities, while 
firms that innovate in a broader sense allocated just 3% (ANII, 2008a). Moreover, the 
proportion of workers engaged in innovation activities is higher in large firms. This is 
because those firms’ human resources are more qualified, have greater access to finance 
and have formal organisational structures and innovation strategies. SMEs employ 
relatively less-skilled workers in their innovation activities, who generally conduct their 
activities in informal units or departments. In addition, SMEs have financial constraints 
that restrict their capacity to innovate. Latin American companies, especially SMEs, 
generally have to fund their own innovation activities, since they are faced with obstacles 
in accessing the financial system and being included in government programmes to 
promote business innovation. 
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According to the results of innovative activities in selected Latin American 
countries, companies mainly make incremental innovations in products and processes 
aimed at the production unit itself or the local market. There is a strong correlation 
between company size and the results of innovative activities, with large companies 
obtaining better results than SMEs. SMEs’ focus on marginal, incremental innovations in 
products, processes and activities produces very little impact, if any, on their access to 
international markets. This is mainly due to the stronger investment in machinery and 
equipment by Latin American companies and weaker investment in radical innovation 
activities such as R&D (Figure 4.3). 
A company’s sector is also a crucial factor. In Argentina, for instance, engineering-
intensive activities and the car industry are the sectors of industry with the highest 
proportion of innovative firms, while in the tertiary sector IT services are most innovative 
(Barletta et al., 2011). In Colombia too, innovation varies greatly among different 
industrial sectors. SMEs that produce machinery and electronic goods innovate the 
most in products, while SMEs involved in manufacturing cars, trailers and semi-trailers 
innovate the most in processes (Gutiérrez, 2011). The situation is similar in Brazil and 
Uruguay.
Among SMEs, the sector of activity determines the level of innovation. 
In Argentina, innovation is led by the car industry and engineering-
intensive companies, while in Colombia it is led by SMEs that 
manufacture machinery, electronic goods, cars, trailers and semi-trailers.





























































Figure 4.3.  Innovation results by company size and sector
Note: The company sizes are those defined by each country for their surveys. 
Source: National Business Survey on Innovation, R&D and ICTs (2002-04) Argentina, (Barletta et al. 2011,) Brazilian
Technological Innovation Survey (2010), (Gutiérrez, 2011),  7th Chilean Innovation Survey (2012), 3rd Uruguayan Industry
Innovation Survey 2004-06 (ANII, 2008a), 1st Uruguayan Services Innovation Survey 2004-06 (ANII, 2008b).
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113LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
4. SMEs, INNOvATION AND TEChNOLOgICAL DEvELOpMENT
Microeconomic, sectoral and macroeconomic factors affect innovation processes by 
influencing whether firms choose to innovate, how much they choose to innovate and 
the quality of the innovation. In Latin America there are several common elements that 
hinder innovative behaviour, including the difficult access to credit and the shortage 
of qualified staff. These are particularly relevant to SMEs and must be taken into 
account when designing or implementing policies and instruments to promote science, 
technology and innovation. 
The poor linkages and co-operation among companies and agents belonging to the 
NISs create an obstacle to technology and knowledge transfer, innovation processes and 
co-ordination between the production sector and academia. The smaller the company, 
the greater these difficulties become. 
The high costs and risks of innovation are the main factors that 
hold back this activity, especially among SMEs. In Brazil, service 
companies also point to the lack of qualified staff as an obstacle. 
The very characteristics of innovation discourage innovative behaviour, especially 
among SMEs (Figure 4.4). The high costs and risks hold back or inhibit this activity, 
especially among SMEs and non-innovative companies. For example, non-innovative 
companies in Argentina cite the high costs (57%), excessive economic risks (55%) and 
lack of funding (49%) as the main obstacles, which can be explained by their high risk 
aversion (Barletta et al. 2011). In Brazilian industry, innovative companies identify as 
their obstacles to innovation the high cost (73%), the high risks (66%) and poor access 
to finance (52%). In the service sector, the obstacles are the lack of qualified staff 
(70%) and, as for industrial companies, the high cost (72%), the associated risk (63%) 
and the restricted access to finance (49%) (IBGE, 2010). The major obstacles identified 
by innovative Colombian SMEs are finding and training human capital (45%), the risks 
(43%), organisational and management problems (40%), problems with the market 
structure and size (38%) and information problems (37%) (Gutiérrez, 2011). 
Public policies to support innovation vary greatly across the region. Although 
progress has been seen in several countries, SMEs are still faced with obstacles and 
restrictions that make it difficult for them to benefit from government policies and 
programmes.
In addition to the obstacles mentioned above, there are also country-specific factors. 
In Uruguay, for instance, the small domestic market makes it harder for firms to develop 
innovations, since they are faced with diseconomies of scale.
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Note: The company sizes are those defined by each country for their surveys. For Chile, “Limited co-operation with
other institutions/companies” is calculated as the simple average of limited co-operation with institutions and
limited co-operation with companies. In the Uruguayan services sector, “Macroeconomic instability” was replaced
by “Level of economic uncertainty”.          
Source: 3rd Uruguayan Industry Innovation Survey (2004-06), 1st Uruguayan Services Innovation Survey (2004-06),
Brazilian Technology Innovation Survey (2008), 5th Chilean Innovation Survey, Innovación y sus determinantes en la pequeña
y mediana empresa: el sector manufacturero colombiano (Gutiérrez, 2011) and La conducta innovativa de las pymes industriales y de






























Figure 4.4. Major obstacles to business innovation,
by country and sector




Shortage of trained staff  
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Box 4.2. Awareness of policies to promote innovation in Chile and Brazil
In Chilean industry, 55% of innovative companies say the lack of government incentives is 
an obstacle to innovation. While 38.3% of innovative companies are aware of public support 
programmes such as InnovaChile, the Scientific and Technology Development Fund 
(FONDEF), Foundation for Agricultural Innovation (FIA) and Innova Bío Bío, only 5.2% of them 
have used them. Among non-innovative firms, 20.5% of them are aware of the programmes 
but only 1.5% of use them. So, as one would expect, innovative firms are more aware of 
public support programmes for innovation and use them more than non-innovative firms, 
among which there is little or no knowledge of such initiatives. Nevertheless, although 
some innovative firms are aware of government support programmes and use them, the 
percentage of those that do is low. 
Table 4.1. Knowledge and use of government support programmes 
by innovative and non-innovative Chilean companies
(as percentages)
Awareness of government support programmes
Innova Chile FONDEF FIA Innova Bío Bío Awareness of at least 
one programme
Innovative 27.6 31.3 12.9 14.5 38.3
Non-innovative 13.9 13.6 7.6 6.4 20.5
Use of government support programmes
Innova Chile FONDEF FIA Innova Bío Bío Awareness of at least 
one programme
Innovative 2.5 2.6 1.1 0.4 5.2
Non-innovative 1 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.5
Source: Based on Ministry of Economy, Chile (2009) 
In Brazilian industry, 22.8% of innovative firms have obtained at least one piece of 
government support to help them innovate products or processes. However, the percentage 
is lower among small firms than among large ones. While 36.8% of large firms have received 
at least some government support, the figure falls to 23.7% among medium-sized firms 
and 22.2% among small firms. Among industrial companies, the most common thing that 
grants are spent on is purchasing machinery and equipment (14.2%).
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Box 4.2. (contd).
 
Table 4.2. Use of support programmes by Brazilian companies, by company size
(as percentages)
Support programmes used by innovative companies, by company size
Small Medium Large Total
Industry Services R&D Industry Services R&D Industry Services R&D Industry Services R&D
Funding for R&D 
and for purchase 
of machinery and 
equipment












1.3 0.9 50 0.9 2.1 52.6 4.7 1.1 83.3 1.4 1 61.5
Financial 
subsidies 
for R&D and 
employment of 
researchers 
0.4 3.1 12.5 0.9 4.1 21.1 4.1 3.6 50 0.5 3.2 28.2
Computer 
Technology Act




0.5 0.5 0 1.9 6.7 26.3 16.2 16.5 33.3 1.1 1.5 23.1
Other support 
programmes 
7 7.6 37.5 7.6 12.9 57.9 9.2 2.5 83.3 7.1 7.9 61.5
TOTAL 22.2 14.1 75 23.7 26.2 100 36.8 25 100 22.8 15.3 94.9
Source: Based on Ministry of Economy, Chile (2009) and IBGE (2010) figures.
There are few linkages between Latin American businesses and other NIS 
participants. Multidisciplinary collaboration and linkages through interaction with these 
agents generates forums to address, disseminate, transfer and acquire knowledge and 
information and technology. However, universities and businesses have had a complex, 
difficult relationship with each other because of their different roles in society and their 
respective characteristics. Universities have not played a significant or dynamic role in 
the innovation of business. There is little co-ordination between the two, which means 
little scientific and technological knowledge is transferred to the production sector and 
instilled in businesses’ innovation strategies (ECLAC/SEGIB, 2010). Given the constraints 
faced by SMEs restricting them from increasing their potential for innovation and 
technological modernisation, they need platforms for linking and communicating 
with other NIS firms and institutions to reduce their costs and uncertainty, access new 
knowledge and strengthen their internal capacities. There are major advantages for 
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firms establishing such links, which can take many different forms with varying levels 
of frequency and intensity.
In Chile, 55% of innovative firms believe the lack of government 
incentives is an obstacle to innovation. Although nearly 40% of 
firms are aware of public support programmes, only 5% have used 
them.
Box 4.3. SMEs and their linkages with the NIS
The degree of linkage between firms in the service and industry sectors and NIS agents 
is positively correlated with the company size. In Brazil, a breakdown by sector and size 
reveals that 9% of small innovative industrial firms and 12% of small service-sector 
firms had linkages with other NIS actors; in medium-sized companies, the figures rise 
to 15% in industry and 14% in the service sector; and in large firms the figures jump to 
35% in industry and 24% in the service sector. 
Although there are few linkages between Brazilian firms (industry and services) and 
universities, firms view such linkages as important. Indeed, 30% of industrial firms and 
43% of service-sector firms consider it important to co-operate with universities (IBGE, 
2010). In Colombia, there are very few linkages with universities. Only 6% of small firms 
and 10% of medium-sized firms have such linkages. In both countries, linkages and 
co-operation with NIS agents increases as the company’s size increases. As in other 
Latin American countries, Colombian universities have not helped boost innovation 
among SMEs in the manufacturing sector (Gutiérrez, 2011). Similarly, in Uruguay 
innovative companies in industry and the service sector develop linkages with various 
NIS agents, but co-operation between them and universities and research centres is very 
low, though it is higher among larger firms. About 4% of small firms, 10% of medium-
sized firms and 24% of large firms have such linkages. The importance of this form of 
co-operation for innovation is highlighted by the fact that 32% of firms that innovate 
in the strict sense of the word have linkages with universities, compared with just 12% 
of firms that innovate in a broader sense. Similarly, government bodies responsible for 
operating STI programmes have very few linkages with Latin American firms.
It is vital to develop policies focused on strengthening the capacity for co-operation 
between NIS agents and innovation in the region. Although few countries have strong 
NISs, there is a consensus that innovation is important to improve economic growth 
and competitiveness. Several Latin American countries have thus bumped the topic up 
their agenda, introducing policies to foster linkages among NIS agents in national STI 
plans.
Source: Based on data from innovation surveys.
In short, the innovation survey results bring to light a series of characteristics 
shared by SMEs and the main factors that hinder innovation activities. Innovations 
introduced by SMEs have a far narrower scope than those introduced by larger firms. 
SMEs generally allocate few resources to radical innovation activities such as investment 
in R&D, focusing instead on acquiring machinery and equipment, with ICTs playing a 
prominent role. This, they say, is due to the obstacles they face because they are not 
large companies and the high costs and risks associated with innovation activities, along 
with their limited access to financing. Innovation activities exhibit economies of scale, 
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making it difficult for SMEs to make any profit from them. The poorly qualified human 
resources and unfavourable characteristics of the sectors in which they operate – with 
little incorporation of technology, knowledge acquisition and information – discourage 
them from investing in innovation. These factors are constraints that must be taken into 
account by policy makers and those who design instruments to promote innovation and 
the incorporation of knowledge into production processes. 
These conclusions reaffirm the need for governments to step up and broaden the 
scope of public policies to promote and support SMEs, because without such support 
they have been unable to undertake complex, wide-reaching innovation activities. 
Although some Latin American firms have come close to the 
international technology frontier in some fields, such firms tend 
to be “technology islands” in a region characterised by a highly 
diverse production structure.
Although in Latin America there are some firms, production clusters and sectors that 
have come close to the international technology frontier, they tend to be “technology 
islands” in a region characterised by a highly diverse production structure. For Latin 
American countries to converge upon a pathway of inclusive development, it is essential 
that they increase business investment in innovation and R&D to significantly boost 
productivity and competitiveness. It is therefore important that they make progress in 
designing and implementing industrial policies accompanied by science, technology 
and innovation policies. These policies must take into account the specificities of 
SMEs, encourage complementarity among NIS agents and facilitate linkages between 
SMEs and all other production and innovation firms and organisations to improve their 
access to new technologies and their capacity to innovate. Policies should help these 
companies overcome the barriers they face, expand the spillover effects into other 
sectors and foster productive links in both directions. This will increase the added value 
and improve income and salaries in SMEs and the wider economy.
ICTs in Latin American SMEs: access and adoption 
As we have seen, one of the fundamental innovation activities that occurs in Latin 
American firms, especially smaller firms, is the incorporation of technologies through 
investment in machinery and equipment. ICTs have become particularly prominent in 
recent years. Therefore, it is important to analyse the penetration rate of ICTs in SMEs, 
what access SMEs have to more complex technologies, what limitations they face, and 
the potential of these new applications. 
ICT penetration in SMEs
Although more SMEs have adopted and begun using basic tools (personal computers, 
Internet and e-mail), there is still a wide gap between Latin America and OECD countries 
in terms of the sophistication of the ICTs they use. Although SMEs have narrowed the 
gap in terms of basic ICT infrastructure, they are now lagging even further behind in 
their use of complex technologies. 
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Formal Latin American SMEs do not lag very far behind in terms 
of access to basic ICTs such as mobile and fixed-line phones, 
computers, ordinary software and Internet use.
Data on ICT access and use in the region is sparse and difficult to compare among 
and within countries because of the different methodologies and coverage. Data tend 
to be for basic indicators (Internet access and number of computers), and very little 
information is available on complex applications and effective use of ICTs in businesses. 
This makes it difficult to identify gaps between Latin American and OECD countries 
from which to draw lessons.
In recent years, there have been several initiatives to improve how ICT use in 
the region’s businesses is measured. Current methods focus on basic data, and new 
indicators are still in the early stages of development. Generally the data available in 
the region are as follows: computer availability, intranet and Internet access, online 
sales and purchases, and human resources who use these technologies, sometimes 
including information on the type of Internet connection, how the connection is used, 
and extranet access, without details on the hardware or its use. In several cases, the data 
only cover the manufacturing sector, rather than all production sectors, and in other 
cases data from microenterprises are not included or are not proportionally represented. 
For instance, statistics often do not measure the incorporation of ICTs in agricultural 
SMEs.4 
Despite these limitations, we can analyse certain indicators that provide a partial view 
of the extent to which ICTs have spread in Latin American companies of different sizes. 
The adoption of these technologies is the result of an evolutionary process that requires 
certain minimum thresholds for technology infrastructure, which are necessary to move 
into maturer, more advanced stages (Peirano and Suárez, 2006; Kotelnikov, 2007; Rivas 
and Stumpo, 2011). Completing one phase and moving onto the next requires additional 
efforts and complementarities in firms’ skills and organisation. Firms can make progress 
in the ICTs they adopt and use by moving from unsophisticated technologies such as 
mobile and fixed-line telephones and computers with basic software to more advanced 
technologies like e-commerce and information and communication systems. 
Compared to large firms, formal SMEs do not lag very far behind in terms of access 
to basic ICTs, which represent the first stage of adoption and use. This is attributable to 
the sharp drop in the cost of access to these technologies. Although there are very few 
follow-up surveys to investigate the dissemination of ICTs among firms of different sizes, 
existing surveys show that in several countries SMEs have gradually been acquiring 
computers and their level of Internet access is similar to that of larger firms. The gap is 
minimal for the use of basic tools such as e-mail, with data across the region indicating 
around 98% of small firms and 99% of large firms using this means of communication. 
Many Latin American SMEs seem to have entered the second stage of incorporating 
ICTs. The second stage involves creating and managing databases that, with a small 
amount of investment in computer infrastructure, can be used to speed up and 
standardise administrative procedures, which has an impact on information-generating 
activities. Changes in computer and communications infrastructure mainly affect 
routine operations. The main benefit for the company is that procedures are automated, 
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improving the productivity of human resources and lowering costs for the company itself 
and for third parties. This stage involves relatively advanced uses of technology, such 
as transactions with government bodies and banking and financial services. Although 
many smaller firms do use these technologies, the gaps among firms of different sizes 
are beginning to widen (Table 4.3). The gaps in ICT use are also widening among firms 
that have their own website, but the statistical data do not indicate how firms use their 
website, and include in this category those who use their site solely for informational 
purposes rather than to form a link with their customers or suppliers.
Table 4.3. Use of intermediary ICTs, by company size
(as percentages)
Country Microenterprises Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises
% of companies using the 
Internet for transactions 
with government 
agencies
Argentina* - 50 66 82
Brazil - 66 78 87
Chile 70 83 95 97
Colombia 39 53 68 78
% of companies using the 
Internet for banking and 
financial services
Brazil - 83 91 94
Chile** - 77 89 93
Colombia 67 84 91 93
% of companies with 
their own website
Argentina - 62 76 83
Brazil - 50 75 91
Chile 9 21 53 75
Colombia*** 2 23 60 77
Uruguay - 45 60 75
Notes: (*) Average for businesses that undertake transactions (independent of the frequency) of a) liquidation 
and payment of AFIP, b) assessment and payment of contributions and c) other transactions with the state-
based OEDE-DGEYEL-MTEySS (2011). (**) Survey Data Access and use of Information and Communication 
Technologies in Chilean companies (2006). The stages of firm size are used in the surveys of the respective 
countries, based of their respective definitions. (***) For Colombia, data based on their Core Indicators Study of 
Information and Communication Technologies ICT (2006 and 2007), DANE (2008). 
 
Source: Produced by author based on several surveys. For Argentina, data based on OEDE-DGEYEL-MTEySS (2011), ICT-EIL 
module. For Brazil, data based on homes and businesses ICT 2011 (CETIC, 2012). For Colombia, based on DANE ICT Survey 
(2008). For Chile, based on 2nd Business Longitudinal Survey, Business Centre, Ministry of Economy (2012). For Uruguay, 
based on ICT module developed by the INE (2007).
In the third stage, ICTs support decision making and allow changes to be made to 
how information is processed and how it is co-ordinated with the firm’s strategic areas. 
For these more advanced applications and uses, there is a much wider gap between SMEs 
and larger firms. Relatively speaking, the effort required of SMEs to incorporate and use 
these tools is much greater in terms of training up staff and acquiring the prerequisite 
skills. The staff’s skills even become more important, since new tools need to be used 
for management tasks in order to be effective. One indicator of how well firms can co-
ordinate their different areas is whether they have an intranet, and the vast differences 
among agents of production in their adoption of an intranet is significant for the region’s 
production fabric. 
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Table 4.4.  Frequency of ICT use
(as percentages)
Country Microenterprises Small enterprises Medium enterprises Large enterprises
% of companies 
placing online 
orders
Argentina - 22 24 25
Brazil - 56 68 68
Chile 5 10 15 14
Colombia 33 43 49 49
Uruguay - 36 49 54
% of companies 
receiving online 
orders
Argentina - 18 22 23
Brazil - 11 14 18
Chile 4 6 10 9
Colombia 35 45 49 46
Uruguay - 37 47 44
% of companies 
with an intranet
Argentina - 18 34 61
Brazil* 18 35 49 72
Colombia** 19 21 37 62
Uruguay - 22 38 56
Notes: * For Brazil, the values correspond to the percentage of companies that have ICT. For other countries, the values 
are with respect to the Internet. (**) For Colombia, value based on a study of Basic Indicators of Information and 
Communication Technologies ICT (2006 and 2007), DANE (2008). 
 
Source: Values based on data from various surveys. For Argentina, data based on OEDE-DGEYEL-MTEySS (2011), ITC-EIL 
module. For Brazil, based on homes and businesses ICT 2011(CETIC, 2012). For Colombia, based on DANE ICT Survey (2008). 
For Chile, based on the second Business Longitudinal Survey, Business Centre of the Ministry of Economy (2012). For 
Uruguay, based on an ICT module developed by the INE (2007). 
Firms that use ICTs more intensively and for more complex applications, and therefore 
need an intranet combined with highly specialised software such as enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM), are in the fourth stage of 
adopting ICTs. In this stage, investment focuses on technology infrastructure and highly 
qualified staff. Firms fully adopt ICTs when the technology enables them not only to carry 
out the activities described above for the previous stages but also to innovate better. 
Innovations can be enhanced by greater interaction among different areas of the company 
or by fluid, permanent contact with suppliers and customers.5 There are differences in 
the use of these systems, which are related to the technological, organisational and 
absorption capacities of each company, and not just its size or lifetime. For example, in 
Argentina, ERP systems are used by 25% of small firms, 32% of medium-sized firms and 
60% of large firms, while in Brazil the respective figures are 31%, 51% and 72%. 
Much of the production sector in Latin America, especially SMEs, is in the first or 
second stage of using ICTs. Such firms mainly operate in industry, basic services and 
business. At the third stage are a small proportion of firms, especially medium-sized 
and large firms, with a higher proportion of industrial activities or more specialised 
services. Finally, the fourth stage, in which ICTs are used to adapt equipment and human 
resources’ skills, has been reached by only a very small proportion of businesses in the 
region, mainly large companies (especially transnational and large domestically owned 
corporations) and other firms of various sizes operating in more technology-intensive 
sectors, in industry and in specialised services.6 Some companies often incorporate 
more complex technology without having the internal resources to use it productively, 
which creates organisational problems (Breard and Yoguel, 2011).
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When firms use ICTs to help them develop innovations, they are 
considered to have fully adopted ICTs.
New opportunities to digitise SMEs 
ICTs have revolutionised various aspects of modern life. One of these aspects is the 
business sector, with ICTs becoming ever more vital in making companies competitive. 
Thanks to their ability to speed up communication, streamline management processes, 
generate market information and knowledge and open up new distribution channels 
and business models, businesses have rapidly adopted them, especially large firms. 
For SMEs, using the Internet provides new opportunities to supplement or replace 
traditional advertising. And with e-commerce applications, they can expand their 
markets, especially internationally. 
Latin American SMEs have been slower to take up ICTs because many are unaware 
of their benefits for business, and more importantly, because they find them expensive. 
For example, the early development of integrated management programmes and 
applications, such as knowledge management systems (KMSs) and, as mentioned above, 
ERPs and CRMs, are better adapted to large firms than to SMEs, which have a much 
simpler business structure. Also, the high cost of computer software and hardware 
remains an obstacle, despite ever-falling prices. Finally, to adopt these technologies 
firms must invest in giving staff the technical training they need to use, benefit from 
and maintain them. 
Driven by the recent expansion of broadband services, cloud computing is an 
opportunity for SMEs, since it significantly reduces the weight of ICTs in their cost 
structures. Cloud computing is the provision of standardised, configurable, on-demand, 
online computer services. These services include computing, storage, software and 
data management using shared physical and virtual resources (networks, servers 
and applications, among others). Since cloud computing takes place online, with 
shared resources and on-demand services, it offers major advantages over traditional 
computing. Being online, the service is constantly available, allowing users to access 
their data and applications using various types of devices wherever they are located, 
provided they have a suitable Internet connection.
Cloud computing gives SMEs the opportunity to access low-cost, 
standardised, configurable online computer services. These services include 
computing, storage, software and data management using shared physical 
and virtual resources (networks, servers and applications).
Since they are on-demand services and you pay for what you use, users can access a 
catalogue of services and pay only for those ones they need for their business, adapting 
what they use to their demand and workflow. Providers of cloud services, meanwhile, 
use economies of scale, user-demand aggregation and the diversity of demand patterns 
to offer a scalable, customised service more cheaply, since the cost of the computer 
resources is shared among a wider user base. Finally, the cloud-computing model 
minimises management efforts, as the service can be provided without users knowing 
details about the infrastructure, such as where it is located. This brings down the cost of 
managing and maintaining equipment and systems.
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The main impact of cloud computing is that it reduces costs, especially for SMEs.7 
Businesses benefit from greater flexibility to respond to cyclical fluctuations and a lower 
cost of entry. In some countries the use of SaaS CRM solutions reduces costs by an 
estimated 20-25% compared to conventional applications, while migrating infrastructure 
to cloud services can reduce costs by over 50%.8 The impact on the number of businesses 
started up varies from country to country and sector to sector, but the greatest impact 
takes place where SMEs are strongest and ICTs are adopted quickest, and in sectors in 
which the fixed cost of ICTs is very high, such as wholesale and retail trade, and property. 
Cloud computing can have a very positive effect in Latin America, given the strong 
presence of SMEs in the business sector and the slow adoption of ICTs. The extent to 
which the model is used in the region is marked by the characteristics of the region’s 
businesses, including their capacity to adopt the technology, and by the development of 
cloud computing services that meet business needs, and the expansion of broadband 
services and the quality of the connection. These factors form the platform for enabling 
cloud computing. 
Regional broadband connectivity
A critical factor for efficient, productive use of ICTs is the availability and quality of 
broadband services, which facilitates the development of complementarities in social 
and production sectors. Analysis of broadband Internet connectivity and its determining 
factors in Latin America shows that certain problems restrict access to the service, both 
for home and business users, by affecting connection speed and quality, teledensity and 
prices.9 These problems include:
•	 Economies of scale: Due to the low purchasing power of most Latin Americans 
and the high cost of broadband in the region, Latin America does not achieve the 
economies of scale seen in developed countries. Broadband is significantly more 
expensive than in developed countries, both in absolute terms and relative to 
per capita income. Both factors severely limit broadband services from spreading 
through market mechanisms.
•	 Cost of international Internet access: The greater distances involved in connecting 
Latin American countries to the global network raises the cost of broadband access. 
The transmission capacity required to access the Internet, usually via the United 
States, is high. Furthermore, low traffic prevents better use of the infrastructure 
deployed, making relative costs more expensive than in other regions. The cost 
of international access has an impact of between 20% and 40% on the end cost of 
broadband services.
•	 Non-optimal regional connectivity: The limited direct connectivity among Latin 
American countries raises the cost and reduces the quality of Internet access due 
to the two-way, long-distance international transport needed to move data from 
one country to another, usually via the United States. Often, data moving from 
one Internet service provider (ISP) to another ISP in the same country must go 
through foreign-based Internet exchange points. If regional traffic were to increase 
significantly, economies of scale would justify direct links among Latin American 
countries.
According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the penetration of 
fixed broadband in the region is well below that of more developed countries and regions. 
This means the benefits of using broadband are available only to a small part of the 
population.10 The positive effects of broadband on GDP growth exhibit returns to scale: 
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broadband makes a greater contribution as its penetration rate increases, and must 
reach a critical mass of users to maximise profits. In this context, the large access gaps 
among countries in the region and between the region and developed countries, both in 
absolute terms and relative to per capita income (Figure 4.5) are a major hindrance to the 
development. For output, given the financing problems encountered by SMEs, costs are 
also a key factor in determining their capacity to access broadband services.
Broadband penetration in Latin American countries is well below 
the rate in developed countries and other regions around the 
world. It is available only to small segments of the population.










































Bolivia (Plur. State of)
Figure 4.5. Cost per megabit per second of fixed broadband,
relative to GDP per capita, February 2012
(percentage of GDP)
Source: ECLAC Regional Broadband Observatory (ORBA).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732899
Connection quality also restricts broadband use in the region. A traditional measure 
of quality is bandwidth speed. Bandwidth is important because many applications can 
be inaccessible with slow connections, including most advanced applications, which 
provide the most benefits. Such applications are highly interactive, require real-time 
communication and use video-based multimedia tools. High levels of connectivity are 
needed to ensure services are provided without interruptions. Although sometimes 
high speeds are not required, broadband improves users’ Internet experience, so they 
use it more often and more intensively and are able to benefit more from the electronic 
services (OECD, 2009). 
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Note: Mbps.: megabits per second.
Source: ORBA, based on information from Ookla.
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732918
Figure 4.6. Average broadband Internet connection speeds
(in megabits per second, as of 1 April 2012)
Download speed in Mbps. Upload speed in Mbps
There is an important space for policies and strategies aimed at expanding network 
infrastructure and improving access and quality of service. But until the aforementioned 
problems have been solved, broadband use in Latin America will remain limited to small 
segments of the population, and the region will not be able to fully benefit from ICTs. 
This situation could even widen the technology-access gaps, hindering the potential 
interaction among different production sectors, especially between small and large 
firms.
In terms of connection speed, the quality of broadband services is 
lower than in developed countries.
Conclusions and recommendations: institutional structure 
and policies for innovation and the dissemination 
of technology
Business leaders and policy makers in Latin America are showing increasing 
concern for innovation. Innovation is also working its way on to government agendas, 
although often this does not translate into action. Innovation plays an increasingly more 
important role for entrepreneurs as well as policy makers in Latin America, thus gaining 
added importance in national agendas, but often discourse translates into few concrete 
activities that promote technical change, innovation or technological development. 
Creative actions taken by firms explain their innovative behaviour, and although these 
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reactions are not spontaneous, they are strongly influenced by and dependent upon 
internal capabilities and the environments in which they are embedded. Institutions, 
laws, regulatory frameworks and public policy play a crucial role in promoting, or 
inhibiting, technological innovation and dissemination, just as relations between 
institutions and agents facilitate access to knowledge for the most disadvantaged 
sectors and exchanges with other agents. Innovation activities and activities to create 
knowledge-based added value involve trial and error; there is great uncertainty as to 
the results, the costs are high, and the time frame is often unpredictable. For all these 
reasons, it is crucial to promote an effective, efficient, focused public policy for the long 
term that will foster linkages between the public and private sectors and knowledge-
production centres. This will lead to synergies and complementarities, economies of 
scale and knowledge spillovers.
In general, national science, technology and innovation plans in Latin America now 
explicitly mention SMEs, but this does not translate into instruments and actions to close 
the technology and innovation gap. The institutional structure is hugely complex, with 
different bodies connected together in this area, thus reinforcing the presence of the 
private sector in co-ordination with the public sector. A key feature that largely explains 
why the institutional fabric is so complex is the lack of institutions dedicated exclusively 
to promoting and financing innovation in SMEs (Ferraro, 2011). In some countries, this 
role is the responsibility of institutions and bodies that promote innovation, such as 
the Financier of Studies and Projects (FINEP) in Brazil and the National Research and 
Innovation Agency (ANII) in Uruguay, while in others it is the responsibility of bodies 
that promote production, such as the Production Development Corporation (CORFO) in 
Chile. In some countries in the region, the institutions responsible for policies to support 
SMEs and innovation are of little importance in the government structure and have 
deficiencies such as a lack of resources to sufficiently manage the programmes. Part of 
the finance comes from international co-operation, which often poses a challenge to the 
continuity of public policies. Other problems are the lack of available human resources 
and weaknesses in the training system. These programmes are often determined by 
governments for their term of office, and there are not enough true state policies in this 
area (Ferraro and Stumpo, 2010). 
While the budget for science, technology and innovation policies has increased 
in several countries in the region, such as Brazil and Uruguay, the funds earmarked 
specifically for this activity in SMEs, though difficult to quantify, seem to have changed 
very little (Dini and Stumpo, 2011). 
Latin American countries’ policies to promote innovation in SMEs can be summarised 
as being instruments that directly or indirectly encourage innovation, focusing on 
demand, supply and linkages among actors. The policies and instruments to support 
innovation generally do not discriminate in favour of smaller firms or give them any 
special treatment (see Annex 4.A1). 
Regarding policies to facilitate ICT access and use, since the mid-2000s most of 
the 26 Latin American countries have drawn up a digital agenda, but only 11 of them 
have included ICTs and the production sector as a strategic line of action (albeit only 
a minor one).11 Generally their digital strategies attach great importance to ICTs as a 
means of social integration and improving the population’s quality of life, yet there 
are few references to the possibility of using these technologies to boost economic 
development.12 Some programmes try to promote the integration of ICTs in the 
production sector, particularly in SMEs. Two years ago, programmes were introduced 
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in the region to stimulate the digital inclusion of SMEs in order to bring ICT supply 
in line with the demand. The programmes were a step forward towards policies that 
approach the problems associated with incorporating and using ICTs from an integrated 
perspective (Box 4.4). 
Most Latin American countries have defined digital agendas 
since the mid 2000s. However, only 11 of 26 countries have 
incorporated ICTs into the production sector as a strategic line of 
development, albeit only marginally.
The way SMEs innovate varies greatly between one firm and another, with little 
use of technologies and at a lethargic pace. Development policies recently introduced 
in Latin America have been too weak and have failed to significantly abate the 
companies’ difficulties. The structural diversity persists and SMEs have not raised their 
productivity relative to that of large firms, so they still cannot dynamically join the 
production structure. However, there is a consensus that STI policies need designing 
and implementing to help develop the economies in the long term and eradicate the 
gaps that exist.
To achieve this, they must focus those public policies on reducing the gap between 
firms of different sizes. These policies must deal with the restrictions and entry barriers 
faced by SMEs when innovating. Among other factors, the policies are based upon 
variables inherent to innovation activities, such as high sunk costs and high risks, 
which affect SMEs the most (Dini and Stumpo, 2011). Similarly, policies should consider 
the lack of qualified human resources, poor access to credit and international markets, 
and their linkages with government programmes to promote STI. It is important to 
strengthen the NISs to encourage linkages, co-operation, scientific and technological 
capacities and bring about closer ties between knowledge-production centres and the 
production sector. This will create business opportunities, improve competitiveness and 
create good jobs.
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Box 4.4. New programmes to improve SMEs’ ICT competitiveness
Despite the progress made by some countries in the region to incorporate ICTs into their 
production strategy, the common denominator is a lack of an integrated policy. Below are some 
of the innovation programmes that have shifted their focus to developing a new strategy that 
will have a greater impact on the production fabric. 
Table 4.5. New direct programmes for incorporating ICTs 
into businesses: co-ordinating supply and demand
Country Programme Institution Objetives
Brazil PROIMPE Brazilian Development Bank 
(BNDES)
To promote greater competitiveness among 
SMEs by stimulating digital inclusion and 
developing a market for ICT solutions for 
SMEs.
El Salvador Promoting digital maturity 
in small companies and 
microenterprises 
National Micro and Small 
Enterprise Commission 
(CONAMYPE)
A training programme for ICT consultants 
providing tools for managing and delivering 
ICT services to Salvadoran craftsmen and 
craftswomen
Uruguay Pilot Project (promoting 
the incorporation of 
ICTs in SMEs to support 
modernisation and 
technological development) 
Ministry of Industry, Energy 
and Mining (MIEM))
To identify sectoral technology solutions 
and link suppliers with their clients to 
improve take-up of ICTs by industrial value 
chains.
Brazil’s and Uruguay’s programmes focus on equating ICT supply and demand to open the way 
for concrete solutions for SMEs, improving their competitiveness and creating specific markets 
for ICT solutions.
In Brazil, the PROIMPE stimulus programme aims to match ICT supply and demand, focusing 
on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Its objectives are to stimulate SMEs’ 
digital inclusion, improve the competitiveness of SMEs that use and develop ICTs, and stimulate 
the production of applications for SMEs. It also aims to create finance and capitalisation 
mechanisms for SMEs that develop and deliver ICT services and guide SMEs in purchasing ICT 
solutions. 
In Uruguay, as part of the sector-by-sector intervention strategy through the Tripartite 
Boards promoted by the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (MIEM), the overall objective 
of technical assistance is to support the National Industries Directorate (DNI) in defining 
programmes geared at incorporating ICTs into businesses. The goal is to provide tools to help 
increase productivity. An institutional structure is being built and reinforced in which the 
public areas of productive development, participating sector-specific chambers of commerce 
(private sector), and ICT firms are involved.
Digital training programmes include, in particular, the programme recently developed by 
El Salvador, which has a different objective from the Brazilian and Uruguayan programmes. 
The National Micro and Small Enterprise Commission (CONAMYPE) is carrying out a training 
process with technical institutions to give these programmes the technical skills to develop 
digital maturity in micro and small enterprises in the craft sector. The areas that are being 
addressed are: the profile of the technology consultant, ICTs in SMEs in the craft sector, online 
marketing, the use of social networks in business, technology trends in the craft sector and the 
implementation of ecommerce activity. 
Source: Authors’ work. 
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While Latin American countries have added the subject of innovation to their agendas 
and realised its importance, and they have moved towards a more solid institutional 
structure for development, many challenges remain, and efforts need to be channelled 
towards concrete actions (OECD/ECLAC, 2011). Governments in the region should 
focus their action on promoting and drawing attention to their business innovation 
instruments and programmes, especially among SMEs. According to innovation surveys 
conducted by various Latin American countries, entrepreneurs cite the poor awareness 
of public instruments as one of the factors holding back innovation. This is particularly 
true for SMEs, among which awareness of such programmes is even lower. 
In Latin America, policies are needed to promote innovation 
in SMEs and include microenterprises too. Since there are no 
appropriate programmes for less-dynamic SMEs, or if there are any 
they are inaccessible to them, the gap between them and larger 
firms, where most innovation takes place, widens.
Co-ordination and greater co-operation among institutions seeking to promote 
SMEs is also necessary. In particular, policies are needed to promote innovation among 
smaller firms, where there is little innovation, and even among microenterprises, which 
are generally outside the scope of institutions to promote SMEs. Business-innovation 
development programmes are normally fashioned for the most dynamic companies, 
which can use and benefit from the programmes and instruments made available. 
However, for many less dynamic SMEs there are no appropriate programmes or they do 
not have access to them, which serves to widen the gap between them and larger firms. 
Consequently, those who design and introduce policies to stimulate innovation need to 
take into account the characteristics of smaller, less dynamic firms, thus opening the 
way for innovations in such firms, resulting in productivity gains (Dini and Stumpo, 
2011). 
For public policies designed to break down the barriers to adopting technologies and 
encourage innovation and the effective introduction and use of technologies in Latin 
American business, especially among SMEs, major steps forward need to be taken in 
various directions at the same time. These steps are related to improving the business 
environments and factors associated with companies’ technologies and specific 
characteristics. 
a) Infrastructure: There are still problems with the coverage and cost of certain major 
infrastructures and the quality of service they offer. Any innovation strategy involving 
SMEs requires good-quality laboratories and public research centres to support and work 
with those firms. For ICTs, it is particularly important to have high-quality broadband 
so that applications based on these technologies can be utilised. Regulations to increase 
competition among suppliers are also needed, as well as differentiated pricing to 
improve access to basic services provided by laboratories and specialist centres, and 
even to Internet services and computer tools. 
b) Human-resource training: Using new technologies and inciting firms to adopt 
them is vital for innovation, and must become a higher priority in countries’ strategies 
to improve business performance. In addition to improving general education plans, 
specific training programmes must be developed in areas related to production processes 
and management and business techniques.
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c) Specific programmes: Latin American countries need SME-focused programmes 
to promote business innovation, because SMEs are very often unable to access or benefit 
from government innovation programmes. They also need to create incentives to adopt 
ICT-based solutions that will help improve business management, especially among 
smaller firms.
d) Other indirect instruments: Other initiatives that can promote business innovation 
and the dissemination of technology are indirect instruments that can stoke up the 
creation of the types of environments needed for businesses to innovate and NIS actors to 
co-operate with each other. Such initiatives can also target a specific sector, for instance 
with the aim of promoting better quality goods and services for exporting. Improving 
access to high-quality infrastructure services will improve innovation capacities and 
access to new markets while protecting consumers and improving well-being (Göthner 
and Rovira, 2011).
e) Information system: Designing policies and specific instruments requires vast 
knowledge to adapt them to each country’s sectoral and business specificities and to 
companies’ characteristics and needs. If a system is built providing information on firms’ 
innovative behaviour and their adoption and use of technologies, follow-up studies will 
be able to analyse the results of the policies and tie them to company performance. The 
system’s design and application can then be fine-tuned. This means moving towards a 
solution to the problems currently identified by surveys held in the region (duplication 
of efforts, lack of continuity in data collection, and poor coverage, representativeness 
and comparability). It also means taking steps towards defining indicators to analyse in 
greater depth aspects that better represent the complexity of innovation processes and 
the use and dissemination of technology in the production fabric, as well as the impact 
of technologies on business performance. 
In Latin America, industrial policies are needed to encourage the development of new 
sectors and technologies, co-ordinate public and private efforts, increase investment in 
innovation (quantity and quality), create the right environment for innovation, provide 
finance for these high-risk activities, and encourage the training of qualified human 
resources. 
It is imperative that policies have targets at different levels to ensure that 
modernisation spreads throughout the production sector, especially among smaller 
firms, and to respond to the more stringent demands of larger firms and more advanced 
sectors. Such policies will make it possible to expand productive inclusion, reduce 
structural heterogeneity and speed up productivity growth.
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Annex 4.A1. Policies directly affecting business innovation in SMEs
The following table, though it does not cover the full depth of innovation in Latin America, 
provides an overview of what happens in some countries in the region. The table reveals a 
shortage of instruments and programmes to support innovation in SMEs, especially those 
tailored specifically for this type of company. These factors should be especially promoted 
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Notes
1. These are networks in which non-contiguous hubs (companies and people) can be reached from any 
source hub via a relatively small number of links (knowledge/relations) between them (Albert-Laszlo 
Barabasi, 2003).
 2. Myrdal’s theory of cumulative causation (Myrdal, 1957) warns that regional growth is an unbalanced 
process. He predicts that greater initial development in one region rather than a neighbouring region 
results in a relative stagnation in growth, because investment and the more productive resources are 
attracted to the more developed region. This contributes to a greater geographic concentration of the 
economy and explains the natural trend for differences in per capita income among regions to expand. 
Such an effect is of particular concern to smaller companies.
3.  “Schumpeterian efficiency” is related to the presence of sectors leading innovation with faster-growing 
productivity and greater transfer of knowledge and skills to the economy. The resulting productivity 
boosts spread to other sectors. “Keynesian efficiency” is associated with specialisation in sectors that 
benefit from higher rates of growth in domestic and external demand, which has a positive impact on 
output and employment. (Cimoli et al., 2010; ECLAC, 2012).
4. According to data from the Brazilian Geography and Statistics Institute (IBGE) and the Chilean 
National Statistics Institute (INE), there is a significant lag in the agricultural sector in the use of basic 
information technologies, particularly among smaller establishments.
5. When ICTs can replace learning processes with trial-and-error processes in simulations that require 
developing special applications, innovation is boosted.
6. This analysis should be supplemented by information on what these technologies are used for, which 
is related to the firms’ internal capacities.
7. The drastic change in the model is from supplying products to providing on-demand services. The 
result is that the fixed costs associated with investing in ICT capital become operational and may be 
adjusted depending on production needs.
8. See McKinsey & Co. (2011), Winning in the SMB Cloud: Charting a Path to Success, Zoe Diamadi, Abhijit Bora, 
Darren Pleasance and Ashish Vora. 
9. See de León (2012).
10. According to a study by Katz (2012), the benefits of broadband on GDP growth depend on the widespread 
availability of the service.
11. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.
12. There is an important difference between the approach taken by European Union countries and that 
taken by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For example, Spain’s digital strategic 
plan (Avanza 1 and Avanza 2) has two key features. First, there is an interconnection and integrity 
among four major areas that are central to the plan: the digital citizen, the digital economy, the digital 
context (infrastructure) and digital public services. Second, the digital economy (production) and 
the digital context (infrastructure, security and digital content) are prioritised (mainly through the 
allocation of budgetary resources) above the other two areas.
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CHAPTER 
fivE 
Human capital and skills for SMEs
Despite recent progress in the field of education and skills in Latin 
America, there are still challenges that should be confronted through 
careful analysis and new public policies. A relatively untrained 
workforce and management, a high dropout rate from school, and low-
quality education stand in the way of increasing SMEs’ productivity. 
Another obstacle is the mismatch between the skills that the 
production sector demands and the training that the educational 
system provides. The technical education and vocational training 
systems are key factors to deal with this. These challenges have been 
responded to in this region through programmes that try to address 
the needs of the production sector and SMEs. However, many areas 
need government action to strengthen institutions and need policies 
to better align the education system with the needs of the job market, 
foster training paths that combine the classroom with the workplace, 
add new skills and abilities to training curricula, develop certification 
schemes for acquired skills and abilities, and establish institutional 
frameworks to encourage co-operation among SMEs.
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introduction
The barriers to productivity growth faced by small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are very diverse, as described in the previous chapters. One aspect that the 
literature deems essential to understanding an economy’s productivity is the production 
sector’s access to human capital and skills. In this sense, the low productivity of this 
business segment is partially explained by some of the major educational and training 
challenges faced by the region.
On the one hand, Latin America continues to trail other regions in access, reach and 
number of years of schooling completed, even with great educational advances in recent 
years. This lag is reflected in the educational levels of the workforce, much lower than 
those seen in more developed countries, and in the high dropout rate, as reflected in the 
number of people who enter the job market at a very young age with little training.
SMEs face problems involving the quantity and quality of human 
capital and skills in the region. This is a major barrier to the 
expansion of their productivity and to their development.
On the other hand, the region is far behind other parts of the world in the quality 
of education, understood as the education system’s ability to give new generations the 
knowledge and skills needed to enter the job market and succeed there. This gap can 
be seen in the comparisons outlined in the report by the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA).
Studies of human capital and the job market agree on an additional factor that 
needs to be analysed in order to understand SMEs’ low productivity. That factor is the 
mismatch between the training that the education system provides and the skills that 
the production sector demands. Many SMEs in the region say they have difficulties 
finding workers with the skills they need, which shows there is a skills gap that acts as 
a barrier to increasing productivity. 
This manifests itself in highly varied ways and reflects the vast spectrum of SMEs 
in Latin America. Depending on factors such as business size, sector and geographic 
location, these enterprises demand different skill sets and have greater or lesser 
difficulty in finding them.
This imbalance between the training that the education system supplies and the skills 
that the production sector demands appears to be worsening and it can be expected to 
continue growing. The globalised economy is characterised by fast technological change 
and a production dynamic that is evolving towards a knowledge-centred model. This 
leads to an ever greater demand for human capital trained in skills related to technical 
aspects and to non-cognitive dimensions of learning, yet the region’s education system 
does not seem to be able to adapt in order to respond satisfactorily.
In short, SMEs face problems involving the quantity and quality of human capital 
and skills in the region, which are a major barrier to increasing productivity. This is 
a key challenge for Latin America. The expansion of potential growth in the region, a 
greater ability to compete and innovate in the global economy, and the creation of jobs 
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and opportunities for Latin American society require strengthening and promoting the 
SME sector. For these reasons it is necessary to consider the role that public policy can 
play in confronting this challenge.
This chapter addresses these issues using the following structure. The first section 
analyses the training challenge faced by the region’s SMEs by examining how this 
problem affects different types of SMEs, and explores the role that public policy can 
play in helping to overcome this challenge. The second section reviews the technical 
education and vocational training systems in Latin America as a main linkage mechanism 
between the education system and the production sector, seeking to identify lessons 
learned and pending challenges. Lastly, the third section proposes a set of public policy 
recommendations. 
SMEs’ training challenge
How lagging behind in training impacts the region’s workforce
In recent years, Latin American governments have made considerable efforts in 
education, which have translated into advances in access and reach, especially the 
gradual increase in the number of years of schooling among the economically active 
population in the region.
From 2000 to 2010, the working-age population whose education terminated with 
secondary school rose 8.2 percentage points, while the rate of tertiary education rose by 
2.4 percentage points (Table 5.1).
Despite progress in recent years, the region’s workforce has 
relatively little training. In Latin America, 46.6% of the people 
entering the workforce have no education beyond secondary school 
and 12.2% have tertiary education, while the percentages in the 
OECD are 54.9% and 23.8%.
Compared to figures from other, more developed regions, these data show that 
the gap is still very wide. The portion of the Latin American workforce that reaches 
secondary education and tertiary education are 46.6% and 12% respectively, a far cry 
from the figures from OECD countries, in which 54.9% of workers have secondary 
education and 23.8% tertiary education.
Table 5.1. Global regions and the OECD: working-
age population by highest level of education
(as percentages and percentage-point change, 2000-10)















Primary education 33.1 -7.1 18.4 -6.7 32.7 -4.2 13.5 -4.6
Secondary education 46.6 8.2 54.9 3.6 42.9 2.9 67.1 1.9
Tertiary education 12.0 2.4 23.8 4.3 14.1 4.2 18.2 3.7
Source: Produced by the author based on data from Barro & Lee (2010).
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The workforce’s limited education seems to have a greater impact on smaller 
businesses. According to the International Labour Organization, 75.9% of the people 
employed in microenterprises and SMEs in the region have a maximum educational 
level of uncompleted secondary. The situation varies by country. People employed in 
microenterprises and SMEs (MSMEs) who have not completed secondary school total 
57% in Argentina, 51% in Chile (the figure excludes medium-sized enterprises), 38% in 
Mexico and 40% in Peru (Tueros et al., 2009). In addition, the less educated workers are 
concentrated among independent non-professionals, women and people working in 
rural microenterprises.
Another notable phenomenon in the region is the school dropout rate, which has a 
major effect on the educational level of the workforce entering the production sector. 
Although some progress has been made, the overall dropout rate among 15- to 19-year-
olds in the region averaged about 29% in 2009, and nearly half of these dropped out 
before secondary school.1 As a result, on the one hand, a large number of young people 
leave the education system without gaining the knowledge and skills needed to be even 
minimally employable and increase their chances of attaining a satisfactory career path. 
On the other hand, since one of the main reasons for dropping out of school is the need 
to find work for subsistence, this leads young people to enter the job market with little 
education. Therefore, they generally find unstable employment in the informal sector 
where micro and small enterprises have a greater presence.
Workers in MSMEs who started but did not finish secondary 
school total 57% in Argentina, 51% in Chile (the figure excludes 
medium-sized enterprises), 38% in Mexico and 40% in Peru.
Another relevant topic for understanding the training landscape of Latin American 
SMEs is the level of skills found among their management. In general, there is a significant 
shortage of management skills and business leadership in the region. Many small and 
medium-sized enterprises are limited by their management’s inability to lead processes 
of development, technology adoption, innovation, and expansion into new sectors and 
markets, which is definitely a barrier to increasing productivity. 
All of these issues show that there are still broad educational gaps to close, but 
that considerable advances have been made in terms of access and years of schooling. 
Nonetheless, more people spending additional time in the education system does not 
necessarily mean that skills are being taught and learned effectively, or that students 
are being trained in skills and abilities needed to find a job in the real economy. These 
considerations are part of the qualitative side of education, a field in which Latin America 
is facing its toughest challenges. 
On the one hand, international comparisons reflect a particularly worrying gap in 
the quality of education. According to data from the PISA report (OECD, 2010), 15-year-old 
students in the region scored far below those in OECD countries in the three subject areas 
analysed by the study (Table 5.2). Nearly 49% of 15-year-old Latin American students 
scored at the lowest possible level in reading tests, whereas about 19% of students in 
OECD countries are at that level. Similarly, 84% and 80% of the students tested achieved 
the lowest possible level in mathematics and science respectively, twice the rates seen 
in OECD countries. This shows that young people in the region have trouble performing 
skills that are basic for participating in the workforce and society. 
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Table 5.2. Latin America and OECD: students aged 15 and over
with the lowest score in the PISA tests
(as percentages)   
Country Reading Mathematics Science
Argentina 51.6 84.3 79.1
Brazil 49.6 88.1 83.0
Chile 30.6 78.3 67.4
Colombia 47.1 90.8 84.3
Mexico 40.1 79.1 80.9
Panama 65.3 92.6 88.3
Peru 64.8 90.4 90.0
Uruguay 41.9 72.7 71.9
Latin American average 48.9 84.5 80.6
OECD Average 18.8 44.0 42.3
Source: PISA 2009 results (OECD, 2010).
Then again, the problem of quality is aggravated by the major gap in this region 
between the skills the education system teaches and the abilities the production sector 
wants.  
Mismatch between the education system and the production sector
Economic globalisation has fostered a profound transformation of the production 
model, largely defined by an intense process of technological change. Knowledge is 
now at the core of the economy and is vital to understanding the production dynamic 
and the ability to compete and innovate. Part of the business world is moving towards 
new sectors and new working arrangements, making increasingly intensive use of new 
technologies in their production processes. 
The nature of the skills demanded by the production sector has also changed over 
time. This has created a gradual move away from the training traditionally offered by 
education systems, a phenomenon known as “skills gap”. To the extent that it limits 
businesses’ ability to find the skills they need, this skills gap impedes productivity 
growth. This is why it is important to understand its impact on Latin America and how 
it affects SMEs.
In Latin America there is a “skills gap” due to a mismatch 
between the training given by the education system and the 
abilities SMEs demand, which acts as a barrier to expanding these 
businesses’ productivity.
In Brazil, 71% of managers say they have difficulties filling 
vacancies, while in Panama the figure is 47%, 45% in Argentina 
and 43% in Mexico.
In several Latin American countries, managers say it is hard to fill job vacancies 
in their establishments. Notable examples include Brazil, where 71% of managers 
have difficulty filling positions, Panama (47%), Argentina (45%) and Mexico (43%) 
(ManpowerGroup, 2012). 
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This has a major impact on SMEs, which also have trouble finding the workforce they 
need. Factors such as the production sector they belong to, how extensively they have 
adopted technology, their participation in global value chains, and how much export-
focused they are will determine, to a large degree, what type of skills SMEs need and 
therefore how the skills gap affects them. About 37% of SMEs in the region consider this 
gap to be one of the main obstacles faced in their everyday operations (World Bank, 
2012). 
SMEs in different sectors face differing problems in finding a suitably trained 
workforce (Figure 5.1). On the one hand, there are sectors such as computer technology 
services in which 80% of SMEs say they have from moderate to severe or very severe 
problems finding the workers they need, and other sectors, such as machinery and 
equipment, textiles and chemicals, in which the percentage of businesses with severe 
or very severe problems is also very high, at 40% to 60%. On the other hand, there are 
areas such as the hotel and restaurants sector and the wholesale and retail sectors, 
where some 40% of businesses report no problem in finding the workforce they seek, 
and only around a third of the businesses say they face severe or very severe problems 
(World Bank, 2012).2
The type of skills SMEs demand depends on factors such as 
the sector they belong to, how extensively they have adopted 













Severe or very severe Moderate Little or none
Figure 5.1.  Difficulty encountered by Latin American SMEs in finding skilled labour,

























































































Source: Based on data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732937
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The difficulties faced by SMEs are based on the sector in which they operate and 
largely depend on the relative shortage of the type of skills they demand. As a result, 
it is important to know what type of skills these businesses are looking for, to better 
understand the fields in which they do business and the limitations they may face in 
specific economic sectors, and to get an overview of the skills the education system is 
not providing and whose scarcity blocks productivity.
Recently, important progress has been made in understanding these issues, which 
confirms the transformation seen in recent years in the demand for skills in the 
regional economy. The effect of technology change mentioned above and the parallel 
transformation of the production model have created new types of jobs that demand 
new skills, while repetitive activities traditionally performed by workers with secondary 
education are being replaced gradually by technology (Aedo and Walker, 2012). 
This broad trend in the region is at odds with an education system still very focused 
on training in traditional disciplines which, though relevant, need to be complemented 
with the new type of professional skills demanded by job markets in the new economy 
(Aedo and Walker, 2012). In this sense some studies (Bassi et al., 2012; EIU, 2009; 
ManpowerGroup, 2012; Schwalje, 2011) identify various fields in which there is a 
mismatch between demand in the economy and the supply provided by the education 
system, which could be grouped into two categories.
There is evidence that some investment decisions in Latin America 
are made based on the limited availability of human capital and 
are generating a barrier to growth and limiting the expansion of 
productivity.
First, the production sector in the region has trouble satisfying its demand for 
technical competencies, both company-specific ones and more general skills, especially 
those related to technology, occupations in the new economy, and the knowledge of 
foreign languages or the use of computer systems (EIU, 2009). 
Furthermore, recent studies indicate that besides cognitive skills, companies 
increasingly are asking in the job market for non-cognitive socio-emotional skills, known 
as “soft skills”. These include elements such as critical thinking, responsibility, teamwork, 
the ability to solve problems and handle change, oral and written communication, 
and the ability to understand and relate to one’s environment. Managers in the region 
appreciate such skills sometimes even over technical skills, whether general or specific, 
but say it is very hard to find workers who have them (Bassi et al., 2012). 
In short, there are major mismatches in the region between skills demanded and 
those available in the job market. This increases the training challenge that SMEs face, 
as it poses a barrier to access to the skills that should allow productivity gains, especially 
among the more dynamic businesses with growth potential.
However, many SMEs are in sectors that contribute little added value and whose 
production processes make little use of technology or of skills most closely related to 
technical matters and knowledge. This suggests that Latin America has an insufficient 
supply of well-trained workers, but also a limited demand for higher competencies 
among SMEs, which generates a stagnant production dynamic.
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The production sector in Latin America has difficulties meeting its 
demand for technical skills related to technology, occupations in 
the new economy, knowledge of foreign languages, using computer 
systems and the so-called “soft skills”, such as critical thinking, 
responsibility, teamwork, the ability to solve problems and handle 
change, oral and written communication, and the ability to 
understand and relate to one’s environment.
In this sense the shortage of skills and competencies in the job market also affects 
productivity and the production structure due to demand-side considerations. Some 
evidence indicates that businesses’ demand for skills sometimes adapts to the skills’ 
limited supply, meaning investment decisions are adopted based on the limited 
availability of human capital (Aedo and Walker, 2012). This would constitute a barrier 
to growth and limit expansion of productivity in the region, especially since the sectors 
that would be adapting to the shortage are precisely those most connected to the global 
economy and with greater growth potential, and, due to the scarcity of human capital, 
must do without the skills they would need. At the same time, the low demand for skills 
can also discourage a broader, higher-level supply of competencies. This could stimulate 
a sort of vicious cycle that hinders productivity growth and does not foster development 
of the production sector.
Facing the training challenge: the role of public policy
The limited training of the workforce and of business managers, together with the 
problems associated with the school dropout rate and the poor quality of education, 
translate into a major mismatch between the education system and the needs of the 
job market. All these factors, which are a barrier to economic development and to 
productivity gains, suggest the need for public policy that helps meet these challenges 
and transform the education system in general and vocational education in particular. 
This is the nature of the training challenge faced by the region’s production sector.
However, the design of public policy should arise from a greater ability to diagnose 
training challenges and from the availability of further empirical evidence. Decision 
making must be backed up by a better understanding of the knowledge and competencies 
available in the population, of the ability of the education and technical/vocational 
training systems to foster the inclusion of adults in society and in the workforce, and 
of the gaps between the education system and the production sector. A key challenge 
for Latin America is to expand the ability to make better diagnoses and establish 
comparisons between countries and across time. In this regard, the experiences of OECD 
countries can be very relevant (Box 5.1).
Public policies for the training of the workforce and of business managers should 
make SMEs a priority, both because of their growth potential and ability to generate jobs 
and because it is a sector that generates inefficient dynamics.
In particular, in competing for a limited number of suitably trained workers, SMEs 
are in a weaker position than large businesses. Big enterprises are able to offer workers 
better salaries and incentives, along with potential for promotion and internal mobility, 
the reputation associated with the company, and even greater in-house training 
opportunities, among other advantages.
145LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
5. HUMAN CApITAL AND sKILLs fOR sMEs
Box 5.1. Assessing adults’ competencies: the OECD PIAAC study
With the aim of assessing the knowledge and skills of the adult population aged 16 to 65 in 
26 countries (25 OECD member countries plus Russia), the OECD launched the Programme 
for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). This initiative is 
meant to broaden and improve the way adult knowledge and skills are evaluated, to get 
a more detailed, accurate picture of the training a country’s population has for facing 
the challenges of the knowledge society. The results from the first edition of this study 
will be ready in late 2013. Chile is the only Latin American country participating in the 
project.
PIAAC is contributing two main innovations. First, it examines adults’ competencies 
through direct assessment. This system has advantages over more traditional ways 
of analysing a country’s human capital, based on the population’s educational levels. 
PIAAC’s form of direct assessment acknowledges that a diploma does not guarantee 
specific skills when it is obtained, and especially not after time has passed. By contrast, 
direct assessment of adult knowledge and skills through tests and surveys helps build a 
more accurate picture of a country’s human capital.
Second, the PIAAC evaluation incorporates new elements that help achieve a broader 
vision of adult knowledge and skills and their usefulness in the job market. The 
programme measures skills in the fields of reading, mathematics and writing, and 
analyses the ability to solve problems in an environment that includes technologies and 
the abilities used in the workplace, as well as the socio-economic context of the adults 
surveyed. 
The goal of PIAAC is for all of the collected information to provide governments with 
elements for the design of public policy affecting adult competencies. Its analysis 
is useful because: i) it provides a more accurate view of competencies among a 
country’s adult population, broken down by age or demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics; ii) it helps give a deeper understanding of the education and technical/
vocational training systems’ ability to impart knowledge and competencies that let adults 
function satisfactorily in society and the work world; iii) it fosters analysis of the type of 
competencies and abilities that improve job performance and that the production sector 
is demanding, while also examining the evolution of skills over the course of people’s 
working life and the role that training plays in careers; and iv) it allows comparisons 
among countries and over time within a given country, since the programme is intended 
to be ongoing.
Source: www.oecd.org/piaac.
The focus of the Programme for the International Assessment 
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) acknowledges that a diploma 
does not guarantee specific skills and abilities, neither when it 
is obtained nor after time has passed, which is why they are 
assessed directly through tests and surveys of adults to determine 
a country’s human capital.
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While many large firms opt for in-house training as a strategy to overcome the 
scarcity of qualified workers, SMEs have little incentive to adopt a similar solution, given 
the risk that large companies will hire the personnel away once they are trained. As 
a result, it is only in their interest to offer a specific type of training applicable to the 
company’s particular activities, without emphasising broader competencies, though 
these ought to be part of what is taught by the education system.
Since a portion of the undertrained workforce takes jobs in SMEs, the lack of 
incentives for in-house training leads these businesses to not substantially increase 
their capabilities, and the learning that does occur tends strongly towards imitation and 
repetition of business activities with little need for technical skills. Together with the 
sector’s minimal ability to embrace technology, this leads to SMEs not broadening their 
production knowledge base in any meaningful way and not innovating significantly, 
which prolongs the stagnation of production.
In light of this, and given the wide range of SMEs in Latin America, it is particularly 
important to bolster institutional capabilities and the design of policies that respond to 
the sector’s training demands. The efforts to compensate for gaps in basic education, 
increase the educational level of management and develop job skills in those SMEs with 
low levels of organisation and formalisation should be accompanied by a concern for 
promoting those enterprises that have a certain technical and/or managerial capability, 
to focus education on the most knowledge-intensive fields, which bring with them 
greater dynamism and added value. This translates into more focused approaches that 
differentiate methodologies and action tools based on businesses’ characteristics and 
capabilities.
Besides, training SMEs’ human resources requires deploying a wide range of 
services related to management, technology and access to knowledge. Information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) play an essential role in this. Training programmes 
that use ICTs have advantages in terms of their flexibility, ease of access, freedom from 
specific schedules and locations, and lower costs. They therefore have great potential to 
expand the scope and depth of the response to the training needs of SMEs, the type of 
businesses with the greatest barriers to training access.3 
Because of their advantages in terms of flexibility, ease of access, 
freedom from specific schedules and locations, and lower costs, 
training programmes that use information and communication 
technologies are especially suitable for SMEs.
The training that is in demand among SMEs can be transmitted through three 
channels: i) within the formal education system, meaning primary, secondary and 
tertiary education; ii) technical education and vocational training, which is more 
focused on greater practical applicability and whose offerings are associated with public 
and private institutions, which make up the technical education and vocational training 
institutions (TEVTIs); and iii) informal education, referred to as on-the-job training, in 
which sharing and interaction in the workplace are the channel for knowledge transfer. 
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Informal education and traditional formal education will be the subject of some of 
the recommendations put forward in the third part of this chapter. Technical education 
and vocational training are the fields most closely linked to providing job skills and the 
type of abilities the region’s job market demands. The next section analyses the general 
state of technical education and vocational training in Latin America.
Regional overview of technical education and vocational 
training for SMEs
Policies to strengthen SMEs’ human resources have advanced considerably in the 
region. Nearly all the countries have institutions and programmes to develop these 
businesses’ human capital. This section analyses the progression of trends in the supply 
of technical/vocational training, and delves into the situation in various countries in the 
region to understand the strengths and pending challenges of this process.
Regional trends in the supply of technical/vocational training for SMEs 
Since the 1940s, vocational training institutions started to be founded and expanded 
in Latin America, mainly to meet the production sector’s needs arising from the period 
of import substitution. Since then, governments have been heavily involved in funding 
and regulating their policies and in providing training services. 
The institutional model that has been spread and replicated almost throughout 
the region is that of Brazil’s National Industrial Learning Service (SENAI), founded in 
1942.4 One notable feature of this model is that most of its management is trilateral, 
with participation by representatives of workers (with varying degrees of involvement 
and influence), managers and government. The funding formula specified in the laws 
that created most of the TEVTIs includes corporate payroll tax. Thus this formula grants 
enough financial autonomy and allows ongoing adjustment to demand variations.
The training policy institutions came into being with a bias towards the needs of 
large enterprises, with SMEs having little influence on their focus. In the first decades 
the dominant approach was defined based on supply, with the government determining 
which courses would be launched and continued and what their priorities were. 
Companies acted mainly as consumers of the training services, playing a lesser role in 
defining courses and identifying the competencies to be developed (Gallart, 2001). SMEs 
had little influence in plotting the path for these policies, despite being subjects of a set 
of specific programmes to increase their productivity.
In the 1980s and especially the 1990s there was an important shift in the focus of 
vocational training policies, with a notable general trend towards strengthening policies 
defined based on demand in the production sector (“demand subsidies”) (Gallart, 2001; 
Labarca, 2001). While concern about SMEs grew, support institutions targeting this 
sector began to be established, and the goal of having qualified human resources was 
incorporated into the framework of policies for SMEs in various countries, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador and Mexico (Goldstein and Kulfas, 2011). 
These include the activities of the Brazilian Micro and Small Enterprise Support Service 
(SEBRAE) in Brazil, the Secretariat of SMEs and Regional Development (SEPYME) in 
Argentina and the Undersecretariat for SMEs (SPYME) in Mexico.
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This demand-focused trend in human-resource policies occurred in response to 
changes in the modes of production, which required human resources who were more 
qualified, with increasingly flexible knowledge and skills, able to adapt to new forms of 
production, as well as the budget constraints arising from the structural shift of the 1980s 
and 1990s. Amid a rethinking of the state’s role and the spread of the perception that 
market forces would be the most efficient mechanisms for the allocation of resources, 
an attempt was made to encourage the creation of a training market that would serve to 
meet the demands expressed by the production sector.
Latin America has vocational training systems defined and 
applied by national government institutions, as well as a model in 
which the government provides resources and regulation but does 
not provide the service.
Two main trends in opposite directions arose in this process (Gallart, 2001). On the 
one hand, where there were still vocational-training policies defined and implemented 
by government institutions, the transformations tended towards a decentralisation 
by economic sectors and branches for greater alignment with the production sector’s 
demands, as well as a regionalisation of institutions to meet the more specific local 
requirements. Examples include the National Learning Service (SENA) in Colombia and 
the National Institute of Technical and Vocational training (INFOTEP) in the Dominican 
Republic, both of which are government agencies that retained their responsibilities for 
planning and execution of vocational-training services to develop human resources and 
boost companies’ productivity.5 
On the other hand, systems appeared with a stronger trend towards creating a 
training market, in which the state remains in charge of providing resources and 
regulating services, but withdraws from providing the services directly. In this approach, 
resource allocation is done by the market, through interaction between the supply 
offered by (public and private) training institutions and the demand (among companies 
and individuals). The National Training and Employment Service (SENCE) in Chile is an 
example of this model. It subsidises demand through tax exemptions (for companies) 
or scholarships (for individuals), without providing direct training services, leaving the 
training institutions in charge of allocating the public funds in keeping with the demand 
observed. 
The situation in Chile illustrates the limitations of this type of mechanism in which 
the state handles the design, funding and oversight of the training system, leaving the 
more important responsibilities to the companies. Several studies and assessments 
indicate that demand subsidies for training, if not accompanied by other mechanisms 
to co-ordinate and focus the training supply, cause segmentation of the training supply 
which particularly benefits larger firms (Geo Consultores, 1999; Dini and Stumpo, 2002; 
Jara, 2002; Belmar and Maggi, 2010). 
The diversity of the training programmes targeting Latin American SMEs reflects 
the coexistence of these two trends. This variation, which is also seen in the nature 
and scope of these government programmes, is closely related to funding, not only in 
terms of where the resources come from but also in the means of financing the training 
activities.
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If demand subsidies for training are not accompanied by 
additional mechanisms to co-ordinate and focus the training 
supply, they cause segmentation of the training supply which 
particularly benefits larger companies, according to several studies 
and assessments.
Many countries allocate specific funds from payroll taxes, as occurs in Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala, among 
others. In some countries (Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico) training is a line item in 
the national budget (Lengfelder and Schkolnik, 2011). Another funding model for training 
is subsidies to companies in the form of tax exemptions, such as the tax reduction 
administered by SENCE in Chile. This subsidy can consist of a monthly credit in the case 
of SMEs (or annual credit for larger firms) or scholarships in the case of microenterprises. 
Subsidies can also be given to training centres, by branches or regions, managed by 
chambers of commerce, as in the case of SEBRAE in Brazil. Lastly there are subsidies to 
workers, often used as a way to target training (for instance, at the unemployed, youth 
and women). 
Even if some common traits are identified in the Latin American governments’ 
responses to meeting the human-resource training needs of SMEs, in each country these 
institutions have evolved based on the country’s specific circumstances and on the 
approaches of its policies. Besides TEVTIs, the universe of support to SMEs consists of 
technical education agencies, such as the National Institute of Technological Education 
(INET) in Argentina and the Uruguayan University of Work (UTU), and the chambers 
of commerce in most of the countries and even private institutions such as the ICAM 
GROUP in Mexico and Interfases in Chile, which also develop training programmes to 
improve productivity (Table 5.3). 
Table 5.3. Institutions and programmes supporting 
human capital development in SMEs
Types of institutions Characteristics
Institutions dedicated to vocational training Primarily public and national, some private and more specialised 
(ICAM/México; Interfases/Chile)
Institutions providing technical education Support and training programmes (INET / Argentina; UTU /
Uruguay; DUOC / Chile)
Ministries of Labour, Industry, Economy and Culture Specific programmes for supporting SMEs: such as  the Support 
Fund for Micro and Small and Medium
Enterprise (FONDO PYME) in Mexico
Other private organisations NGOs
Source: ILO/CINTERFOR (2012).
In short, there is a wide variety of public and private institutions active in supplying 
training, funding sources (public, private, and international organisations, among 
others) and government programmes with different approaches to strengthening the 
human resources of companies in general and SMEs in particular (ILO and CINTERFOR, 
2012).
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There are still very important challenges, especially in two areas. SMEs generally 
are somewhat wary of devoting resources to buying these services, which translates 
into insufficient investment in training. Development agencies, meanwhile, lack a clear 
sense of the priorities to be addressed, with the result that the support instruments are 
not focused enough (Goldstein and Kulfas, 2011). In the first case, the SMEs’ reluctance 
to invest in training is often reinforced by the proliferation of the demand subsidy 
mode, resulting in later underutilisation of support programmes. In the second case, 
the lack of a clear strategy for SMEs in the region and the inability to prioritise a core 
of knowledge-intensive activities, in which these activities would strengthen their 
chances of development, ends up being reflected in the lack of training strategies for 
these businesses.
SMEs are somewhat wary of devoting resources to training, 
which leads to insufficient investment in it, and the development 
agencies lack a clear sense of the priorities to address, so the focus 
of the support instruments is insufficient.
Country-specific cases: programmes to strengthen human resources in SMEs
Argentina: tax credit programmes and activities run by the training centres of the 
sectoral chambers of commerce
In Argentina the demand-side approach to policy is dominant, primarily through 
tax credit programmes. For example, the Worker and Management Training Tax Credit 
Programme run by SEPYME is aimed at SMEs. This tool lets these businesses get partial 
refunds of their investment in training their human resources, in open-enrolment 
activities (administered in public or private institutions) or closed-enrolment activities 
(courses custom-designed for the business) (SEPYME, 2012). The programme operates in 
two modes depending on the size of the business. The first enables large companies and 
SMEs that fund training for other SMEs to be reimbursed. The second is for “beneficiary 
SMEs”, which can claim reimbursement for training activities carried out by company 
owners and in-house employees. 
The Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security also has a tax-credit 
programme consisting of incentives for SMEs and large enterprises to generate projects 
along one of the following fundable lines: i) vocational training; ii) design and certification 
of primary, secondary, tertiary or higher education; iii) occupational training for the 
unemployed; and iv) strengthening and/or certifying management quality in vocational-
training institutions based on the benchmark defined by the ministry. The programme 
supports bolstering the job skills of employed and unemployed workers, while letting 
vocational-training institutions obtain new equipment and become stronger institutions 
(MTEySS, 2012). 
For training of SME workers in Argentina the demand-side policy 
approach is dominant, especially through tax-credit programmes.
Another relevant experience is related to increasing co-ordination between the 
training supply and the training needs of the production sector. In Argentina this has 
been implemented through the Sectoral Chambers’ Training Centres. As previously 
mentioned, INET plays an important role through the vocational training programme. 
151LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
5. HUMAN CApITAL AND sKILLs fOR sMEs
This has promoted the establishment of sectoral networks for vocational training 
for the following industries: i) car repair; ii) electricity; iii) metallurgy; iv) wood and 
furniture; v) tourism, hotels and catering; vi) leather and footwear; vii) construction; and 
viii) agriculture. A new network is also being set up for the textile and clothing industry. 
Two types of institutions make up these networks: those that provide vocational 
training; and agencies, associations or bodies that sponsor, promote or use vocational 
training services.
Notable examples are the initiatives conducted by the footwear and graphics sectoral 
chambers. The former has the Footwear Industry Human Resources and Technology 
Centre (CEFOTECA), active in supplying training to operators and technicians specialised 
in footwear, and consulting and technical assistance. This centre has support from the 
Avellaneda Regional Faculty of the National Technological University (UTN FRA) and 
the Leather Technology Research Centre (CITEC), affiliated with the National Industrial 
Technology Institute (INTI). Since 1907, the graphics industry has had the support of 
the Gutenberg Foundation as a provider of technical vocational training at the higher-
education and continuing-education level. This private foundation’s activities also 
include applied research, technology assistance and services, and management for 
development of the graphics sector, and it works closely with the production sector and 
the education system, especially with regard to vocational and specialised training. 
Another notable feature of the Argentine approach is the role of technical education 
(in secondary and tertiary education) and INET’s efforts to strengthen it and integrate 
it into the national education system. This includes initiatives to promote the 
institutionalisation of technical education providers and recognition and validation 
of the material taught. INET is responsible for co-ordinating industry-specific forums, 
which bring together representatives of workers, management, science and technology 
institutions, and industry experts. The forums aim to identify the training needs in each 
sector and outline the professional profiles required, as a preliminary step to designing 
the course offerings.
Brazil: the spread of distance learning through SEBRAE and the SENAI model for 
promoting dialogue among workers, management and trainers 
Two helpful models for meeting SMEs’ training needs stand out in Brazil: the one run 
by the Brazilian Micro and Small Enterprise Support Service (SEBRAE) and the one from 
the National Industrial Learning Service (SENAI), one of the region’s largest education 
systems for vocational and technology-based training.
SEBRAE is a private non-profit organisation which has been fostering the 
competitiveness and sustainable development of SMEs since 1972 through programmes 
that promote training, co-operation, regional development and access to markets. It 
develops these programmes in collaboration with the public and private sectors. The 
institution has a network of nearly 700 in-person service centres throughout the country 
and increasingly invests in developing new channels and formats for communication, 
transmission and dissemination of knowledge through ICTs, which are accessible to 
smaller businesses and facilitate training via distance learning (SEBRAE, 2012).  
Founded in 1942 on the initiative of the production sector, SENAI embodies the so-
called “Industry System” and has 797 operating units, supporting 28 industrial areas. 
Training human resources and providing technical and technological services are their 
main activities, which aim to serve more than 2.3 million workers a year. SENAI has 
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federal directorates and regional offices spread over 26 states, to meet the professional 
and local development needs of these territories (SENAI, 2012).  
Brazil has two large systems for training in SMEs: SEBRAE, 
which offers in-person training as well as distance learning, and 
SENAI, one of the region’s largest institutions for vocational and 
technology training.
Besides its impressive scope, SENAI’s operations stand out in the region thanks to 
various experiences, but particularly two: creating and implementing sectoral technical 
committees for dialogue among workers, managers and trainers; and creating a long-
term planning model for training (Box 5.2), through which it works with the sectoral 
committees to identify future training needs and meet this demand. Given its success, 
this system is spreading to other countries in the region. 
Box 5.2. SENAI’s long-term planning model for training
SENAI’s long-term planning model was developed in co-operation with Brazil’s main 
universities to answer this question: “How many workers should be trained in the future 
and what qualifications should they have?” in order to reduce potential imbalances 
between the supply and demand of training. 
This model makes it possible to estimate how quickly various emerging technologies will 
spread and likely organisational structures in the short term, and to generate estimates of 
the demand for workers every five years. Based on these estimates regarding technology, 
organisation, jobs and education, subsidies are issued to develop proactive measures in 
the areas of vocational education, technical services and technology services (Martins, 
2008). 
The analysis that this method produces takes into account: 
Emerging technologies most likely to catch on in the next five and ten years in a given 
sector or segment of Brazilian industry.
Organisational trends most likely to occur in the next five and ten years in a given sector 
or segment of industry.
Educational trends regarding changes in skills among SENAI’s target public and 
identifying education gaps in that same public.
Occupational trends in the sector’s job market over the next five years, in light of the 
spread of emerging technologies.
Occupational impacts that may be caused by the spread of emerging technologies and 
consolidation of organisational trends.
The earlier stages are correlated and contextualised to generate recommendations, in a 
moment known as a “thematic antenna”. This planning method has been used to analyse 
and make recommendations to numerous industries, including textiles, petrochemical, 
machinery and equipment, telecommunications, construction (building), footwear, food 
(meats), foundries, shipbuilding and repairs, and industrial automation.  
Source: Caruso (2011).
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Sectoral technical committees hold sector-specific consultative forums for discussion 
of issues around education and work. The participants in these events are professionals 
and experts from within and outside SENAI whose practical and theoretical knowledge 
helps inform the decisions that are made about professional-education activities. The 
main functions of these committees are to: i) define skills-based professional profiles, 
including performance assessment parameters; ii) update these profiles on an ongoing 
basis; and iii) provide input for the development of professional certification standards 
(Martins, 2008).
Chile: SENCE’s experience with the tax exemption programme
The Tax Exemption Programme implemented by SENCE consists of a tax deduction 
for businesses that plan, design and execute training programmes for their workers. 
This tax deduction is capped at 1% of taxable payroll for the year, or for the month in 
the case of SMEs. Through this tax exemption, businesses can use three mechanisms to 
train their staff: i) direct training, in which the business organises and develops its own 
training processes for its workers; ii) hiring specialised staff; and iii) education through 
technical training agencies (“OTECs” in Spanish), which are institutions authorised by 
SENCE to provide training services (professional institutes, private institutions, technical 
training centres and some universities).
The third approach is the most widely used. This involves technical-training 
intermediary agencies (“OTICs” in Spanish), which are recognised by SENCE and provide 
consulting services and technical support to businesses. Grouped by sector or region, 
these agencies do not provide courses directly but administer training resources that 
businesses give them in order to develop, organise and oversee training and technical-
assistance programmes for the development of human resources. (Poblete, 2004).
Although technical agencies are the most common source of such 
training in Chile, they are little used by SMEs.
It has been clear for years that SMEs rarely use this instrument and that it is unable 
to generate training options in areas that would require major investment by PTIs 
(industrial technology and processes, for example).6 The attempts at correcting this 
situation in Chile have yielded no relevant results, basically because there was no change 
in the underlying logic that gives the market the role of connecting businesses’ training 
demand to the available supply (Dini and Stumpo 2002; Belmar and Maggi, 2010). 
Colombia: support for starting up SMEs and improving business management
The National Learning Service (SENA) fosters the strengthening of SMEs through 
its training, modernisation and technical-consulting programmes, which include both 
in-person and virtual vocational training. Its SME strengthening programme provides 
support to improve their business-management indicators related to ICTs, logistics and 
human-talent management. Another form of assistance to SMEs is through the national 
government’s Entrepreneurship Fund, administered by SENA. This fund is intended to 
facilitate business start-up resulting from groupings of apprentices, interns and recently 
graduated professionals. It prioritises projects targeting the rural sector, especially those 
that are part of the Young Rural Entrepreneurs Programme. 
154 LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
5. HUMAN CApITAL AND sKILLs fOR sMEs
Mexico: support for strengthening SMEs’ capabilities based on the type of business and 
the certification of competencies (CONOCER)
The training and consulting programmes of the Undersecretariat for SMEs (SPYME) 
in Mexico were structured based on the type of business (entrepreneurs, micro-
enterprises, SMEs, “gazelle companies” and “market-driving companies”).7 This is a 
distinctive feature of this policy towards SMEs, in which the beneficiaries are segmented 
based on their current phase of growth. 
SPYME has the Support Fund for Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(SME Fund), an instrument that grants temporary aid to programmes and projects 
that encourage the creation, development, consolidation, viability, productivity, 
competitiveness and sustainability of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. 
One of its areas of activity is training and/or consulting, through seminars, workshops, 
certificate programmes and specialised courses for SMEs, which help bolster management 
skills and foster an increase in productivity and competitiveness, and improving the 
businesses’ organisation.
Also notable in Mexico is the structuring of a national skills certification system, 
co-ordinated by the Job Skills Standardisation and Certification Council (CONOCER), an 
agency affiliated with the Secretariat of Public Education and Secretariat of Labour and 
Welfare, with a three-part structure including representatives of the government (from 
the areas of agriculture, finance, education, the treasury, and labour, among others), 
business managers and workers. CONOCER organises the Skills-Based Management 
Committees, represented by business managers and workers, which, with support 
from technical groups, develop the competency standards applicable to their respective 
sectors. Once these standards are defined they are recorded in the National Register of 
Competency Standards.  
The competency standards serve as inputs for developing training curricula (in 
greater alignment with the requirements of the production sector, society, government, 
and the education system) and are also used as criteria in assessing and certifying 
various organisations and institutions. Only agencies accredited by CONOCER to train, 
assess and/or certify these labour competencies can do so based on the standards 
documented in the National Registry (“Certification and Assessment Agencies”). 
Peru: small-business service centres
The National Industrial Training Service (SENATI) was founded in 1961 on the 
initiative of the production sector to develop professional skills needed for successful 
performance in industrial manufacturing and jobs related to installation, repairs and 
maintenance. To fund it, they agreed to a monthly financial contribution or self-imposed 
tax. This is a privately managed public agency, devoted to vocational training and the 
development of technical services. Business managers take part in the decision making, 
planning and development of the vocational training, which focuses on specific job 
skills. 
SENATI offers specialised training at different levels (technical and vocational) in the 
following areas: business administration, agribusiness, graphic arts, communications, 
electrical engineering, travel and tourism, food industry, information technology, 
jewellery, goldsmithing and silversmithing, car repair, metallurgy, textile/fashion, and 
woodworking.
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To meet SMEs’ needs, the agency has Small-Business Service Centres (CENTROPYMEs), 
which seek to boost productivity, the quality of products and innovation, and access to 
new technologies in smaller businesses. The centres offer business diagnostics, training, 
consulting, information and technical assistance, and have consultants to address 
different areas of production related to clothing and fashion, metallurgy, business 
management, processing of food, carpentry and environmental management.
Towards a human-capital training strategy for SMEs: 
conclusions and public-policy recommendations
SMEs in Latin America face major challenges related to the shortage of human capital 
and job skills, which affect the sector’s productivity. The challenges the region has 
traditionally confronted in terms of availability and quality of education are exacerbated 
by the challenges of globalisation and technological change with new training demands 
that the education system and job training system must respond to. Further progress is 
needed in developing institutional capabilities and in designing and applying policies to 
satisfactorily meet SMEs’ various demands for competencies. 
Strengthening the institutional framework among managers, 
workers and trainers to advance a shared definition of 
qualifications that promote co-ordination with job skills, 
the development of mechanisms to anticipate demand for 
competencies, and promotion of classroom training and workplace 
training are some of the policies that can have a relevant impact.
A description of some of the fields where public policy in the region can have a 
relevant impact follows. 
1) Developing the link between the education system and the job market, between 
supply of training and the demands of the production sector. Progress can be made in 
several directions:
•	 Strengthening the institutional framework to foster dialogue between managers, 
workers and trainers; and opening a steadier flow of communication, to help 
understand the nature of the supply and demand. Countries such as Finland, for 
instance, have developed an interesting system of dialogue between labour and 
management, which leads to jointly defined qualifications and fosters consistency 
between the available skills and employers’ needs.
•	 Developing mechanisms to anticipate the market’s demand for competencies. 
Brazil’s SENAI long-term planning model is a good point of reference. 
Other Latin American examples that aim to strengthen co-ordination between 
the education system and the production sector include Mexico’s CONOCER, while 
on the sectoral level there are the Sectoral Certification Councils sponsored by 
Argentina’s Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, Brazil’s SENAI 
Sectoral Technical Committees, and Colombia’s SENA Sectoral Committees.
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Besides more traditional training, it is important for the training 
curriculum to include so-called “soft skills” and give greater 
relevance to generic competencies applicable to different work 
environments.
2) Promoting training paths that combine classroom sessions with workplace 
training, and which continue throughout the worker’s adult life. The two-prong model 
of vocational training in Germany is perhaps the most representative example of this 
strategy, which combines training in companies and learning centres, and enjoys a high 
participation rate among the workforce, besides being well regarded in German society. 
3) Reforming the technical- and vocational-training curriculum to include “soft 
skills” and give greater weight to generic competencies. This helps resolve some 
of the main training gaps identified in the region and which are demanded by the 
production sector. It also fosters the workforce’s ability to adapt to changing professional 
requirements and boosts the employability of the workforce throughout their adult lives. 
4) Make progress in establishing credible benchmarks to suitably define assessment 
scores and their relationship with the various education levels, whether resulting 
from formal education, vocational training, practical experience or some combination 
of these. A certification system would make it possible to validate hands-on training 
and give it the greater recognition and the social prestige it deserves. This is especially 
relevant in Latin America, where young people often drop out of school to work for a 
living, and as a result the recognition of training obtained through informal channels or 
in the workplace is vital for one’s prospects for professional success. A useful approach 
that could be adapted to each country’s needs is the European Qualifications Framework 
for Lifelong Learning (EQF), a fairly advanced scheme for recognising, interpreting and 
converting qualifications among EU countries. To be effective, however, this framework 
requires institutional capabilities and a certain amount of social capital, both within the 
government and among the private and social agents involved.
An essential challenge facing SMEs in Latin America is to 
strengthen the professionalisation of these businesses’ managers 
and senior executives to identify training needs and implement the 
production advantages of worker training.
5) Strengthening and broadening the co-ordination of vocational training with the 
social and regional context, as well as the production and technology environments. 
This is a key way to achieve synergies, foster results and contribute to the specific 
development of comparative advantages. Also, it is an education policy not focused 
exclusively on demand, but also an instrument to help generate a supply of training that 
is high in quality and therefore aligned and co-ordinated with industrial policy. 
6) Promoting professionalisation of small businesses’ managers and senior 
executives, a central challenge that is very important in order to properly grasp the 
existing qualification problems and boost productivity by making the most of the 
training available to workers. At the same time, managers’ ongoing acquisition of 
specialised knowledge about the specific area or sector they work in is important for 
their development. A notable case is SENA’s SME Strengthening Programme in Colombia, 
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which promotes training initiatives to improve business management with emphasis on 
ICTs, logistics and human-talent management. 
7) Establishing and/or strengthening institutions and the incentive programmes to 
encourage SMEs to provide in-house training for workers and have greater participation 
in externally provided training programmes. More progress could be made in creating 
networks of SMEs to activate synergies and take advantage of economies of scale, 
instituting frameworks of tax incentives for training, and using ICTs in training. 
8) Improving information and broadening the basis for empirical proof of job 
skills to get a more accurate diagnosis of the region’s training challenges and how well 
aligned its education systems are with the needs of the production sector. This favours 
a more efficient, sustained and focused design for public policy in this field. Initiatives 
such as the OECD’s PIAAC can represent a chance to improve this diagnosis and make 
international comparisons. 
9) Putting in place assessment mechanisms and programmes to evaluate the 
impact of the policies applied and appropriate use of the invested resources. This will 
focus policies on quality assurance, guaranteeing compliance with the established goals 
and continual improvement of the policies’ design and application.
It is important to move forward in establishing credible 
benchmarks that make it possible to suitably define qualifications 
and foster recognition of practical training. Additionally, 
strengthening the institutions and the programmes by providing 
incentives for SMEs to conduct in-house training and co-operation 
among themselves can be very useful.
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Notes
1. Estimates based on data from ECLAC, ECLACSTAT, 2012. 
2. Estimates obtained from data of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2012.
3. An interesting example of working to promote the use of ICTs in SMEs’ training is the Guía metodológica 
para diseñar estrategias de capacitación basada en TIC para mipyme (A Methodological Guide to Designing ICT-
Based Training Strategies for MSMEs), prepared by ILO/CINTERFOR in co-operation with institutions in 
various countries in the region. 
4. Such training agencies are found in Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Uruguay.
5. SENA and INFOTEP are public institutions funded mainly through corporate payroll tax.
6. According to SENCE’s annual statistical report (2010), of all the large enterprises and SMEs that took 
advantage of the tax exemption in 2010, the economic sector that provided the most training to its 
employees was retail and wholesale; followed by property, business administration and leasing 
activities; and then non-metal manufacturing. These three sectors account for about 43.5% of the 
participants trained in 2010 who were claimed under the tax-credit programme, and the most requested 
type of training was in business administration.
7. See Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 
six 
Production linkages, clusters and global value 
chains: seeking answers for sMEs 
Bridging the gap in SMEs’ production and exports in the region justifies 
the need to implement efficient production linkage policies based 
on instruments to promote business co-operation and institutional 
collaboration in order to improve businesses’ competitive performance 
and create a dynamic, innovative business environment. There is 
a whole range of partnership projects in Latin America, aimed at 
promoting clusters, business networks and regional programmes, 
as well as SMEs’ participation in global value chains. However, these 
projects have been based on approaches and instruments whose 
operational modes of action are not always consistent with the goals 
being pursued.
For production linkage policies to have more impact it is essential for 
them to be part of countries’ national development policies. These 
strategies being broader and more long-range, provide clear signals 
to enhance the efforts of companies, link them with sector priorities, 
and seek greater co-ordination between public instruments and 
an environment of dialogue and consensus with private support 
initiatives. When there are scattered development initiatives in a weak 
institutional context with a lack of priorities for industrial policy and 
for selecting production chains and sectors, there is less chance for 
complementarity, co-ordination of support and institutional learning 
that are required in promoting this type of action from the public 
sector with co-operation from the private sector.
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introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are part of a heterogenous universe of 
extremely diverse economic agents, whose characteristics vary depending on the business 
sector they operate in, the markets they serve, the products they produce and how involved 
and connected they are with the macroeconomic context and support institutions. 
In the past two decades, the governments of different Latin American countries 
have implemented various support instruments and programmes for SMEs to create a 
favourable business environment, encourage structural change and improve such agents’ 
performance. These initiatives have often focused on reducing levels of informality, 
facilitating financing and access to credit, promoting improvements in management and 
quality, introducing business-development mechanisms and human-resource training, 
and fostering the search for and entry into markets. 
International experience indicates that actions and policies to support SMEs should 
consider various aspects. With specific reference to this segment, important factors 
include bolstering co-operation among businesses and inter-institutional co-operation, 
intended to improve production performance and competitiveness, by stimulating a 
dynamic, innovative business environment. This involves implementing production 
linkage policies to strengthen links and integration among companies in different lines 
of business. Often, SMEs are part of production linkage chains made up of different-
sized companies from different sectors. Embracing this type of production requires a 
comprehensive, systemic policy approach, which can have a large impact if it includes 
elements that make it possible to boost businesses’ productivity and competitiveness 
and consider regional, sectoral and institutional variables that are important to ensuring 
the quality and efficiency of public policy.  
Given these motivations, this chapter will analyse several aspects of production 
linkage policies in Latin America. To do this, it assesses the lag in production and exports 
among SMEs in the region, which justifies the need for efficient production linkage 
policies. It also defines this type of instrument and illustrates its implementation in 
the region. This is followed by a specific analysis of SMEs’ integration into global value 
chains, an example of a more complex associative strategy that has gained relevance in 
the wake of worldwide fragmentation of production. Lastly, it gives a general assessment 
of these types of projects in the region. 
Production context, performance of exports, and sMEs’ 
productivity in Latin America
Though the world economy is tending towards globalisation, the economic system 
consists of a set of very different business activities. While some of this activity is 
integrated into the globalised core of dynamic activities whose meeting place is the 
global market, most of the region’s economic activity takes place in restricted markets 
(local or national) that are not fully integrated or are still on the margins of globalisation.
Latin American SMEs generally have a hard time entering the trade and production 
streams that characterise the globalised economy and most of them participate in local 
or national, rather than supranational, production systems. This is due to the nature of 
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the goods they produce and the types of markets they serve, among other reasons (such 
as management and production capabilities, quality, scale and pricing). 
The greater trade integration of economies is a result of changes in technology, 
industrial organisation and an international division of labour. These have facilitated 
a fast and profound fragmentation of production systems that has made it possible 
for large companies to outsource certain activities, some of which have been assigned 
to smaller firms. Export strategies vary depending on the size of the business (Abel-
Koch, 2011). Most major companies export directly, while SMEs have low participation 
in exports and seek to access foreign markets indirectly, through partnership schemes, 
consortia, sales groups and market operators. 
SMEs in Latin America are less internationalised than those in other regions. 
According to World Bank data, direct and indirect export levels of Latin American SMEs 
are only half of those recorded in Europe and are one-third less than those seen in four 
East Asian countries (Figure 6.1). In short, there are two realities in Latin America: one 
group of companies, comprised mostly of SMEs, that operate on a local, national or 









Figure 6.1. Enterprises that export directly or indirectly,
by size and by region, 2009-10
(as percentages)
Small Medium Large
Note: East Asia includes 4 countries (Philippines, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam),
Europe 12 and Latin America 18. 
Source: based on data from the World Bank (2009-10 Enterprise Surveys).
12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932732956
Latin America Europe East Asia
SMEs in Latin America are less internationalised than those in 
other regions. Direct and indirect export levels of Latin American 
SMEs are only half of those recorded in Europe and are one-third 
less than those seen in four East Asian countries. 
Participation in export markets is related to the productivity gaps between SMEs and 
larger companies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Latin America’s micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises have an average productivity that is respectively 13%, 32% and 43% 
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that of large firms (very low percentages compared to other regions). This is linked to the 
limited participation of the region’s businesses in international markets. According to 
World Bank Enterprise Survey data (2009-10), there is evidence that production growth 
rates are higher in businesses that export directly or indirectly than in businesses that 
exclusively serve the domestic market.  
Overcoming Latin America’s lag in productivity requires differentiated policies, since 
the distinct business categories (globalised and domestic) operate based on a different 
underlying logic. As shown below, this difference between types of businesses justifies a 
broad range of production linkage policies, with considerable differences in their design, 
actions and goals.  
Production linkage: a course of action to improve sMEs’ 
production performance and competitiveness 
This chapter groups together under the heading of production linkages different types 
of collaborative agreements between economic agents designed to increase businesses’ 
competitiveness and the efficiency of support institutions. In general, these are partnership 
programmes that aim to bolster interaction and ties among businesses and institutions. 
In practice, this definition includes a range of experiences, programmes and projects, 
including business networks, production clusters, other clusters, industrial districts, 
supplier development, large market-driving buyer companies, and global value chains.  
Production linkages include several types of collaborative 
agreements between economic agents designed to increase 
businesses’ competitiveness and the efficiency of support 
institutions.
Support programmes based on production linkages have become widespread in 
Latin American countries, especially since the second half of the 1990s. They have 
yielded numerous projects designed and implemented by governments and, less often, 
by the private sector, with support from international organisations that have seen such 
initiatives as a way to improve the effectiveness of SME development projects. This led 
to such pioneering business partnership programmes as the Development Partnership 
Projects (PROFOs) (Chile), business development centres (Argentina, El Salvador), 
outsourcing exchanges (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico), supplier development 
schemes (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), horizontal network programmes (Honduras), 
clusters and production chains (Peru), clusters (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Uruguay) and 
export consortia (El Salvador, Uruguay). These evolved from a scheme to support 
individual businesses to a more complex programme targeting groups of businesses 
(ECLAC, 2007). Some of these programmes were discontinued and new ones continued 
to appear, such as the local production clusters (APLs) in Brazil, production linkages 
and market-driving companies in Mexico, and Micro and Small Business Development 
Centres (CDMYPEs) in El Salvador.  
Fostering production linkages gained acceptance among political and financial 
decision makers due to the need to co-ordinate public policies, complementing them 
with private agents’ greater participation in discussing, designing and executing 
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instruments, as a way to ensure a public-private consensus, a medium- and long-term 
working perspective, and greater coherence of activities. Creating environments for 
co-operation among businesses fosters competitive advantages and externalities that 
help strengthen and drive the modernisation of companies. Amid financial constraints 
that limit the scope of public policy, adding partnership projects to the SME development 
schemes offers a chance to reduce the programmes’ operating costs, since the fixed 
cost of the support activities is spread among more beneficiaries and increases the 
programmes’ efficiency and reach. 
The main instruments used in fostering production linkages in Latin America have 
been: 
•	 subsidies in the form of grants to fund group actions to boost the businesses’ 
competitiveness, as in the case of PROFOs and supplier development (Chile), export 
consortia programmes (Argentina, Uruguay) and programmes led by technology 
funds and agencies (Argentina, Chile);
•	 professional technical assistance to support the creation and launch of partnership 
projects; 
•	 fiscal support through favourable tax conditions associated with the development 
of group projects,
•	 credit through special paths to incorporate or develop shared assets (such as 
effluent treatment plants and joint purchasing of machinery).  
Beyond the differences among the programmes, the resources have had only a 
partial reach, since they only cover part of the expenses and are allocated for a limited 
time. Though most programmes combine more than one instrument, the most common 
ones to promote production linkage mechanisms are subsidies and technical assistance. 
By incorporating findings from academic research and lessons from successful 
international projects, the policies supporting production linkage help overcome 
simplistic viewpoints, contributing innovative elements for analysing, designing 
and implementing actions in different social, institutional, economic and production 
contexts. In many successful projects it has been possible to observe strong links between 
the production side (relationships among companies, division of labour, specialisation) 
and the social and institutional context. In projects carried out in the Italian industrial 
districts and in different regions it became clear that the region can play an important 
role in creating an environment favourable to business development and is a key element 
in creating external effects. The region, seen broadly as more than just the physical and 
administrative space where the businesses operate, is the point of interaction among 
the key players and development agents, where co-operation between businesses occurs 
and the social division of labour is organised. From this perspective, the region is part of 
a historically and socially constructed process. 
In Latin America, production linkage projects should not be considered just for 
technologically advanced regions that have numerous local, domestic or foreign 
industrial companies, that use information and communication technologies, or that 
produce sophisticated products. In less developed areas as well, a strategy based on 
production linkages can help promote development processes that could not get off the 
ground through isolated, individual efforts. 
Though they operate in many different ways, production linkage mechanisms must 
meet certain basic conditions to produce positive results. Such initiatives must occur in a 
clear, predictable business environment, which requires a regulatory framework, a set of 
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standards, and a favourable macroeconomic environment. Production linkages cannot 
resolve contradictions beyond the control of the participating agents (such as distortion 
of the relative prices), but they can be very vulnerable to higher-level decisions beyond 
the scope of their internal governance mechanisms (such as changes in standards and 
regulations). In addition, the basic conditions for better performance and application 
of production linkage mechanisms include: i) incorporating these mechanisms 
into industrial policy and into the national development strategy; ii) operational 
decentralisation of the instruments to broaden the programme’s reach into the various 
regions; and iii) availability of all the agents, especially those in the public sector, to 
implement participatory processes that use consensus to define short-, medium- and 
long-term action plans.  
Production linkage mechanisms are operational solutions to 
weaknesses and shortfalls in production, competitiveness and 
development that individual companies often are not in a position 
to confront on their own. 
Production linkage mechanisms are operational solutions to weaknesses and 
shortfalls in production, competitiveness and development that individual companies 
often are not in a position to confront on their own. They should not be conceived as 
free-standing, self-contained tools, since they also need to seek and generate responses 
in the environment of the production cluster itself. In a context like the current one, the 
goal is to promote programmes of co-operation, co-ordination and linkage of efforts and 
resources that must also develop and rebuild links outside the production cluster as a 
source of information, technologies, markets, human resources, and so on. Though one 
of its goals is to create and strengthen internal capabilities and thus develop collective 
functions such as collective learning, its potential will be determined by successful 
competition with the outside world (i.e. outside the production cluster) and in other 
markets. 
The main goals of partnership programmes in support of SMEs focus on seeking 
and developing processes to exchange and complement resources, knowledge and skills, 
while building a foundation of trust that facilitates contact and dialogue among the 
agents. The projects in this region face similar challenges associated with establishing 
processes for change and with introducing new practices that involve eliminating 
existing routines and behaviours and generating intangible capital for collaborative 
work (Dini et al., 2007; Ferraro, 2010). Evidence shows that the different projects have 
very similar goals and difficulties (Box 6.1). In Latin America we can identify three basic 
approaches: networks, clusters and regional development programmes.
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Box 6.1. Successful linkage projects in the region
The results of more than a dozen production linkage projects were analysed as a way 
to use partnerships and other types of co-operation to improve the competitiveness of 
SMEs operating in various business sectors in ten Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru and Uruguay). The analysis indicates that these projects produced results in two 
areas relevant to policy design: promoting innovation and improving access to more 
demanding markets. 
These experiences have differing traits depending on the business sectors they target, 
which range from primary production (goat product linkages in Córdoba, Argentina, and 
Isabella grapes in the Cauca Valley, Colombia), agro-industrial linkages (dairy products 
in Nicaragua and agro-businesses in Guatemala), traditional manufacturing sectors 
(fashions and furniture in Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador), mines and 
quarrying (Brazil), tanneries (Mexico) and crafts (Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), 
to information and communication technologies (Argentina).
The results show the ability of partnership projects to meet qualitative and quantitative 
goals. Results were achieved in innovation of products and processes, creation of new 
functions in the production chains and even institutional innovation and new examples 
of co-ordination. Regarding access to markets, the projects generated economies of scale 
and of scope by giving small producers new abilities to market and sell, which lets them 
formalise relationships with their clients and intermediaries and gain access to more 
demanding markets. All these abilities have important positive external effects on SMEs’ 
production.
The analysis of this group of projects shows two other interesting results. The first is to do 
with the initiatives’ sustainability, meaning the strategies adopted to extend the activities 
past the end of each project’s operation. These results vary depending on the projects’ 
strategic focus (networks, clusters or regional development). Generally, the time needed 
to ensure a project’s sustainability is longer than four years. This leads to the second, more 
conceptual result, which helped identify three types of actions in the different projects 
that can be grouped into three categories: networks (collective actions by businesses), 
clusters (collective actions by businesses in the same production sector, which involve 
support institutions) and regional development programmes (collective actions among 
different agents, businesses, and public and private institutions, focused on the region). 
Depending on the emphasis of each type of action, the results vary in their maturation 
time, agents involved, governance mechanisms, suitability of results, and generation of 
external effects. These differences in the types of results are worth bearing in mind 
when designing and implementing policies, and when formulating a comprehensive 
production-development strategy that gives complementary consideration to the three 
types of actions to foster the businesses’ competitiveness through integrated production.
Source: Dini et al. (2007); Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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Business-network development strategies 
A network is a set of independent businesses that work together on projects to achieve 
shared goals they could not achieve by working alone. When generating and bolstering 
business networks, the main protagonists are groups of businesses in the same industry 
(or related industries), possibly in the same geographic area. The businesses associate 
in a relatively formal manner to achieve a shared goal. Notable examples analysed in 
the region include the tannery and ceramics SME networks in Guanajuato, Mexico, the 
fashion networks in Gamarra, Peru, the craft networks in Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua, and the furniture and fashion networks in the Dominican Republic (Dini et 
al., 2007). Other examples of networks are the supplier-development programmes, in 
which larger private companies promote linkage projects with their network of suppliers 
to improve particular aspects of the production chain. These initiatives can be part of 
public policy facilitated by development instruments or can be implemented separately 
using private resources. Since these are links between large companies and SMEs the 
relationships are not symmetrical, and hierarchical criteria dominate the governance of 
such networks. 
The most common joint activities are: 
•	 buying consumables to cut costs or improve the terms with the suppliers (delivery 
terms, variety, quality, payment methods, etc.); 
•	 hiring consulting firms to access knowledge that the businesses could not afford 
on their own; 
•	 joint sale of products to achieve economies of scale and access high-volume 
markets (such as supermarkets or exports), or sale of complementary products to 
achieve economies of scope; 
•	 shared use of costly, highly productive facilities and equipment that can be paid 
for and, above all, used efficiently by groups of small and especially medium-sized 
enterprises. 
This type of collective action has certain distinctive features. First, membership in a 
business network is defined by the rules set by the members themselves. Second, these 
organisations’ joint activities are designed and performed to give a competitive edge 
solely to the businesses that the membership rules recognise as part of the network. 
The networks’ management mechanisms are the responsibility of the beneficiary 
businesses or their representatives. Once an agreement is reached to establish joint 
actions, these can be one-off or recurring, which means the agreements will have 
different time frames depending on their nature and traits. However, assembling and 
developing networks is a medium-term process, given the time needed to build trust 
among the parties.  
The analysis of successful production clusters highlights 
externalities as well as the collaborative relationships among 
agents in the cluster to confront on their own. 
The networks tend to be small, with few members. Having too many members can 
produce a disproportionate rise in transaction costs that the businesses must bear in 
building trust and managing joint actions. Nonetheless, relatively large groups can 
always exist, especially in the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors. 
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The literature about clusters and production linkages shows there are location 
advantages that yield benefits generated outside the companies but within the industry, 
business sector or location (Marshall, 1920). These external effects are static advantages 
important to the growth of the production cluster, but are not enough to overcome 
changes in the product market and factor market. The analysis of successful production 
clusters that were able to react to and confront challenges and compete in both domestic 
and international markets highlights another aspect that complements the external 
effects: the network of collaborative relationships among agents in the cluster. These 
relationships are established through intentionally sought joint actions. There are two 
types of joint actions: i) co-operation among individual businesses; and ii) groups of 
businesses joining together to create business associations (Schmitz, 1995). When the 
production sector includes both elements (externalities and joint action) we can talk 
about collective efficiency. This helps explain how companies in business clusters gain 
greater efficiency and capabilities to improve competitiveness. 
Strategies aimed at promoting the competitiveness of production clusters 
Though there is no one definition of the cluster concept, we can find broad consensus 
in a basic meaning describing it as a set of specialised businesses in one sector, or in 
related fields of production, including the institutions that interact with these businesses 
and affect their competitive performance. In this region it is possible to analyse some 
examples of clusters in the fashion sector in Atuntaqui, Ecuador; metallurgy in Rafaela, 
Argentina; underwear in Nova Friburgo, Brazil; furniture in Bento Gonçalves and Uba, 
Brazil; dairy products in Chontales, Nicaragua; and aerospace in Queretaro, Mexico.  
In general, attempts to develop clusters’ competitiveness reveal problems shared by 
all businesses in the sector or in the production chain. The joint actions they undertake 
have significant external effects and may be related, for instance, to generating 
specialised technology services, setting up testing or measurement laboratories, 
creating specialised training centres, applied research, establishing product standards 
and promoting a particular product typical of the cluster. So the point is to promote 
actions that seek to foster collective-efficiency mechanisms. 
The beneficiaries of these actions are all the businesses and institutions that belong 
to the cluster, without distinctions. It is important to stress that the promoters of the 
initiative do not get to choose who is and is not a member; membership is determined 
by the agents’ location and type of business. In other words, if a business or institution 
is located or works in areas related to the cluster’s activities, it is part of that cluster 
and would benefit from the actions to support this type of partnership programme. 
These initiatives are driven by collective entities, with participation by public and 
private agents, generally related to the cluster’s main business sector. The results are 
not accessible individually and generally are achieved beyond the short term.  
The main limitation of the cluster approach as a policy instrument is that the 
region’s production systems have only some partial cluster-like traits, with embryonic 
relationships among agents or in less developed production contexts in which production 
linkages, to succeed, must extend into regional development actions. This opens the 
door to regional actions and programmes.
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Programmes incorporating competitive aspects of the regions (where networks 
and clusters are located) 
Regional programmes are an approach to organising the agents in a community 
which, through a participatory action mechanism, aims to develop a shared strategy 
focused on generating collective goods that bolster the local system’s competitiveness 
and thus improve the quality of life and employment conditions of its inhabitants. A 
regional development programme is defined as all production agents and all institutions 
that belong to a location and participate in its economic development. In this case, unlike 
clusters, the sectoral facet is not most relevant and the essential trait is geographic 
location and adherence to the system of traditions, values and standards that define the 
community. Emphasis is placed on the agents of production, but we must also consider 
the social, cultural and political variables that determine community members’ ability 
to enter into dialogue and act in unity. In some cases the scope of the support extends 
into activities that benefit not just the businesses in a network or cluster but all members 
of a given community (regardless of sector). In these cases, the activities include 
an even greater component of public good and generally have to do with creating or 
strengthening general competitive factors that affect all economic activity in the target 
geographic area.  
For instance, these projects can include land-use planning, development of schools 
and basic-education programmes, building or upgrading basic infrastructure, improving 
administrative procedures and streamlining municipal processes. In these cases, projects 
are carried out with the co-operation of numerous local agents from different branches 
of production and various support institutions. Because such projects are so focused on 
the public good, leadership of these activities tends to fall to public institutions. 
One limitation of the cluster approach as a policy instrument 
is that the region’s production systems have only some partial 
cluster-like traits, with embryonic relationships agents or the 
existence of less-developed production contexts.
Implementing this kind of production linkage mechanism involves focusing on both 
sectoral and local advantages, given that both facets (the production sector and the 
region) are acting in an integrated, interrelated way.  
While some projects only seek to develop business networks, others also focus on 
developing clusters and the regional production system. This leads to major differences, 
both in the project’s design/implementation phase and in the assessment stage, especially 
when it comes to comparing experiences. These differences reflect a complementarity 
between the development processes driven by the various partnership and production 
integration instruments. 
In the design/implementation phase, the development of these divergent 
strategies involves major differences in their co-ordination arrangements, governance 
mechanisms, public-sector and private-sector leadership, corporate commitment, and 
motives of the people promoting the initiatives. In the next stage (assessment), the most 
important differences are maturation times for the results and their sustainability.  
To define this complementarity between strategies based on networks, clusters 
and regional development projects, we must highlight two important issues: i) most 
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initiatives that implemented a cluster development strategy also promoted the forming 
of business networks within them; and ii) measures favouring development of the 
regional production system usually were accompanied by actions to foster production 
networks and clusters (Box 6.1). 
Therefore business networks and the initiatives to develop the competitiveness 
of a cluster or region can help develop differing, complementary competitive factors: 
the networks generate benefits available to a limited number of businesses, while the 
partnership activities promoted by clusters and regional projects aim to produce collective 
benefits for the public. To the degree that the strategies are put into practice, the former 
produce a significant change in the behaviour of the businesses that implemented the 
strategies (generally real, profound changes though limited in scope). The latter, by 
contrast, generate potential benefits for many more companies. In fact, they represent 
a great opportunity for the competitive development of businesses, which only become 
effective when they make real use of these goods, services or actions, building them into 
their competition strategies (Dini et al., 2007). Based on these arguments, a production 
linkage initiative would be more effective if it included strategies implementing all three 
approaches mentioned above.  
In short, the success of production linkage policies depends largely on their ability 
to adapt to their geographic, historical and institutional context. For example, in the 
clusters that characterise production linkage mechanisms there are both formal and 
informal relationships. Sometimes being in the same region makes it easier to upgrade 
human-resource training because the education and labour systems create re-training 
options and learning opportunities. This is a collective competitive edge, based on 
effective interplay of institutions and businesses, which SMEs benefit from in the job 
market. In other cases, development and benefiting from the advantages requires the 
company to take on a more active role or participate directly in building new capabilities. 
Each production environment has its own history and culture, 
and a set of political/institutional conflicts that must be taken into 
account when designing and implementing support activities.
Each production environment has its own history and culture, and a set of political/
institutional conflicts that must be taken into account. Clusters can succeed even in 
the presence of such conflicts. The secret is in channelling them appropriately so the 
collective interactions can yield positive results, and so some intangible assets (such 
as trust, good governance, respect for shared rules and reciprocity of effort) can spread 
progressively.  
Towards an integrated national-policy approach: local production clusters in Brazil  
The policy for local production clusters (APLs) in Brazil is the most important example 
of promoting production linkages in Latin America. APLs are the Brazilian version of 
industrial districts and clusters, adapting those concepts to the country’s culture and 
production conditions, and to the historical and institutional characteristics of the 
various geographic locations and sub-national realities. They are clusters of a region’s 
economic, political and social agents that engage in specific production activities in a 
co-ordinated but independent way. They are characterised by the presence of businesses 
from the same production sector and heavy participation by SMEs. Participants in APLs 
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also include public and private institutions that support production development and 
offer training for human resources, technical assistance and financing for partnership 
activities. APL participants also include suppliers of raw materials, consumables and 
services associated with production.  
The Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) supervised the 
creation of the Permanent Working Group on Local Production Clusters (GTP APL), 
which has the participation of more than 30 public and private institutions that have 
programmes to promote SMEs. This group co-ordinates projects nationwide among 
the various agents associated with the policy to support APLs, identifies their needs 
and provides responses through the existing support instruments or by creating 
revitalisation projects as part of each APL’s strategic-development plan prepared by its 
steering committee.
To further this policy, an initial phase in 2004 identified some 450 local production 
clusters in various types of businesses. The Brazilian Micro and Small Enterprise Support 
Service (SEBRAE), which was involved with more than half of these clusters, developed a 
participation method based on international best practices. Later, another 955 APLs were 
identified, including established projects, incipient projects, and ones with development 
potential. The sectors covered range from farming and livestock to mining, tourism, 
and manufacturing industries, whether traditional and labour or capital-intensive, 
including innovative and technology-intensive sectors. There is thus coverage of a wide 
range of sectors and a great diversity of activities with different degrees of maturity and 
development. 
A critical look at the APL policy shows the problem of the large number of goals being 
pursued through this instrument: reducing social and regional inequality, innovating 
technology, modernising the production base, boosting employment and income, 
cutting the mortality rate of micro and small enterprises, and increasing training, 
competitiveness and production, while bolstering exports. It is hard to analyse the 
results quantitatively since there are no data on these policies’ impact on business, even 
though they have been in operation for some time.  
The MDIC has held five Brazilian APL conferences to analyse the progress of this 
instrument in collaboration with the institutions in the Permanent Working Group 
on APLs. At the last conference, held in Brasilia in 2011, a decision was made to move 
forward in four areas. First, an agreement was reached to promote the regionalisation 
of macro policies and national programmes (Greater Brazil, Brazil Without Poverty, 
and the National Regional Development Policy) and their relationship with state and 
local policies through the APL policy. In a new generation of policy instruments, it is 
necessary to try out mechanisms to align macro policies and co-ordinate them with 
state and municipal policies and with private initiatives at the local level, where the 
needs and opportunities of the production systems manifest themselves. In this context 
it is crucial to try models that take an integrated view of sustainable development 
and adapt actions to each region’s specific traits. This requires classifying situations 
(dynamic, stagnant or weak production systems or systems with heavy investment) to 
apply the most suitable differentiated intervention instruments. 
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Following that up, the goal is to strengthen and increase density in production 
chains. It is necessary to try different mechanisms that take advantage of business 
opportunities presented by major investments or global value chains to achieve a 
sustainable generation of greater local added value, affecting employment, income, the 
use of economies of scale, access to markets, and so on. To design new policy instruments 
one must identify the bottlenecks that hinder fuller participation by other economic 
agents in these value chains to indicate specific solutions. 
Next, it is necessary to promote the public procurement system and its knock-on 
effect in the region. There is an identified need to work with the national and local 
government to encourage micro and small enterprises to participate in public bidding 
processes and the region’s businesses to become more directly involved in providing 
goods and services. To inform the process of defining new policies, a need has been 
identified for public procurement policies and practices to be aligned with the specifics 
of scale; capacity for high-quality provisioning; credit; risk appetite; and liquidity. There 
also need to be limits on the aggregate offerings of small producers, which can lead to 
their exclusion from this market. 
The policy for local production clusters (APLs) in Brazil is the most 
important example of promoting production linkages in Latin 
America. These comprise established projects as well as ones with 
development potential in a broad range of sectors.
Last, collective businesses need to be encouraged. The idea is to take advantage 
of collective activities for production, distribution and sales among private economic 
agents. This involves exchange of knowledge and practices that could improve the firms’ 
competitiveness. To make good use of the advantages and savings these approaches 
enable for Brazilian businesses, different models must be tried which encourage 
collective action and overcome the main initial barriers identified, such as co-ordination 
costs and the lack of density in the network of producers. 
The experience of APLs in Brazil has been rich and diverse. Moreover, the country’s 
varied production sector shows a great ability to design and implement convergent 
policies among different institutions, emphasising the co-ordination of actions to take 
advantage of synergies and generate greater benefits for businesses. These APLs are an 
environment for co-ordinating policies for sectoral production development, technology, 
and support for SMEs. 
Towards greater complexity in associative strategies: 
insertion of partnership approaches into global value chains 
Deepening the trend towards greater globalisation has led to the emergence of 
international systems of integrated production, global production networks and concepts 
such as global value chains (UNCTAD, 2002; Gereffi et al., 2001). Intermediate products and 
services account for 56% of world trade in goods and 73% of world trade in services, which 
shows that finished products are less important in trade flows (Miroudot et al., 2009). 
Though Latin America is not as integrated into international production systems as Asia 
and Europe, there is an observable increase in trade links with Asia and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement zone. These changes in the international production structure 
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are due to quick advances in information and communication technologies, which help 
reduce the costs of co-ordination, logistics and monitoring. Reducing the costs of freight 
and easing restrictions on trade and foreign direct investment have been accompanied by 
bilateral and multinational agreements, regional integration processes and investment 
treaties. These factors help reshape business strategies worldwide among the main 
agents in global value chains: transnational corporations. The resulting segmentation 
of the production process offers the region’s SMEs new opportunities and challenges in 
accessing markets, especially for those operating in limited domestic markets. 
Benefits from integration into global value chains 
Integration into global value chains can lead to a broad range of benefits, such as 
helping diversify exports, creating new jobs and obtaining new technological capabilities 
in keeping with international best practices. Additionally, this integration can offer 
potential benefits in efficiency or productivity, in the following categories (UNIDO, 2004): 
•	 production process efficiency upgrading
•	 product upgrading 
•	 functional upgrading, which involves adding new functions to the chain, with a 
greater added value 
•	 inter-sectoral upgrading, which involves expanding the clusters towards new 
production activities  
Nonetheless, achieving these benefits is not automatically guaranteed. An analysis 
of the advantages and challenges of global value chains from the Latin American 
perspective should consider the size and traits of the participating businesses, the 
type of products and services they produce, and institutional frameworks that regulate 
businesses in the countries, since these factors determine the features and relationships 
essential to their operation.  
The greater complexity of these structures also helps generate greater diversity 
in the benefits to SMEs. Entry into global value chains generally raises the quality 
requirements for participating businesses. In addition, relationships among the agents 
involved are often characterised by a greater level of sophistication. Industrial clusters’ 
entry into global value chains involves a wider range of sources of competitiveness, 
both local and global, thanks to the possibility of simultaneously exploiting horizontal 
relationships within the cluster itself and vertical relationships with other members of 
the value chain. Despite everything, the literature shows that SMEs’ entry into global 
value chains, both individually and through local clusters, does not guarantee higher 
productivity, greater added value or more innovative processes (Humphrey, 2004). 
The importance of governance structure and the global-value-chain sector  
Humphrey and Schmitz’s research on production chains sheds some light on the 
variability with which the benefits described play out (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000 and 
2002). In their analysis, the concept of governance (leadership) is central, since at any 
point in the chain some degree of governance or co-ordination is needed to decide what 
is produced (product design), and how it is produced (process standards, technology, 
quality).  
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The governance relationship within the chain plays a fundamental role in defining 
the SMEs’ ability to access the benefits in question. Based on how hierarchical they are, we 
can group the chains into four categories ranging from ones where there is little control 
by the leader (market relations) to those that are completely hierarchical, in which the 
leading company handles the operations of the chain in house (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2010). Between these extremes are two types of chains notable for their intermediate 
level of hierarchy, which are particularly relevant to production in developing countries. 
First there are the network chains, characterised by mutual dependency among the 
businesses, which tend to facilitate highly co-operative processes involving intensive 
exchange of information. In this case, there are conditions favourable to local businesses 
enhancing their performance, provided they possess at least a moderate level of skills. 
Then there are the quasi-hierarchical chains, emphasising control of the production 
process by the chain leader, sometimes as a result of doubts that may arise about local 
businesses’ ability to embrace the quality standard that the chain requires. Participation 
in quasi-hierarchical chains also offers favourable conditions for local companies to 
successfully upgrade their process and product, but considerably complicates functional 
upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000). In both cases, there is a conspicuous 
similarity to local and national production linkage projects, but in a more demanding, 
sophisticated context. 
In research about production chains, the concept of governance 
(leadership) is central, since at any point in the chain some degree 
of co-ordination is needed to decide what is produced (product 
design) and how (process standards, technology, quality).
Anecdotal evidence offers some clues about the interaction among governance, 
the sector and the benefits to companies. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2006) look at the 
experiences of 35 clusters in the region and shows that the levels of collective efficiency 
and upgrading vary significantly by sector, governance of the chain, and the cluster’s 
learning patterns. In some clusters, such as the salmon cluster in the Austral Zone of 
southern Chile, co-operation between the private sector and public agents (the Chile 
Foundation) has promoted high collective efficiency and product and process upgrades, 
along with functional and inter-sectoral upgrades (all through a collective learning 
process strongly supported by the high demand for salmon). Other cases, such as the 
furniture cluster in Chipilo, Mexico, show that the dominant position of one business 
together with a drop in demand reduced collective efficiency and the opportunity for 
upgrading. Because of this, some sectoral parameters are put in place which provide 
some indication of smaller companies’ prospects for upgrades (OECD, 2013). First, in 
traditional manufacturing sectors that typically have little technological complexity, 
the environment is more favourable for local businesses to acquire knowledge through 
the exchange of tacit knowledge within the cluster. This is considerably less likely in 
industries with greater technology requirements (transport equipment, aeronautics, 
telecommunications and electronics, and so on). Involvement in these sectors requires 
a prior accumulation of knowledge and technologies that generally excludes smaller 
businesses from meaningful participation in these industries’ value chains. Last, 
in sectors related to natural resources, chain leaders can find incentives to foster 
the efficiency of local businesses if, for instance, the resources are geographically 
concentrated. 
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Table 6.1. Selected experiences of clusters integrating in global value chains
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Note: Scale: 0-absent to 3-high.
Source: Pietrobelli, C. et al. (2005).
Reviewing these experiences confirms that the benefits from participating in global 
value chains are not independent of the type of chain and, in particular, its governance 
and sector. Hence the role of public agents can be vital not only to facilitate the inclusion 
of SMEs in chains, but also to attain benefits for participating businesses.  
The role of public agents in SMEs’ entry into global value chains 
Though there is no single recipe for introducing clusters into global value chains, 
it is well known that public agents play a prominent role in creating favourable 
conditions. An example of such initiatives is the software cluster in Mexico City, where 
the Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Education and the University of León 
created specific training programmes for universities and businesses. In addition, 
public agents can promote links among firms by forming business associations or by 
providing services. This is the case with the Chilean salmon cluster, where the Chile 
Foundation bought a fish farm from the foreign private sector and also provided help in 
founding a producers’ association, SalmónChile. It was these initiatives that ultimately 
facilitated the cluster’s development. Public agents can also play a role in strengthening 
businesses’ position within value chains. For example, through supplier-development 
programmes like the ones in Chile and Mexico, governments can increase SMEs’ ability 
177LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2013 © OECD/ECLAC 2012
6. PRODUCTION LINKAgEs, CLUsTERs AND gLObAL vALUE ChAINs: sEEKINg ANswERs fOR sMEs
to boost productivity and increase sales, while creating stable, qualified suppliers for 
large companies (Arráiz et al., 2011). Public agents too can help SMEs by providing them 
with information about external markets and about the chains operating within the 
country. Programmes supporting international certification, such as ISO, also help 
SMEs become part of these structures.  
In most countries in the region, there are instruments to help SMEs enter foreign 
value chains. Some are isolated measures, while others are part of a more comprehensive 
strategy, which includes activities to establish ties with foreign entrepreneurs, consulting 
and market-research services, and lines of finance. The existence of special institutions 
in charge of promoting foreign trade, and even development banks with programmes to 
finance exports, indicates governments’ intention to improve SMEs’ entry into foreign 
markets.  
 
Though there is no single recipe for introducing clusters into global 
value chains, public agents play a prominent role in creating favourable 
conditions; for instance, by promoting links between firms, creating 
business associations, providing services, and in general, promoting 
actions that foster development of the cluster.
However, most of these strategies are incomplete and lack resources. In this context, 
it is also important to consider the diversity of SMEs. Though only a small segment is 
able to enter foreign markets, it is appropriate to implement specific strategies to bolster 
the growth of that group. The strategy should be comprehensive and not only include 
business loans but also technical assistance, and must be co-ordinated with policies 
that promote SMEs’ competitiveness in the local sphere. 
National governments must play an active role in internationalising SMEs, both 
through facilitating and supporting direct exports and through a broader approach to 
internationalisation involving participation in production networks aimed at foreign 
markets. Administrative support for foreign trade is certainly important, but it is not 
enough. Horizontal measures to streamline administrative procedures and upgrade 
transport and logistics systems should be complemented with training and support 
initiatives for SMEs that export and that have the potential to seek market niches 
and opportunities that allow a leap in quality and improvement of productivity and 
competitiveness. The impact of these instruments and programmes is greatest when 
they are part of a country’s strategy for internationalisation within a production-
development policy.  
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Box 6.2. Developing local suppliers in global value chains: the case of BHP Billiton-
CODELCO
A project is currently underway in Chile’s mining industry to insert a national cluster into global 
production chains, in which the benefits to local companies include both internationalisation 
and an upgrade in production. This programme, initially launched by the multinational mining 
company BHP Billiton and later joined by the state-owned company CODELCO (National Copper 
Corporation), aims to develop the productivity and efficiency of local businesses that participate 
in the copper mining sector as suppliers. 
The programme focuses on various segments of Chile’s mining cluster, which includes more 
than 3 000 firms and is located in central and northern Chile. These businesses are notable for 
their diversity: there are large mining companies (including eight multinationals and CODELCO), 
businesses that support the mining companies (machinery, engineering services, transport, 
etc.), which make up a large group of 80 multinationals, and local firms of various sizes.  
The reasons why BHP set up the suppliers programme are related to demand factors in the 
copper market, as well as the functioning of production in the company’s mining operation in the 
Escondida deposit in Chile (the largest copper deposit in the world, with an annual output that 
reached 1 078 million tonnes in 2010, representing 21% of domestic production). Meanwhile, at the 
sectoral level, production costs in Chile’s mining industry have risen steadily since the mid-2000s. 
The suppliers’ programme offers participating local businesses the chance to increase their 
efficiency and competitiveness through technical-training activities about the production 
process, setting targets for improving the quality of products and services, and providing 
consulting services to improve business management. The programme’s ultimate goal is for 
250 suppliers to meet an international quality standard by 2020 and improve competitiveness 
and their prospects for internationalisation.  
Under the categories used in this section, the type of relationship between businesses in 
the mining cluster and the multinational BHP reflects a medium level of hierarchy, typical of 
network chains and quasi-hierarchical chains. BHP is a case that could be defined as a network 
relationship, given the mutual dependence between the leader company and the other members 
of the chain. This dependence is largely determined by the chain’s sectoral nature: since the 
chain is for mines and quarrying, the chain leader has little ability to relocate geographically 
(and thus establish relationships with other businesses), since it needs to operate where the 
natural resource is located.  
The goals of the BHP programme centre on boosting the efficiency of the work the suppliers are 
already doing within the production chain (though in some cases there are also product upgrades). 
Because this value chain is built around a natural resource, with copper as its end product, it 
has a relatively short value chain with limited room for product upgrades or inter-sectoral 
improvements. This is even more important given that the transition from copper to derivative 
products requires competencies and technologies largely unrelated to the ones used in mining. 
Since 2008, 50 BHP Billiton suppliers and 20 CODELCO suppliers have joined. Though it is not 
yet possible to assess the programme’s results, the participating companies’ performance has 
improved noticeably, both in production and in administrative management. Following the 
addition of the Production Development Corporation (CORFO) to the initiative in 2011, it is 
expected to achieve a greater impact on the supply chain, heavier participation by other agents 
and institutions, and greater involvement of public policy, with spillover effects into other 
business activities and production sectors.
Source: Based on interviews with BHP and CODELCO.
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Outcomes and lessons from the experiences in Latin America 
In the last two decades, production linkage initiatives were developed in Latin 
America based on business co-operation and institutional collaboration, to improve 
businesses’ competitive performance and create a dynamic, innovative business 
environment that is more inclusive of SMEs. This has resulted in further experiences 
and a dissemination of innovative instruments in almost every country in the region. 
Production linkage mechanisms provide a generic conceptual framework that aims 
to foster different types of initiatives (such as clusters, business networks, regional 
programmes and global value chains) through partnership instruments focused on 
different goals that seek, among other things, to reduce transaction costs, overcome lack 
of co-ordination among agents, eradicate distrust, and facilitate capacity building and 
internationalisation. The region offers a broad range of experiences whose outcomes 
can be analysed to draw lessons that can be useful for policy makers. 
One major challenge for countries in the region is to go from having individual 
successful projects to implementing effective policies. Doing this requires overcoming 
conceptual doubts and ambiguities by explicitly stating goals in order to ensure greater 
consistency and coherence between the goals pursued and the operational approaches 
used in pursuing them. 
For production linkage policies to have more impact it is essential for them to be part 
of countries’ national development policies, which, being broader and more long-range, 
give clearer indications to make the most of the companies’ efforts, link them with 
sectoral priorities, and seek greater co-ordination between public instruments and an 
environment of dialogue and consensus with private support initiatives. When there are 
scattered initiatives in a weak institutional context with a lack of priorities for industrial 
policy and production chains, there is less chance for complementarity, co-ordination of 
support and institutional learning. 
In terms of creating institutional capabilities, the political context and the 
institutions’ strength and quality influence the continuation of successful projects and 
generating learning. Sometimes, political and institutional changes alter time frames 
and affect the continuity of projects and of the local partner’s technical teams, which 
affects the accumulation of institutional learning. 
Thanks to the support that the local production clusters (APLs) receive in much of 
the country, Brazil is the most important example of institutional development and 
continuity for these types of policies in the region. APLs were formally implemented 
starting in 2004 under the auspices of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign 
Trade, which co-ordinates a network of more than 30 development institutions that are 
part of the Permanent Working Group on APLs.  
In Latin America, the public sector usually plays a major role by promoting this type 
of activity and offering support tools. Public institutions act directly, participating in 
the execution of projects, or indirectly, by adopting an operating model that seeks to 
correct implementation problems by trying to improve the allocation of public funds 
through intermediaries or transfer units. In the three-tiered model (consisting of a 
government agency, intermediary operators and final beneficiaries) the intermediary 
operating agents seek to facilitate the programmes’ management and success by acting 
as a middle party in the distribution of public incentives.  
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One major challenge for countries in the region is to go from having 
individually successful projects to implementing effective measures. For 
production linkage policies to have more impact it is essential for them 
to be part of countries’ national development policies.
The experiences analysed show that incentives of this kind require a fairly long 
maturation period before the benefits become obvious (especially when the intent is to 
change behaviours entrenched in the business culture) (Ferraro, 2010; Dini et al., 2007). 
Actions must be sustained over time and management buy-in must be increased, with 
appropriate institutional oversight and technical assistance.  
It has also been proven that three time frames should be kept in mind when designing 
and implementing production linkage initiatives: i) the political time needed to produce 
agreements between the parties and to design and approve the initiatives; ii) the time 
the projects will last (generally two to three years, or four at most); and iii) the business 
time, which is much shorter given the production and market requirements, and which 
does not necessarily match the previous two.  
The studies cited show that once the subsidy is withdrawn, the initiatives’ 
sustainability is not guaranteed through partners’ income or contributions. Therefore a 
long-term strategic vision is needed that combines short-term results with longer-term 
results and requires broadening the commitment and participation of public and private 
agents. 
It is interesting to note that the production linkage projects have led to a surge 
of new demand for developing technical and vocational skills. This raises important 
public-policy issues. On the one hand, launching production cluster initiatives and 
projects requires access to technical services and professional consulting that have 
not necessarily been developed or may not be available in the market. One important 
result has been the inclusion of scientific research institutions, universities and centres 
of excellence in the offerings of support services. Despite having knowledge and high-
quality infrastructure for the production environment, these support institutions 
often were not properly connected or integrated into production activity for cultural or 
regulatory reasons. This translates into government efforts to stimulate, facilitate and 
expand support infrastructure by incorporating scientific and technological units into 
production linkage programmes. 
Moreover, production linkage policy has had to meet new needs linked to the 
governance and management mechanisms of production clusters, facilitating the hiring 
of managers, facilitators and project developers. This situation reveals the limitations 
of financial resources, which need to be backed up by the development of capabilities 
to manage joint activities that require group decisions to carry out complementary, 
co-ordinated actions. This lack of learning, which is expressed in the shortage of 
specialised human resources, can only be overcome through experimentation as a way 
to add capabilities, which puts new time pressures on production clusters. 
Ultimately, the production linkage policies, programmes and instruments are a 
method of public action with multiple potential effects, because they not only can meet 
the productive and competitive challenges of a group of companies or a sector, but can 
help strengthen various factors related to competitiveness and business development. 
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Though many production clusters achieve targets and positive results as planned, 
they also help generate, as collective intangible by-products, new processes of public-
policy co-ordination and public-private co-operation that define, with different styles, 
speeds and characteristics, new modes of action and interaction in the production and 
institutional sphere. 
To achieve a positive, lasting impact on the circumstances of SMEs, it is important to 
continue moving forward in implementing public policies that address ways to improve 
implementation systems and establish mechanisms for institutional co-ordination 
among the various agencies, implementation levels and action areas of the government 
sector. These development initiatives should be supplemented by fostering private-
sector measures to promote SMEs, aiming to create forums for dialogue and consensus 
to build a support strategy that extends beyond a government’s term of office, giving the 
programmes continuity and generating greater institutional capabilities for performance 
and learning. The prior experiences of production clusters have not been neutral, and 
formal mechanisms of governance and representation may be central to a strategy of 
production linkages. Thus, the varied wealth of experience providing support to SMEs in 
the region could be turned into tangible capital of best practices that advance towards 
more co-ordinated, integrated types of support.  
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